Owner Scorecard


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FAF, First American Fin

The Company, through its subsidiaries, is engaged in the business of providing title insurance, settlement services and other financial services and risk solutions through its title insurance and services segment and its home warranty segment.

Many of these products, services and solutions involve the use of real property-related data, including data derived from the Company's proprietary databases.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FAF · First American Fin
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.5B
+21.6% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $7.7B 5-yr avg $7.3B
Return on equity 12% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
The underwriting result is not cleanly tagged in the filings. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 8% a year across the record. The float runs about 0.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.6B$5.8B$5.7B$6.2B$7.1B$9.2B$7.6B$6.0B$6.1B$7.5B$7.7BRevenueRevenue
$126M$162M$230M$316M$221M$215M$340M$570M$561M$621M$638MInvestment incomeInv. inc.
$343M$423M$474M$707M$696M$1.2B$263M$217M$131M$622M$673MNet incomeNet inc.
28%5%22%22%24%24%19%21%20%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$489M$632M$793M$913M$1.1B$1.2B$778M$354M$898M$951M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$390M$498M$675M$806M$971M$1.1B$610M$166M$679M$763M$824MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11%12%13%16%14%22%6%4%3%11%12%Return on equityROE
7%8%8%12%10%18%1%0%−2%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BFloat (reserves)Float
$8.8B$9.6B$10.6B$11.5B$12.8B$16.5B$15.0B$16.8B$14.9B$16.2B$17.9BTotal assetsAssets
$1.0B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$3.6B$1.7B$1.4B$2.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.0B$3.5B$3.7B$4.4B$4.9B$5.8B$4.7B$4.8B$4.9B$5.5B$5.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
111M112M113M114M113M111M107M105M104M104M103MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.09$3.76$4.19$6.22$6.16$11.14$2.45$2.07$1.26$6.00$6.51EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.51$4.43$5.96$7.09$8.59$9.51$5.69$1.59$6.51$7.35$7.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.18$1.42$1.58$1.65$1.76$1.91$2.03$2.07$2.12$2.15$2.16Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$27.06$30.95$33.03$38.88$43.45$51.77$43.41$46.35$47.06$53.03$53.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.1%/yr+2.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.6%/yr−3.1%/yr
EPS+7.7%/yr−0.5%/yr
Dividends / share+6.9%/yr+4.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.8%/yr+12.5%/yr
Book value / share+7.8%/yr+4.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+21.6%
    “The Company’s total revenues for 2025 were $7.5 billion, which reflected an increase of $1.3 billion, or 21.6%, when compared with $6.1 billion for 2024. This increase was primarily attributable to increases in direct premiums and escrow fees of $316.7 million, or 12.9%, agent premiums of $397.5 million, or 15.5%, and information and other revenue of $127.4 million, or 13.3%.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
104Mpeak FY2019
Revenue
$7.5Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 98%
    What this means

    Premiums or claims weren't found in the filing data.

  • Solid
    Net income $622M ÷ equity $5.5B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 0.2× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $1.2B, 0.2× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • earned on investments
    Net investment income $621M
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“While we hope to realize financial benefits from these venture investments, we make and hold these investments primarily for strategic reasons. 10 Innovation and Intellectual Property In an effort to speed the delivery of our products, increase efficiency, improve quality, improv…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$3M
'27$2M
'28$2M
'29$200K
'30$450M
later$1.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$6Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$450Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2.4B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$763M
Together, against $3M due next year940.8×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $3.2B against the $3M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 941 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$10.8M$17.7M$1.1B
2022$6.0M$2.9M$610M
2022$9.0M$1.9M$610M
2023$7.1M$9.0M$166M
2024$7.8M$7.8M$679M
2025$8.3M$8.2M$763M
2025$9.6M$5.4M$763M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio101:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$68M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
VOYAVoya Financial Inc.$8.2B75%11%
FAFFirst American Fin$7.5B12%
GNWGenworth Financial Inc$7.3B2%
THGHanover Insurance Group$6.6B99%64%12%
GLGlobe Life Inc.$6.0B98%66%20%
MCYMercury General$6.0B100%76%10%
SIGISelective Insurance$5.3B97%61%10%
STCStewart Information Services Corporation$2.9B8%
Group median11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what First American Fin’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered1%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity18%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $3.6B on 102M shares, a 18% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "First American Fin (FAF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FAF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FA its page in the Manual FANG →

Industry order: ← ESNT the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter FNF →