Owner Scorecard


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FINV, FinVolution Group

Revenue is led by Loan Facilitation Service Fees (38%) and Guarantee Income (30%), with 3 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 5 ordinary shares
FINV · FinVolution Group
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥13.6B
+3.9% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥13.6B 5-yr avg CN¥12.0B
Return on equity 15% 5-yr avg 18%
Return on tangible equity 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Equity / assets 65.1% 5-yr avg 62.1%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has run high across the record (median 21%, above 12% in 9 of 10 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Loan Facilitation Service Fees at 38%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Loan Facilitation Service Fees38%CN¥5.2B
  • Guarantee Income30%CN¥4.1B
  • Postfacilitation Service Fees [Member12%CN¥1.6B
  • Net Interest Income [Member10%CN¥1.3B
  • Financial Service, Other10%CN¥1.3B
  • Grant1%CN¥118M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥1.2BCN¥3.9BCN¥4.2BCN¥6.0BCN¥7.6BCN¥9.5BCN¥11.1BCN¥12.5BCN¥13.1BCN¥13.6BCN¥13.6BRevenueRevenue
CN¥42MCN¥31MCN¥256MCN¥1.1BCN¥1.1BCN¥1.2BCN¥1.2BCN¥1.0BCN¥854MCN¥1.3BCN¥1.3BNet interest incomeNet int.
CN¥35MCN¥16MCN¥60MCN¥236MCN¥463MCN¥374MCN¥416MCN¥587MCN¥320MCN¥638MCN¥638MCredit-loss provisionProvision
CN¥501MCN¥1.1BCN¥2.5BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.0BCN¥2.5BCN¥2.3BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.4BCN¥2.5BCN¥2.5BNet incomeNet inc.
9%20%6%17%19%9%17%14%16%18%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
23.4%12.6%18.8%13.0%13.2%13.8%10.7%11.2%10.1%10.0%10.0%Return on assetsROA
30%42%30%24%23%18%17%16%15%15%Return on equityROE
25%20%20%15%14%13%12%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
31%43%30%24%24%19%18%16%16%16%Return on tangible equityROTCE
Balance sheet
CN¥2.1BCN¥8.6BCN¥13.1BCN¥18.3BCN¥14.9BCN¥18.1BCN¥21.4BCN¥21.3BCN¥23.6BCN¥25.4BCN¥25.4BTotal assetsAssets
CN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥50MCN¥80MCN¥80MGoodwillGoodwill
(CN¥438M)CN¥3.6BCN¥5.9BCN¥7.9BCN¥8.4BCN¥10.7BCN¥12.4BCN¥13.7BCN¥15.2BCN¥16.6BCN¥16.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.33B1.56B1.60B1.55B1.49B1.48B1.45B1.40B1.32B1.33B1.33BShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥0.38CN¥0.69CN¥1.54CN¥1.53CN¥1.32CN¥1.68CN¥1.57CN¥1.70CN¥1.81CN¥1.91CN¥1.91EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥0.25CN¥0.18CN¥0.21CN¥0.26CN¥0.31CN¥0.33CN¥0.38CN¥0.38Dividends / shareDiv/sh
CN¥-0.33CN¥2.32CN¥3.70CN¥5.12CN¥5.61CN¥7.19CN¥8.51CN¥9.80CN¥11.52CN¥12.40CN¥12.40Book value / shareBVPS
CN¥-0.33CN¥2.25CN¥3.63CN¥5.05CN¥5.51CN¥7.09CN¥8.40CN¥9.69CN¥11.37CN¥12.14CN¥12.14Tangible book / shareTBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+30.8%/yr+14.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.9%/yr−1.7%/yr
EPS+19.7%/yr+7.6%/yr
Dividends / share+7.2%/yr (6-yr)+16.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.2%/yr+53.6%/yr
Book value / share+17.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
1.3Bpeak FY2018
Revenue
CN¥13.6Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Strong
    Net income CN¥2.5B ÷ equity CN¥16.6B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Strong
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill CN¥80M − intangibles CN¥270M)
    Industry peers: median 25%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 39%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 65.1%
    Well capitalized
    Equity CN¥16.6B ÷ assets CN¥25.4B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Funding
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Deposits or total assets missing.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 48%
    Elevated
    Provision for credit losses CN¥638M ÷ net interest income CN¥1.3B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
AXPAmerican Express Company$72.2B30%35%73%4.3%
FINVFinVolution GroupCN¥13.6B23%24%5.1%
DFSDiscover Financial Services$17.9B25%26%39%8.6%
BKKTBakkt Inc.$2.3B-146%-252%0.5%
TREELendingTree Inc.$1.1B5%-2.2%
SOFISoFi Technologies$3.6B-6%-9%85%3.6%
SYFSynchrony Financial$19.0B21%25%27%15.5%
OMFOneMain Holdings Inc.$4.9B23%48%39%15.3%
Group median22%25%4.7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each of which represents five Class”; FinVolution Group reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what FinVolution Group’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered17%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity24%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $2.4B on 267M shares, a 24% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "FinVolution Group (FINV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FINV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FER its page in the Manual FLNG →

Industry order: ← FIGR the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter HASI →