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FRO, Frontline Plc
We are engaged in transporting crude oil and its related refined petroleum products and our vessels operate in the spot and time charter markets.
Our LR2/ Aframax tankers are designed to be flexible, able to transport primarily refined products, but also fuel and crude oil from smaller ports limited by draft restrictions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 30% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −30% and 119% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 42% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $754M | $646M | $742M | $628M | $428M | $753M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| $177M | ($196M) | $83M | $240M | $508M | $8M | $446M | $747M | $782M | $599M | $599M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.5% | −30.4% | 11.1% | 38.1% | 118.5% | 1.1% | 31.0% | 40.9% | 36.1% | 30.4% | 30.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $118M | ($264M) | ($8M) | $140M | $413M | ($15M) | $476M | $656M | $496M | $379M | $476M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 0% | — | — | 0% | -0% | — | 0% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 1% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $286M | $130M | $46M | $280M | $604M | $85M | $385M | $856M | $736M | $682M | $682M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $141M | $142M | $123M | $118M | $139M | $165M | $165M | $231M | $339M | $328M | — | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $27M | $253M | ($68M) | $22M | $52M | ($65M) | ($255M) | ($31M) | ($98M) | ($25M) | $207M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | — | $474M | $336M | $1.6B | $915M | $13M | $13M | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | — | — | 62.9% | 23.3% | 89.3% | 42.3% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($80M) | $220M | $625M | $397M | $670M | $670M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | — | — | −10.6% | 15.3% | 34.2% | 18.4% | 34.0% | 34.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($389M) | $50M | ($775M) | ($179M) | $670M | $670M | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | — | — | −51.6% | 3.4% | −42.4% | −8.3% | 34.0% | 34.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $165M | $51M | $386K | $20M | $312M | $0 | $33M | $639M | $434M | $207M | $207M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 8% | -6% | — | 8% | 14% | 0% | 11% | 14% | 15% | 12% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | -22% | -1% | 9% | 26% | -1% | 21% | 29% | 21% | 15% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| −3% | −27% | −1% | 8% | 6% | −1% | 20% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $202M | $123M | $67M | $178M | $177M | $116M | $255M | $308M | $414M | $251M | $254M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $49M | $50M | $54M | $63M | $64M | $74M | $139M | $125M | $129M | $134M | $134M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $38M | $62M | $69M | $67M | $58M | $81M | $107M | $135M | $137M | $120M | $120M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | — | — | $55M | $43M | $82M | $98M | $99M | $143M | $143M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $87M | $111M | $123M | $130M | $67M | $111M | $165M | $162M | $167M | $111M | $111M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $384M | $322M | $308M | $448M | $378M | $333M | $881M | $728M | $826M | $707M | $707M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $183M | $222M | $214M | $848M | $322M | $287M | $392M | $409M | $596M | $495M | $495M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 0.5× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 2.2× | 1.8× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $225M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | $112M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $5.9B | $6.2B | $5.8B | $5.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $982M | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $2.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $780M | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.5B | $2.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.1× | -2.8× | 0.9× | 2.5× | 7.0× | 0.2× | 9.8× | 4.4× | 2.6× | 2.6× | 2.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 157M | 170M | 170M | 179M | 198M | 199M | 214M | 223M | 223M | 223M | 223M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.81 | $3.81 | $4.37 | $3.50 | $2.17 | $3.79 | $6.72 | $8.20 | $9.71 | $8.85 | $8.85 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.75 | $-1.56 | $-0.05 | $0.78 | $2.09 | $-0.08 | $2.22 | $2.95 | $2.23 | $1.70 | $2.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | — | — | $-0.40 | $1.03 | $2.81 | $1.78 | $3.01 | $3.01 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | $-1.95 | $0.23 | $-3.48 | $-0.80 | $3.01 | $3.01 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.05 | $0.30 | $0.00 | $0.11 | $1.58 | $0.00 | $0.16 | $2.87 | $1.95 | $0.93 | $0.93 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | $2.38 | $1.57 | $7.33 | $4.11 | $0.06 | $0.06 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.55 | $6.99 | $6.85 | $8.42 | $8.12 | $8.26 | $10.56 | $10.23 | $10.51 | $11.28 | $11.28 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.0%/yr | +32.5%/yr |
| EPS | +9.6%/yr | −4.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −1.3%/yr | −10.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −60.8%/yr (4-yr) | −60.8%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +1.9%/yr | +6.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $379M of profit into $670M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $379M | $496M | $656M | $476M | ($15M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$328M | +$339M | +$231M | +$165M | +$165M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$25M | −$98M | −$31M | −$255M | −$65M |
| Cash from operations | $682M | $736M | $856M | $385M | $85M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$13M | −$339M | −$231M | −$165M | −$165M |
| Owner earnings | $670M | $397M | $625M | $220M | ($80M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$576M | −$1.4B | −$171M | −$309M |
| Free cash flow | $670M | ($179M) | ($775M) | $50M | ($389M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 34% | 18% | 34% | 15% | -11% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $599M ÷ interest expense $233M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.7B · 4.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $251M + ST investments $2M − debt $2.9B
What this means
Netting $254M of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, about 4.5× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median, range -6%–15%; 11% latest = NOPAT $591M ÷ invested capital $5.2BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -11%–34%; latest $670M = operating cash $682M − maintenance capex $13MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 5 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $682M ÷ net income $476M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $207M ÷ Owner Earnings $670M
What this means
Of $670M Owner Earnings, $207M (31%) went back to shareholders, $207M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.04×HarvestingCapex $13M ÷ depreciation $328M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.43×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $213M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record NearUninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.29/share (latest year $2.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 36% lately, median 30% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +66%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 66% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −30.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +4.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$254M
- Receivables$134M
- Inventory$120M
- Other current assets$199M
- Debt due within a year$189M
- Accounts payable$143M
- Other current liabilities$162M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$3.4B · 123%
- Dividends$1.3B · 48%
- Returned to owners$1.3B
72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.3B to $2.9B.
- Net change in share count11.9%
The diluted count rose from 199M to 223M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.93/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained46%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($678M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $309M, so each retained $1 added about 0.46 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Frontline Plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.9%
Diluted shares grew 11.9% over 2021–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$982M → $2.9B
Debt rose from $982M to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about $255M to $564M — about 3.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| FROFrontline Plc | $2.0B | — | 30.7% | 11% | 18% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited | $342M | — | -1.1% | -0% | 31% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.6% | 5% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Frontline Plc's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Frontline Plc has delivered.
Frontline Plc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Frontline Plc earns about $362M on its 18.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $670M on 223M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← FORTY its page in the Manual FSM →
Industry order: ← FLNG the Marine Shipping chapter GASS →