Owner Scorecard


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EVGO, EVgo Inc.

Auto Dealers & Services capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are one of the nation's leading public EV fast charging providers.

With more than 1,200 fast charging stations across 47 states, we strategically deploy localized and accessible charging infrastructure by partnering with leading businesses across the U.S., including retailers, grocery stores, restaurants, shopping centers, gas stations, rideshare operators and autonomous vehicle companies.

We prioritize the build out of high-power chargers, a key market segment that is expected to grow faster than the overall EV charging market.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EVGO · EVgo Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$384M
+49.6% YoY · 97% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $418M 5-yr avg $176M
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg −1%
Operating margin −27.2% 5-yr avg −170.7%
ROIC −70%
Owner-earnings margin −26% 5-yr avg −104%
Free cash flow margin −39% 5-yr avg −219%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Charging, retail (35%) and eXtend (30%), with 5 more lines behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −274% through the cycle on a −10% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 99% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Charging, retail at 35%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Charging, retail35%$134M
  • eXtend30%$116M
  • Ancillary13%$49M
  • Charging, commercial9%$35M
  • Charging, OEM7%$26M
  • Network, OEM3%$13M
  • Regulatory Credit Sales3%$10M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$13M$22M$55M$161M$257M$384M$418MRevenueRevenue
−74%−31%−10%6%11%21%20%Gross marginGross mgn
261%320%232%89%55%46%44%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%9%9%4%5%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($58M)($90M)($150M)($153M)($132M)($111M)($114M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−447.8%−404.4%−273.9%−95.3%−51.2%−28.8%−27.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($48M)($6M)($28M)($42M)($44M)($42M)($47M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($20M)($30M)($59M)($37M)($7M)($8M)($33M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$19M$24M$36M$52M$66M$74M$74MDepreciationDeprec.
$8M($59M)($92M)($76M)($51M)($67M)($86M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$19M$65M$200M$159M$95M$117M$132MCapexCapex
148.2%292.6%366.8%98.7%36.9%30.4%31.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($39M)($54M)($95M)($89M)($73M)($82M)($107M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−302.1%−240.9%−173.5%−55.3%−28.4%−21.3%−25.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($39M)($95M)($259M)($196M)($102M)($124M)($165M)Free cash flowFCF
−302.1%−425.9%−474.5%−121.7%−39.7%−32.4%−39.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
Balance sheet
$8M$485M$246M$209M$117M$151M$150MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2M$3M$11M$35M$46M$39M$33MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$3M$9M$10M$13M$8M$14MAccounts payablePayables
($834K)($387K)$2M$25M$33M$31M$19MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$20M$506M$275M$267M$205M$296M$239MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$64M$47M$87M$89M$111M$135M$116MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.3×10.8×3.2×3.0×1.8×2.2×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$22M$31M$31M$31M$31M$31M$31MGoodwillGoodwill
$182M$746M$730M$807M$804M$965M$920MTotal assetsAssets
$0$206M$212MTotal debtDebt
($117M)$55M$61MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-7119.2×-1802.3×-18.0×-13.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$89M($1.4B)($358M)($161M)($256M)($117M)$39MShareholders’ equityEquity
7.1%49.3%45.9%18.5%8.6%7.1%6.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
68.0M68.5M90.6M107M133M138MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.33$0.80$1.78$2.41$2.88$3.03Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.09$-0.40$-0.47$-0.42$-0.31$-0.34EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.79$-1.38$-0.98$-0.68$-0.61$-0.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.39$-3.78$-2.16$-0.96$-0.93$-1.20Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.96$2.92$1.75$0.89$0.87$0.96Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-19.97$-5.23$-1.77$-2.40$-0.88$0.28Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+72.3%/yr (4-yr)+72.3%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share−2.2%/yr (4-yr)−2.2%/yr (4-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Regulatory Credit Sales+13.4%
    “Regulatory credit sales for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased $1.2 million, or 13%, to $10.2 million compared to $9.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was due to growing throughput, primarily in California, resulting in additional credit generation and sales, partially offset by a decrease in market prices.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
133Mpeak FY2025
Gross margin
21%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($82M)owner earningsvs.($42M)net incomelow FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($82M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $74M it takes just to hold its position. It put $43M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($124M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($42M)($44M)($42M)($28M)($6M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$74M+$66M+$52M+$36M+$24M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$27M+$22M+$30M+$25M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$67M−$51M−$76M−$92M−$59M
Cash from operations($8M)($7M)($37M)($59M)($30M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$74M−$66M−$52M−$36M−$24M
Owner earnings($82M)($73M)($89M)($95M)($54M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$43M−$29M−$107M−$164M−$41M
Free cash flow($124M)($102M)($196M)($259M)($95M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-21%-28%-55%-174%-241%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $74M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $43M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer ($109M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“For further discussion of our internal control over financial reporting and a description of the identified material weaknesses, see Part II, Item 9A, " Controls and Procedures " in this Annual Report.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($111M) ÷ interest expense $6M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $151M − debt $206M
    What this means

    Netting $151M of cash and short-term investments against $206M of debt leaves $55M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 37 + DIO 0 − DPO 9 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($61M) = debt $206M + equity ($117M) − cash
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range -302%–-21%; latest ($82M) = operating cash ($8M) − maintenance capex $74M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -21% of revenue this year, a -174% median across 6 years. It chose to put $43M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($124M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves ($109M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($42M) · cash from operations ($8M)

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.58×
    Expanding
    Capex $117M ÷ depreciation $74M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $384M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.19×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $206M vs $161M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.25/share (latest year $-0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −375% → −58% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −375% early to −58% lately, median −274% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Worst year 2020 · −447.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our use of artificial intelligence technologies, including generative AI, may expose us to operational, regulatory, and competitive risks.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$239M
  • Cash & short-term investments$150M
  • Receivables$33M
  • Other current assets$56M
Current liabilities$116M
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$14M
  • Other current liabilities$99M
Current ratio2.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.07×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$124Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $150M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+45.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($24M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($328M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$322M$111M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$94Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$27M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RRyder System$12.7B77%8.0%6%4%
DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc.$1.9B11.4%5%9%
MNROMonro Inc.$1.2B6.9%8%9%
MCWMister Car Wash$1.1B19.0%8%16%
UHALU-Haul Holding$761M96%39.3%8%-29%
EVGOEVgo Inc.$384M-2%-184.6%-114%
Group median77%9.7%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

EVgo Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered106%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−39%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EVgo Inc. (EVGO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EVGO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EVER its page in the Manual EVH →

Industry order: ← DRVN the Auto Dealers & Services chapter GPI →