Owner Scorecard


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FORTY, Formula Systems (1985) Ltd.

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
FORTY · Formula Systems (1985) Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$2.8B
+5.2% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 24%
Operating margin 6.2% 5-yr avg 7.2%
ROIC 23% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 7.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 5.4%–8.8% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −11 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Israel is 63% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2024
  • Israel63%$1.7B
  • United States14%$388M
  • Europe3%$88M
  • Japan0%$13M
  • Zimbabwe0%$4M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMDec 2024
Income statement
$973M$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.4B$2.6B$2.6B$2.8B$2.8BRevenueRevenue
24%23%22%22%23%23%23%24%25%25%25%Gross marginGross mgn
$76M$89M$73M$110M$138M$171M$208M$164M$152M$174M$171MOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.8%8.0%5.4%7.3%8.1%8.8%8.7%6.4%5.8%6.3%6.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$20M$22M$10M$32M$39M$47M$55M$81M$64M$80M$80MNet incomeNet inc.
45%49%56%43%41%40%44%40%42%42%42%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$87M$75M$81M$83M$196M$288M$209M$239M$295M$324M$324MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$30M$32M$44M$49M$87M$96M$122M$115M$121M$115M$115MDepreciationDeprec.
$37M$20M$27M$1M$70M$146M$32M$42M$110M$129M$129MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$7M$9M$10M$12M$22M$17M$17M$22M$17M$16M$16MCapexCapex
0.7%0.8%0.7%0.8%1.3%0.9%0.7%0.9%0.6%0.6%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$80M$66M$72M$71M$174M$271M$192M$217M$278M$308M$308MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.3%5.9%5.3%4.8%10.2%14.0%8.0%8.4%10.6%11.2%11.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$80M$66M$72M$71M$174M$271M$192M$217M$278M$308M$308MFree cash flowFCF
8.3%5.9%5.3%4.8%10.2%14.0%8.0%8.4%10.6%11.2%11.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M$10M$12M$5M$13M$15M$22M$22M$10M$19M$19MDividends paidDiv. paid
18%24%23%ROICROIC
3%7%3%9%9%9%10%15%10%12%12%Return on equityROE
1%4%−0%7%6%6%6%11%9%9%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$260M$278M$260M$278M$375M$503M$487M$545M$452M$508M$509MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$177M$308M$386M$441M$486M$520M$3M$5M$8M$8M$8MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$4M$3M$4M$9M$24M$21M$35M$42M$31M$31MInventoryInvent.
$73M$98M$98MAccounts payablePayables
$181M$312M$389M$445M$495M$544M$24M$41M($23M)($59M)($59M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$357M$634M$695M$781M$966M$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$212M$359M$433M$526M$671M$780M$948M$1.0B$986M$1.1B$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.8×1.6×1.5×1.4×1.5×1.4×1.4×1.4×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$162M$640M$617M$641M$724M$872M$933M$926M$937M$975M$975MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$2.1B$2.5B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$3.0B$3.0BTotal assetsAssets
$58M$316M$257M$257MTotal debtDebt
($202M)($136M)($251M)($252M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.1×5.0×2.4×6.9×6.2×5.8×6.9×6.0×3.6×4.6×4.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$705M$336M$359M$368M$422M$503M$541M$552M$626M$679M$679MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
14.7M14.7M14.7M14.8M15.3M15.3M15.3M15.3M15.3M15.3M15.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$66.01$75.27$91.94$101.22$111.23$126.45$157.21$168.17$171.29$180.17$179.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.34$1.52$0.70$2.19$2.54$3.06$3.57$5.32$4.18$5.21$5.20EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.45$4.47$4.85$4.81$11.36$17.75$12.54$14.19$18.19$20.12$20.09Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.45$4.47$4.85$4.81$11.36$17.75$12.54$14.19$18.19$20.12$20.09Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.87$0.68$0.82$0.34$0.85$0.98$1.44$1.42$0.65$1.23$1.23Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.46$0.62$0.65$0.79$1.46$1.09$1.13$1.44$1.09$1.07$1.07Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$47.83$22.84$24.37$24.92$27.57$32.90$35.37$36.08$40.90$44.39$44.31Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.8%/yr+10.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+15.6%/yr+12.1%/yr
EPS+16.2%/yr+15.4%/yr
Dividends / share+3.9%/yr+7.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.9%/yr−6.0%/yr
Book value / share−0.8%/yr+10.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
15Mpeak FY2024
Gross margin
25%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$308Mowner earningsvs.$80Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned $80M of profit into $308M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$80M
Owner earnings$308M · 11% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$80M$64M$81M$55M$47M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$115M+$121M+$115M+$122M+$96M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$129M+$110M+$42M+$32M+$146M
Cash from operations$324M$295M$239M$209M$288M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$16M−$17M−$22M−$17M−$17M
Owner earnings$308M$278M$217M$192M$271M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%11%8%8%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $171M ÷ interest expense $38M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • Net cash
    Cash $508M + ST investments $738K − debt $257M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $252M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 1 + DIO 5 − DPO 17 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • High
    NOPAT $100M ÷ invested capital $429M (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–14%; latest $308M = operating cash $324M − maintenance capex $16M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $324M ÷ net income $80M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $19M ÷ Owner Earnings $308M
    What this means

    Of $308M Owner Earnings, $19M (6%) went back to shareholders, $19M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.14×
    Harvesting
    Capex $16M ÷ depreciation $115M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.31×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $257M vs $349M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +328%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4902.04/share (latest year $5205.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44386.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 6% lately, median 7%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 5.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$509M
  • Receivables$8M
  • Inventory$31M
  • Other current assets$940M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Debt due within a year$142M
  • Accounts payable$98M
  • Other current liabilities$899M
Current ratio1.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.28×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.45×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$349Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$142M due · $509M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2024 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($513M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.5BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$422M$165M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$149M · 8%
  • Dividends$140M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 85%
  • Returned to owners$140M

    8% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $140M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count4.0%

    The diluted count rose from 15M to 15M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.23/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained63%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($310M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $195M, so each retained $1 added about 0.63 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.2B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $149M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.0%

    Diluted shares grew 4.0% over 2015–2024. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EPAMEPAM Systems$5.5B34%11.9%31%11%
SABRSabre$2.8B57%9.0%8%-0%
FORTYFormula Systems (1985) Ltd.$2.8B23%7.6%23%8%
PLTKPlaytika Holding Corp.$2.8B72%18.8%34%19%
PTCPTC Inc.$2.7B79%21.1%10%19%
RXTRackspace Technology Inc.$2.7B29%-6.7%-10%6%
ZSZscaler Inc.$2.7B78%-22.3%-13%17%
VRSNVeriSign Inc.$1.7B86%65.4%56%
Group median64%10.4%10%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one Ordinary”; Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. has delivered.

Formula Systems (1985) Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. earns about $230M on its 8.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $308M on 0M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $252M. The if-converted diluted count is 15M, 100081% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Formula Systems (1985) Ltd. (FORTY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FORTY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FNV its page in the Manual FRO →

Industry order: ← FIVN the IT Services & Consulting chapter GDEV →