Owner Scorecard


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EDU, NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC.

Education Services asset-light Cyclical

We provide a wide variety of educational programs, services and products.

We deliver our comprehensive educational programs, services and products to students across China through our nationwide physical network of schools, learning centers and bookstores, as well as our pure-play online learning platforms.

We deliver online courses through our online learning platforms, including Koolearn.com, our comprehensive online education platform.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 10 ordinary shares
EDU · NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.9B
+13.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.9B 5-yr avg $3.9B
Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 51%
Operating margin 8.7% 5-yr avg −1.1%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 8.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −32% to 15% — on a steadier 55% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2025
Income statement
$1.5B$1.8B$2.4B$3.1B$3.6B$4.3B$3.1B$3.0B$4.3B$4.9B$4.9BRevenueRevenue
58%58%56%56%56%52%44%53%52%55%55%Gross marginGross mgn
$199M$262M$263M$306M$399M$117M($983M)$190M$350M$428M$428MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.4%14.6%10.7%9.9%11.1%2.7%−31.6%6.3%8.1%8.7%8.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$225M$277M$297M$228M$355M$230M($1.2B)$235M$325M$376M$376MNet incomeNet inc.
14%15%17%27%27%27%22%25%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$524M$623M$781M$806M$804M$1.1B($1.3B)$971M$1.1B$897M$897MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$47M$54M$77M$110M$146M$226M$192M$117M$101M$140M$140MDepreciationDeprec.
$252M$292M$407M$468M$303M$674M($252M)$619M$697M$381M$381MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$64M$106M$214M$269M$310M$429M$151M$143M$249M$242M$242MCapexCapex
4.4%5.9%8.8%8.7%8.6%10.0%4.9%4.8%5.8%4.9%4.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$477M$569M$704M$696M$658M$904M($1.4B)$828M$1.0B$757M$757MOwner earningsOwner earn.
32.3%31.6%28.8%22.5%18.4%21.1%−46.1%27.6%23.7%15.4%15.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$460M$517M$567M$537M$495M$701M($1.4B)$828M$873M$655M$655MFree cash flowFCF
31.1%28.7%23.2%17.3%13.8%16.4%−46.1%27.6%20.2%13.4%13.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$63M$71M$98M$98MDividends paidDiv. paid
$56M$192M$63M$445MBuybacksBuybacks
25%21%22%21%15%3%-30%8%11%15%15%ROICROIC
16%16%15%10%13%5%-33%7%9%10%10%Return on equityROE
12%11%8%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$709M$641M$983M$1.4B$915M$1.6B$1.1B$1.7B$1.4B$1.6B$1.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M$3M$3M$3M$4M$9M$16M$33M$30M$34M$34MReceivablesReceiv.
$27M$32M$40M$29M$31M$31M$28M$53M$93M$81M$81MInventoryInvent.
$21M$24M$40M$34M$33M$38M$22M$70M$106M$80M$80MAccounts payablePayables
$10M$11M$3M($2M)$2M$1M$22M$16M$17M$34M$34MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.9B$2.3B$2.9B$3.5B$3.8B$6.6B$4.5B$4.4B$5.4B$5.2B$5.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$918M$1.2B$1.8B$2.0B$2.5B$3.5B$1.7B$2.3B$3.0B$3.3B$3.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×1.9×1.7×1.7×1.5×1.9×2.6×2.0×1.8×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11M$14M$32M$80M$80M$73M$71M$106M$104M$44M$44MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.9B$4.0B$4.6B$6.6B$10.2B$6.0B$6.4B$7.5B$7.8B$7.8BTotal assetsAssets
$96M$118M$0$0Total debtDebt
($1.3B)($797M)($1.6B)($1.9B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
189.2×86.2×17.4×-242.6×268.8×1175.9×1377.0×1377.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B$1.7B$2.0B$2.4B$2.7B$4.9B$3.7B$3.6B$3.8B$3.7B$3.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.57B1.58B1.59B1.59B1.60B1.65B1.70B1.69B1.67B1.63B1.58BShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.94$1.14$1.54$1.95$2.24$2.59$1.83$1.78$2.58$3.00$3.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.14$0.18$0.19$0.14$0.22$0.14$-0.72$0.14$0.19$0.23$0.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.30$0.36$0.44$0.44$0.41$0.55$-0.84$0.49$0.61$0.46$0.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.29$0.33$0.36$0.34$0.31$0.42$-0.84$0.49$0.52$0.40$0.41Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.04$0.06$0.06Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.04$0.07$0.14$0.17$0.19$0.26$0.09$0.08$0.15$0.15$0.15Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.89$1.06$1.26$1.48$1.71$2.97$2.18$2.14$2.26$2.24$2.32Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.8%/yr+6.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.8%/yr+2.4%/yr
EPS+5.4%/yr+0.7%/yr
Dividends / share+4.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.4%/yr−5.2%/yr
Book value / share+10.8%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
1.6Bpeak FY2022
ROIC
15%low FY2022
Gross margin
55%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$757Mowner earningsvs.$376Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $757M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $140M it takes just to hold its position. It put $102M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $655M.

Reported net income$376M
Owner earnings$757M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$376M$325M$235M($1.2B)$230M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$140M+$101M+$117M+$192M+$226M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$381M+$697M+$619M−$252M+$674M
Cash from operations$897M$1.1B$971M($1.3B)$1.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$140M−$101M−$143M−$151M−$226M
Owner earnings$757M$1.0B$828M($1.4B)$904M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$102M−$149M−$204M
Free cash flow$655M$873M$828M($1.4B)$701M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%24%28%-46%21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $140M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $102M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $428M ÷ interest expense $311K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $1.6B + ST investments $321M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.9B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 3 + DIO 14 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -30%–25%; 15% latest = NOPAT $308M ÷ invested capital $2.0B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -46%–32%; latest $757M = operating cash $897M − maintenance capex $140M
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 22% median across 10 years. It chose to put $102M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $655M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $897M ÷ net income $376M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $544M ÷ Owner Earnings $757M
    What this means

    Of $757M Owner Earnings, $544M (72%) went back to shareholders, $98M dividends, $445M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.73×
    Expanding
    Capex $242M ÷ depreciation $140M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.58×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $1.9B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 9 tagged yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. One year of this record is untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +17%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.20/share (latest year $0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 8% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −31.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our approach combines open-source large language models with our proprietary AI technologies to create intelligent educational tools that enhance the teaching and learning processes.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, May 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.9B
  • Receivables$34M
  • Inventory$81M
  • Other current assets$3.1B
Current liabilities$3.3B
  • Accounts payable$80M
  • Other current liabilities$3.2B
Current ratio1.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.59×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$256M$256M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.2B · 34%
  • Dividends$232M · 4%
  • Buybacks$756M · 12%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.2B · 50%
  • Returned to owners$988M

    19% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $232M as dividends and $756M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $756M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.4%

    The diluted count barely moved (1574M to 1580M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.06/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 23% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained84%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($340M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $286M, so each retained $1 added about 0.84 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?22.3% vs 30.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 30.9% early in the record and 22.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GDDYGoDaddy Inc.$5.0B9.1%15%21%
EDUNEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC.$4.9B55%9.3%15%23%
RBLXRoblox Corporation$4.9B76%-28.8%-247%18%
ZMZoom$4.9B76%11.6%8%33%
CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc.$4.8B74%-9.8%31%
QQnity Electronics Inc.$4.8B46%20.1%7%20%
CVSACovista Inc.$1.8B52%13.2%8%16%
APEIAmerican Public Education Inc.$649M60%7.3%13%9%
Group median60%9.2%8%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “Each ADS represents ten common”; NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. earns about $1.1B on its 23.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $655M on 158M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-05-31; net cash $1.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($242M) runs well above depreciation ($140M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $757M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. (EDU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EDU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EDN its page in the Manual EFXT →

Industry order: ← DAO the Education Services chapter GHC →