Owner Scorecard


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FRO, Frontline Plc

Marine Shipping capital-intensive Cyclical

We are engaged in transporting crude oil and its related refined petroleum products and our vessels operate in the spot and time charter markets.

Our LR2/ Aframax tankers are designed to be flexible, able to transport primarily refined products, but also fuel and crude oil from smaller ports limited by draft restrictions.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
FRO · Frontline Plc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.0B
−8.8% YoY · 36% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Operating margin 30.4% 5-yr avg 27.9%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 34% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 34% 5-yr avg −13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 30% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −30% and 119% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 42% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$754M$646M$742M$628M$428M$753M$1.4B$1.8B$2.2B$2.0B$2.0BRevenueRevenue
$177M($196M)$83M$240M$508M$8M$446M$747M$782M$599M$599MOperating incomeOp. inc.
23.5%−30.4%11.1%38.1%118.5%1.1%31.0%40.9%36.1%30.4%30.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$118M($264M)($8M)$140M$413M($15M)$476M$656M$496M$379M$476MNet incomeNet inc.
0%0%-0%0%0%2%2%1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$286M$130M$46M$280M$604M$85M$385M$856M$736M$682M$682MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$141M$142M$123M$118M$139M$165M$165M$231M$339M$328MDepreciationDeprec.
$27M$253M($68M)$22M$52M($65M)($255M)($31M)($98M)($25M)$207MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$474M$336M$1.6B$915M$13M$13MCapexCapex
62.9%23.3%89.3%42.3%0.6%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($80M)$220M$625M$397M$670M$670MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−10.6%15.3%34.2%18.4%34.0%34.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($389M)$50M($775M)($179M)$670M$670MFree cash flowFCF
−51.6%3.4%−42.4%−8.3%34.0%34.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$165M$51M$386K$20M$312M$0$33M$639M$434M$207M$207MDividends paidDiv. paid
8%-6%8%14%0%11%14%15%12%11%ROICROIC
8%-22%-1%9%26%-1%21%29%21%15%19%Return on equityROE
−3%−27%−1%8%6%−1%20%1%3%7%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$202M$123M$67M$178M$177M$116M$255M$308M$414M$251M$254MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$49M$50M$54M$63M$64M$74M$139M$125M$129M$134M$134MReceivablesReceiv.
$38M$62M$69M$67M$58M$81M$107M$135M$137M$120M$120MInventoryInvent.
$55M$43M$82M$98M$99M$143M$143MAccounts payablePayables
$87M$111M$123M$130M$67M$111M$165M$162M$167M$111M$111MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$384M$322M$308M$448M$378M$333M$881M$728M$826M$707M$707MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$183M$222M$214M$848M$322M$287M$392M$409M$596M$495M$495MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×1.4×1.4×0.5×1.2×1.2×2.2×1.8×1.4×1.4×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$225M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112M$112MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.0B$3.1B$3.1B$3.7B$3.9B$4.1B$4.8B$5.9B$6.2B$5.8B$5.8BTotal assetsAssets
$982M$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1B$3.2B$3.3B$2.7B$2.9BTotal debtDebt
$780M$1.5B$1.7B$1.5B$1.9B$2.2B$1.9B$2.9B$2.9B$2.5B$2.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.1×-2.8×0.9×2.5×7.0×0.2×9.8×4.4×2.6×2.6×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.5B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
157M170M170M179M198M199M214M223M223M223M223MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.81$3.81$4.37$3.50$2.17$3.79$6.72$8.20$9.71$8.85$8.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.75$-1.56$-0.05$0.78$2.09$-0.08$2.22$2.95$2.23$1.70$2.14EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.40$1.03$2.81$1.78$3.01$3.01Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.95$0.23$-3.48$-0.80$3.01$3.01Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.05$0.30$0.00$0.11$1.58$0.00$0.16$2.87$1.95$0.93$0.93Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.38$1.57$7.33$4.11$0.06$0.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.55$6.99$6.85$8.42$8.12$8.26$10.56$10.23$10.51$11.28$11.28Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.0%/yr+32.5%/yr
EPS+9.6%/yr−4.0%/yr
Dividends / share−1.3%/yr−10.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−60.8%/yr (4-yr)−60.8%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share+1.9%/yr+6.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
223Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
12%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.7×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$670Mowner earningsvs.$379Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $379M of profit into $670M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$379M
Owner earnings$670M · 34% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$379M$496M$656M$476M($15M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$328M+$339M+$231M+$165M+$165M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$25M−$98M−$31M−$255M−$65M
Cash from operations$682M$736M$856M$385M$85M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$13M−$339M−$231M−$165M−$165M
Owner earnings$670M$397M$625M$220M($80M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$576M−$1.4B−$171M−$309M
Free cash flow$670M($179M)($775M)$50M($389M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue34%18%34%15%-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $599M ÷ interest expense $233M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.7B · 4.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $251M + ST investments $2M − debt $2.9B
    What this means

    Netting $254M of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, about 4.5× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -6%–15%; 11% latest = NOPAT $591M ÷ invested capital $5.2B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range -11%–34%; latest $670M = operating cash $682M − maintenance capex $13M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 5 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $682M ÷ net income $476M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $207M ÷ Owner Earnings $670M
    What this means

    Of $670M Owner Earnings, $207M (31%) went back to shareholders, $207M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.04×
    Harvesting
    Capex $13M ÷ depreciation $328M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.43×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $213M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Near
    Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.29/share (latest year $2.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 36% lately, median 30% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +66%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 66% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · −30.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$707M
  • Cash & short-term investments$254M
  • Receivables$134M
  • Inventory$120M
  • Other current assets$199M
Current liabilities$495M
  • Debt due within a year$189M
  • Accounts payable$143M
  • Other current liabilities$162M
Current ratio1.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$213Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$189M due · $254M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.9B$2M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2021–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$3.4B · 123%
  • Dividends$1.3B · 48%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$1.9B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.3B to $2.9B.

  • Net change in share count11.9%

    The diluted count rose from 199M to 223M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.93/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained46%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($678M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $309M, so each retained $1 added about 0.46 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Frontline Plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.9%

    Diluted shares grew 11.9% over 2021–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$982M → $2.9B

    Debt rose from $982M to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about $255M to $564M — about 3.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
FROFrontline Plc$2.0B30.7%11%18%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median9.6%5%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Frontline Plc's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Frontline Plc has delivered.

Frontline Plc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Frontline Plc earns about $362M on its 18.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $670M on 223M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Frontline Plc (FRO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FRO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FORTY its page in the Manual FSM →

Industry order: ← FLNG the Marine Shipping chapter GASS →