← All companies ← EVER Manual EVH → ← DRVN Auto Dealers & Services GPI →
EVGO, EVgo Inc.
We are one of the nation's leading public EV fast charging providers.
With more than 1,200 fast charging stations across 47 states, we strategically deploy localized and accessible charging infrastructure by partnering with leading businesses across the U.S., including retailers, grocery stores, restaurants, shopping centers, gas stations, rideshare operators and autonomous vehicle companies.
We prioritize the build out of high-power chargers, a key market segment that is expected to grow faster than the overall EV charging market.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Charging, retail (35%) and eXtend (30%), with 5 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −274% through the cycle on a −10% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 99% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Charging, retail at 35%.
- Charging, retail35%$134M
- eXtend30%$116M
- Ancillary13%$49M
- Charging, commercial9%$35M
- Charging, OEM7%$26M
- Network, OEM3%$13M
- Regulatory Credit Sales3%$10M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $13M | $22M | $55M | $161M | $257M | $384M | $418M | RevenueRevenue |
| −74% | −31% | −10% | 6% | 11% | 21% | 20% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 261% | 320% | 232% | 89% | 55% | 46% | 44% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 9% | 9% | 4% | 5% | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($58M) | ($90M) | ($150M) | ($153M) | ($132M) | ($111M) | ($114M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −447.8% | −404.4% | −273.9% | −95.3% | −51.2% | −28.8% | −27.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($48M) | ($6M) | ($28M) | ($42M) | ($44M) | ($42M) | ($47M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($20M) | ($30M) | ($59M) | ($37M) | ($7M) | ($8M) | ($33M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $19M | $24M | $36M | $52M | $66M | $74M | $74M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $8M | ($59M) | ($92M) | ($76M) | ($51M) | ($67M) | ($86M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $19M | $65M | $200M | $159M | $95M | $117M | $132M | CapexCapex |
| 148.2% | 292.6% | 366.8% | 98.7% | 36.9% | 30.4% | 31.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($39M) | ($54M) | ($95M) | ($89M) | ($73M) | ($82M) | ($107M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −302.1% | −240.9% | −173.5% | −55.3% | −28.4% | −21.3% | −25.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($39M) | ($95M) | ($259M) | ($196M) | ($102M) | ($124M) | ($165M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −302.1% | −425.9% | −474.5% | −121.7% | −39.7% | −32.4% | −39.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $8M | $485M | $246M | $209M | $117M | $151M | $150M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2M | $3M | $11M | $35M | $46M | $39M | $33M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $3M | $9M | $10M | $13M | $8M | $14M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($834K) | ($387K) | $2M | $25M | $33M | $31M | $19M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $20M | $506M | $275M | $267M | $205M | $296M | $239M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $64M | $47M | $87M | $89M | $111M | $135M | $116M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.3× | 10.8× | 3.2× | 3.0× | 1.8× | 2.2× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $22M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $182M | $746M | $730M | $807M | $804M | $965M | $920M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $206M | $212M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | ($117M) | $55M | $61M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | -7119.2× | — | -1802.3× | -18.0× | -13.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $89M | ($1.4B) | ($358M) | ($161M) | ($256M) | ($117M) | $39M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.1% | 49.3% | 45.9% | 18.5% | 8.6% | 7.1% | 6.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| — | 68.0M | 68.5M | 90.6M | 107M | 133M | 138M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $0.33 | $0.80 | $1.78 | $2.41 | $2.88 | $3.03 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | $-0.09 | $-0.40 | $-0.47 | $-0.42 | $-0.31 | $-0.34 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $-0.79 | $-1.38 | $-0.98 | $-0.68 | $-0.61 | $-0.77 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $-1.39 | $-3.78 | $-2.16 | $-0.96 | $-0.93 | $-1.20 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $0.96 | $2.92 | $1.75 | $0.89 | $0.87 | $0.96 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | $-19.97 | $-5.23 | $-1.77 | $-2.40 | $-0.88 | $0.28 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +72.3%/yr (4-yr) | +72.3%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −2.2%/yr (4-yr) | −2.2%/yr (4-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Regulatory Credit Sales+13.4%
“Regulatory credit sales for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased $1.2 million, or 13%, to $10.2 million compared to $9.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was due to growing throughput, primarily in California, resulting in additional credit generation and sales, partially offset by a decrease in market prices.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($82M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $74M it takes just to hold its position. It put $43M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($124M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($42M) | ($44M) | ($42M) | ($28M) | ($6M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$74M | +$66M | +$52M | +$36M | +$24M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$27M | +$22M | +$30M | +$25M | +$11M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$67M | −$51M | −$76M | −$92M | −$59M |
| Cash from operations | ($8M) | ($7M) | ($37M) | ($59M) | ($30M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$74M | −$66M | −$52M | −$36M | −$24M |
| Owner earnings | ($82M) | ($73M) | ($89M) | ($95M) | ($54M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$43M | −$29M | −$107M | −$164M | −$41M |
| Free cash flow | ($124M) | ($102M) | ($196M) | ($259M) | ($95M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -21% | -28% | -55% | -174% | -241% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $74M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $43M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer ($109M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“For further discussion of our internal control over financial reporting and a description of the identified material weaknesses, see Part II, Item 9A, " Controls and Procedures " in this Annual Report.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -18.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($111M) ÷ interest expense $6M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $151M − debt $206M
What this means
Netting $151M of cash and short-term investments against $206M of debt leaves $55M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 37 + DIO 0 − DPO 9 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($61M) = debt $206M + equity ($117M) − cashIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- Owner-earnings margin -174%Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -302%–-21%; latest ($82M) = operating cash ($8M) − maintenance capex $74MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -21% of revenue this year, a -174% median across 6 years. It chose to put $43M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($124M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves ($109M).
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($42M) · cash from operations ($8M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.58×ExpandingCapex $117M ÷ depreciation $74M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $384M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.19×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $206M vs $161M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.25/share (latest year $-0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −375% → −58% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −375% early to −58% lately, median −274% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2020 · −447.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our use of artificial intelligence technologies, including generative AI, may expose us to operational, regulatory, and competitive risks.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$150M
- Receivables$33M
- Other current assets$56M
- Debt due within a year$3M
- Accounts payable$14M
- Other current liabilities$99M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$27M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRyder System | $12.7B | 77% | 8.0% | 6% | 4% |
| DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc. | $1.9B | — | 11.4% | 5% | 9% |
| MNROMonro Inc. | $1.2B | — | 6.9% | 8% | 9% |
| MCWMister Car Wash | $1.1B | — | 19.0% | 8% | 16% |
| UHALU-Haul Holding | $761M | 96% | 39.3% | 8% | -29% |
| EVGOEVgo Inc. | $384M | -2% | -184.6% | — | -114% |
| Group median | — | 77% | 9.7% | — | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEVgo Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered106%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← EVER its page in the Manual EVH →
Industry order: ← DRVN the Auto Dealers & Services chapter GPI →