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GENI, Genius Sports Limited

Casinos & Gaming diversified Unprofitable

Genius is a B2B provider of scalable, technology-led products and services to the sports, sports betting and sports media industries.

The Legend Acquisition is expected to accelerate our strategic and financial objectives, supercharge fan monetization, and help build a fully integrated sports and gaming media network for our customers.

Genius is a fast-growing business with significant scale, distribution and an expanding addressable market and opportunity. 31 Genius' mission is to be the operating system of modern sport, powering the global ecosystem that connects sports, betting and media with every fan around the globe.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F

GENI · Genius Sports Limited

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$669M

+31.0% YoY · 35% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $669M 5-yr avg $439M

Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg −3%

Operating margin −22.6% 5-yr avg −64.8%

ROIC −27% 5-yr avg −35%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg −1%

Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Betting Technology Content and Services (70%), Media Technology Content and Services (22%) and Sports Technology and Services (8%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −23% through the cycle on a 22% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −27%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Betting Technology Content And Services is 70% of revenue, with Media Technology Content And Services the other meaningful line at 22%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Betting Technology Content And Services70%$472M
Media Technology Content And Services22%$144M
Sports Technology And Services8%$53M

By geographyAmericas47%Europe47%Rest Of The World6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
								Income statement
$115M	$150M	$263M	$341M	$413M	$511M	$669M	$669M	RevenueRevenue
22%	24%	−81%	1%	17%	25%	23%	23%	Gross marginGross mgn
($36M)	($21M)	($573M)	($183M)	($74M)	($59M)	($151M)	($151M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−31.6%	−14.0%	−218.2%	−53.6%	−18.0%	−11.5%	−22.6%	−22.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($40M)	($30M)	($593M)	($182M)	($86M)	($63M)	($112M)	($112M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
$2M	$17M	($63M)	($3M)	$15M	$82M	$86M	$86M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$28M	$35M	$59M	$69M	$77M	$73M	$71M	$71M	DepreciationDeprec.
$15M	$12M	$470M	$110M	$23M	$72M	$127M	$127M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$1M	$6M	$6M	$4M	$12M	$22M	$22M	CapexCapex
2.8%	1.0%	2.4%	1.7%	0.9%	2.4%	3.3%	3.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($725K)	$16M	($70M)	($9M)	$11M	$70M	$65M	$65M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.6%	10.4%	−26.5%	−2.8%	2.7%	13.6%	9.6%	9.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($725K)	$16M	($70M)	($9M)	$11M	$70M	$65M	$65M	Free cash flowFCF
−0.6%	10.4%	−26.5%	−2.8%	2.7%	13.6%	9.6%	9.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	-94%	-31%	-12%	-10%	-27%	-27%	ROICROIC
—	—	-84%	-31%	-15%	-11%	-15%	-15%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−84%	−31%	−15%	−11%	−15%	−15%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$8M	$12M	$222M	$123M	$100M	$110M	$281M	$281M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$18M	$25M	$49M	$33M	$71M	$85M	$130M	$130M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$281K	$384K	$530K	$283K	$347K	$482K	$284K	$284K	InventoryInvent.
$13M	$10M	$20M	$33M	$57M	$37M	$112M	$112M	Accounts payablePayables
$5M	$15M	$29M	$540K	$14M	$49M	$18M	$18M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$39M	$61M	$325M	$237M	$245M	$289M	$550M	$550M	Current assetsCur. assets
$55M	$85M	$153M	$171M	$183M	$202M	$353M	$353M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	0.7×	2.1×	1.4×	1.3×	1.4×	1.6×	1.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$193M	$201M	$101M	$310M	$326M	$326M	$338M	$338M	GoodwillGoodwill
$375M	$391M	$887M	$773M	$776M	$792M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Total assetsAssets
$73M	$93M	$88K	$14M	$8M	$38K	—	$38K	Total debtDebt
$65M	$81M	($222M)	($108M)	($93M)	($110M)	—	($281M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($81M)	($139M)	$706M	$577M	$573M	$572M	$724M	$724M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
								Per share
68.4M	70.0M	151M	199M	226M	230M	255M	1.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.68	$2.14	$1.74	$1.71	$1.83	$2.23	$2.63	$357.36	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.59	$-0.43	$-3.93	$-0.91	$-0.38	$-0.27	$-0.44	$-59.56	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.01	$0.22	$-0.46	$-0.05	$0.05	$0.30	$0.25	$34.45	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.01	$0.22	$-0.46	$-0.05	$0.05	$0.30	$0.25	$34.45	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05	$0.02	$0.04	$0.03	$0.02	$0.05	$0.09	$11.66	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.19	$-1.99	$4.68	$2.90	$2.54	$2.49	$2.84	$386.71	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.15 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/135.99 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.8%/yr	+4.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+2.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+10.5%/yr	+32.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

255Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−27%low FY2021

Gross margin

23%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$65Mowner earningsvs.($112M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $112M loss into $65M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($112M)	($63M)	($86M)	($182M)	($593M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$71M	+$73M	+$77M	+$69M	+$59M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$127M	+$72M	+$23M	+$110M	+$470M
Cash from operations	$86M	$82M	$15M	($3M)	($63M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$22M	−$12M	−$4M	−$6M	−$6M
Owner earnings	$65M	$70M	$11M	($9M)	($70M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	14%	3%	-3%	-27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$281M

Net cash

Cash $281M − debt $38K

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $281M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -8d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 71 + DIO 0 − DPO 79 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -27%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -94%–-10%; -27% latest = NOPAT ($120M) ÷ invested capital $444M

Industry peers: median -10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -27% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $65M = operating cash $86M − maintenance capex $22M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 3%)

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 7 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $86M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($112M) · cash from operations $86M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.31×

Harvesting

Capex $22M ÷ depreciation $71M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $669M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $38K vs $197M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.34/share (latest year $-0.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −88% → −17% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −88% early to −17% lately, median −23% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +44%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 44% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −218.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Sensitive information, including confidential, proprietary, competitive or personal data, may be 13 unintentionally disclosed or exposed through the use of third-party AI tools or services, and AI-enabled features that process personal data may reveal additional sensitive information in their outputs.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$550M

Cash & short-term investments$281M
Receivables$130M
Inventory$284K
Other current assets$139M

Current liabilities$353M

Debt due within a year$19K
Accounts payable$112M
Other current liabilities$241M

Current ratio1.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.56×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.80×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$197Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$19K due · $281M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$386Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$144MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5M$5M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$97Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $136M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

Reinvested$55M · 40%
Retained (debt / cash)$81M · 60%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $73M and cash and short-term investments rose $272M.
Net change in share count−97.3%
The diluted count fell from 68M to 2M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$338M30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity47%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against $55M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Genius Sports Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DKNGDraftKings Inc.	$6.1B	38%	-44.5%	-79%	-15%
STUBStubHub Holdings Inc.	$1.7B	—	7.8%	-73%	15%
ACELAccel Entertainment Inc.	$1.3B	—	7.7%	14%	7%
RSIRush Street Interactive Inc.	$1.1B	32%	-19.3%	—	-1%
OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited	$961M	—	7.2%	12%	6%
GENIGenius Sports Limited	$669M	22%	-22.6%	-27%	3%
LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc.	$382M	19%	-13.5%	-1%	—
SEGSeaport Entertainment Group Inc.	$130M	—	-91.7%	-18%	—
Group median	—	27%	-16.4%	-18%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Genius Sports Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Genius Sports Limited has delivered.

Genius Sports Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Genius Sports Limited earns about $18M on its 2.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($18M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+44%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $65M on 255M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $281M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GENI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Genius Sports Limited (GENI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GENI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GDS its page in the Manual GFI →

Industry order: ← GDHG the Casinos & Gaming chapter MSGE →