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UHAL, U-Haul Holding

Auto Dealers & Services capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

UHAL · U-Haul Holding

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$761M

+3.6% YoY · −30% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $761M 5-yr avg $731M

Gross margin 68% 5-yr avg 68%

Operating margin 56.8% 5-yr avg 144.0%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin −179% 5-yr avg −165%

Free cash flow margin −179% 5-yr avg −165%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 414% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 96% and operating margin about 22% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 14% and 235% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 58% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.4B	$3.6B	$3.8B	$4.0B	$4.5B	$699M	$746M	$714M	$735M	$761M	$761M	RevenueRevenue
96%	96%	96%	96%	95%	—	—	—	—	68%	68%	Gross marginGross mgn
$743M	$765M	$621M	$540M	$961M	$1.6B	$1.4B	$978M	$716M	$433M	$433M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
21.7%	21.3%	16.5%	13.6%	21.2%	235.4%	193.7%	136.9%	97.4%	56.8%	56.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$398M	$791M	$371M	$442M	$611M	$1.1B	$924M	$629M	$367M	$83M	$83M	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	—	22%	—	23%	24%	24%	25%	23%	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.1B	$938M	$976M	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$482M	$555M	$581M	$664M	$664M	$697M	$734M	$818M	$972M	$1.2B	$1.2B	DepreciationDeprec.
$180M	($408M)	$24M	($31M)	$261M	$125M	$71M	$6M	$115M	$528M	$528M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$1.4B	$2.1B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.5B	$3.2B	$3.2B	CapexCapex
41.5%	37.9%	49.6%	58.0%	31.7%	305.5%	364.9%	418.9%	469.7%	414.3%	414.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($360M)	($426M)	($894M)	($1.2B)	$94M	($190M)	($994M)	($1.5B)	($2.0B)	($1.4B)	($1.4B)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−10.5%	−11.8%	−23.7%	−31.0%	2.1%	−27.2%	−133.2%	−215.6%	−271.8%	−178.6%	−178.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($360M)	($426M)	($894M)	($1.2B)	$94M	($190M)	($994M)	($1.5B)	($2.0B)	($1.4B)	($1.4B)	Free cash flowFCF
−10.5%	−11.8%	−23.7%	−31.0%	2.1%	−27.2%	−133.2%	−215.6%	−271.8%	−178.6%	−178.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$59M	$29M	$39M	$29M	$49M	$29M	$20M	$0	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
9%	12%	7%	6%	9%	13%	10%	6%	4%	2%	2%	ROICROIC
15%	23%	10%	9%	12%	19%	14%	9%	5%	1%	1%	Return on equityROE
13%	22%	9%	9%	11%	18%	14%	9%	—	—	1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$713M	$770M	$679M	$501M	$1.2B	$2.7B	$2.1B	$1.5B	$989M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$82M	$90M	$104M	$101M	$106M	$159M	$151M	$151M	$163M	$178M	$178M	InventoryInvent.
$82M	$90M	$104M	$101M	$106M	$159M	$151M	$151M	$163M	$178M	$178M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$9.4B	$10.7B	$11.9B	$14.7B	$14.7B	$17.3B	$18.1B	$19.1B	$20.5B	$21.5B	$21.5B	Total assetsAssets
$3.3B	$3.5B	$4.2B	$4.7B	$4.7B	$6.1B	$6.1B	$6.3B	$7.2B	$8.1B	$8.1B	Total debtDebt
$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.5B	$4.1B	$3.5B	$3.3B	$4.1B	$4.8B	$6.2B	$7.0B	$7.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
6.6×	6.0×	4.4×	3.4×	5.9×	9.8×	6.5×	3.8×	2.4×	1.2×	1.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.6B	$3.4B	$3.7B	$4.8B	$4.9B	$6.0B	$6.5B	$7.2B	$7.5B	$7.6B	$7.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
196M	196M	196M	196M	196M	196M	—	196M	196M	196M	196M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$17.47	$18.38	$19.24	$20.30	$23.16	$3.57	—	$3.64	$3.75	$3.88	$3.88	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.03	$4.04	$1.89	$2.25	$3.12	$5.73	—	$3.21	$1.87	$0.42	$0.42	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.84	$-2.18	$-4.57	$-6.29	$0.48	$-0.97	—	$-7.85	$-10.19	$-6.93	$-6.93	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.84	$-2.18	$-4.57	$-6.29	$0.48	$-0.97	—	$-7.85	$-10.19	$-6.93	$-6.93	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30	$0.15	$0.20	$0.15	$0.25	$0.15	—	$0.00	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$7.25	$6.96	$9.54	$11.78	$7.35	$10.90	—	$15.26	$17.61	$16.09	$16.09	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.38	$17.40	$18.85	$24.72	$25.09	$30.36	—	$36.58	$38.24	$38.82	$38.82	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−15.4%/yr	−30.0%/yr
EPS	−16.0%/yr	−32.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.3%/yr	+17.0%/yr
Book value / share	+12.6%/yr	+9.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

196Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

2%low FY2026

Gross margin

68%low FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($1.4B)owner earningsvs.$83Mnet incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $83M of profit but ($1.4B) of owner earnings: $1.4B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$83M	$367M	$629M	$924M	$1.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.2B	+$972M	+$818M	+$734M	+$697M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$528M	+$115M	+$6M	+$71M	+$125M
Cash from operations	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.9B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$3.2B	−$3.5B	−$3.0B	−$2.7B	−$2.1B
Owner earnings	($1.4B)	($2.0B)	($1.5B)	($994M)	($190M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-179%	-272%	-216%	-133%	-27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.2×

Thin

Operating income $433M ÷ interest expense $365M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.0B · 16.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $1.1B + ST investments $16M − debt $8.1B

What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $8.1B of debt leaves $7.0B owed, about 16.2× a year's operating profit (18.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 2%–13%; 2% latest = NOPAT $319M ÷ invested capital $14.6B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -31%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -272%–2%; latest ($1.4B) = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $3.2B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -179% of revenue this year, a -31% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 21.59×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $83M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 2.67×

Expanding

Capex $3.2B ÷ depreciation $1.2B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $761M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −31%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.83/share (latest year $0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $38.82/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 20% → 97% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 20% early to 97% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · 13.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $14.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$22.9B · 164%
Dividends$255M · 2%

Returned to owners$255M
$255M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$9.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $9.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.3B to $8.1B.
Net change in share count0.1%
The diluted count barely moved (196M to 196M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained−20%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $1.1B, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why U-Haul Holding is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−52.8% vs −15.4%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −15.4%) and the loss has widened to −52.8% across the last three years, with the latest year at −133.2%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.3B → $8.1B
Debt rose from $3.3B to $8.1B while owner earnings went from about ($560M) to ($1.6B): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 23% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $82M to $178M while revenue grew −78%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
RRyder System	$12.7B	77%	8.0%	6%	4%
DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc.	$1.9B	—	11.4%	5%	9%
MNROMonro Inc.	$1.2B	—	6.9%	8%	9%
MCWMister Car Wash	$1.1B	—	19.0%	8%	16%
UHALU-Haul Holding	$761M	96%	39.3%	8%	-29%
EVGOEVgo Inc.	$384M	-2%	-184.6%	—	-114%
Group median	—	77%	9.7%	8%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

U-Haul Holding is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−22%/yr’21→’26

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−179%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh UHAL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "U-Haul Holding (UHAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UHAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UGI its page in the Manual UHS →

Industry order: ← SDA the Auto Dealers & Services chapter YSXT →