Share count
163Mpeak FY2022
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GOTU, Gaotu Techedu Inc.
Gaotu Techedu Inc. is a company incorporated outside of mainland China.
The implementation rules define the term "de facto management body" as the body that exercises full and substantial control over and overall management of the business, productions, personnel, accounts and properties of an enterprise.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
CN¥6.1B
+35.0% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥6.1B 5-yr avg CN¥4.5B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −8.2%) on a 72% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −26%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| CN¥98M | CN¥397M | CN¥2.1B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥6.6B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.0B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥6.1B | CN¥6.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 74% | 64% | 75% | 75% | 63% | 72% | 73% | 68% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥92M) | CN¥19M | CN¥216M | (CN¥1.8B) | (CN¥3.2B) | (CN¥118M) | (CN¥149M) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥503M) | (CN¥503M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −94.7% | 4.8% | 10.2% | −24.6% | −48.5% | −4.7% | −5.0% | −26.0% | −8.2% | −8.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥87M) | CN¥20M | CN¥227M | (CN¥1.4B) | (CN¥3.1B) | CN¥13M | (CN¥7M) | (CN¥1.0B) | (CN¥323M) | (CN¥323M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| (CN¥50M) | CN¥242M | CN¥1.3B | CN¥603M | (CN¥4.2B) | CN¥55M | CN¥354M | CN¥258M | CN¥416M | CN¥416M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥5M | CN¥4M | CN¥12M | CN¥56M | CN¥108M | CN¥69M | CN¥51M | CN¥61M | CN¥104M | CN¥104M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥32M | CN¥218M | CN¥1.0B | CN¥1.9B | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥27M) | CN¥310M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥635M | CN¥635M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥370K | CN¥12M | CN¥61M | CN¥284M | CN¥272M | CN¥19M | CN¥41M | CN¥178M | CN¥169M | CN¥169M | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 0.8% | 1.4% | 3.9% | 2.8% | 2.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (CN¥50M) | CN¥238M | CN¥1.3B | CN¥548M | (CN¥4.3B) | CN¥36M | CN¥313M | CN¥197M | CN¥312M | CN¥312M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −51.3% | 59.9% | 60.2% | 7.7% | −65.4% | 1.4% | 10.6% | 4.3% | 5.1% | 5.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (CN¥50M) | CN¥230M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥319M | (CN¥4.5B) | CN¥36M | CN¥313M | CN¥80M | CN¥247M | CN¥247M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −51.3% | 57.8% | 57.9% | 4.5% | −67.9% | 1.4% | 10.6% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 4.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| CN¥0 | CN¥0 | CN¥87M | CN¥283M | CN¥0 | CN¥0 | CN¥90M | CN¥205M | CN¥343M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | 14% | -26% | -117% | -4% | -3% | -152% | -58% | -58% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 15% | -24% | -108% | 0% | -0% | -54% | -26% | -26% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 15% | −24% | −108% | 0% | −0% | −54% | −26% | −26% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| CN¥19M | CN¥231M | CN¥1.5B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥3.7B | CN¥2.9B | CN¥3.2B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥3.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | CN¥9M | CN¥48M | CN¥16M | CN¥23M | CN¥25M | CN¥36M | CN¥55M | CN¥55M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | CN¥9M | CN¥48M | CN¥16M | CN¥23M | CN¥25M | CN¥36M | CN¥55M | CN¥55M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | CN¥281M | CN¥1.8B | CN¥8.5B | CN¥3.9B | CN¥4.2B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥4.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | CN¥356M | CN¥1.6B | CN¥4.2B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥2.0B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥4.2B | CN¥4.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.8× | 1.1× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.6× | 1.8× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | CN¥331K | CN¥331K | CN¥44M | CN¥331K | CN¥331K | CN¥331K | CN¥331K | CN¥11M | CN¥11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | CN¥338M | CN¥3.4B | CN¥10.7B | CN¥5.0B | CN¥4.9B | CN¥5.4B | CN¥5.8B | CN¥6.2B | CN¥6.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥0 | CN¥32M | CN¥32M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | (CN¥3.2B) | (CN¥3.3B) | (CN¥3.3B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| (CN¥479M) | (CN¥493M) | CN¥1.6B | CN¥5.7B | CN¥2.9B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥1.3B | CN¥1.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 92.2M | 92.2M | 139M | 160M | 171M | 176M | 174M | 171M | 163M | 169M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥1.06 | CN¥4.31 | CN¥15.16 | CN¥44.61 | CN¥38.42 | CN¥14.20 | CN¥17.04 | CN¥26.56 | CN¥37.68 | CN¥36.45 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-0.94 | CN¥0.21 | CN¥1.62 | CN¥-8.72 | CN¥-18.17 | CN¥0.07 | CN¥-0.04 | CN¥-6.12 | CN¥-1.98 | CN¥-1.92 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥-0.54 | CN¥2.58 | CN¥9.13 | CN¥3.43 | CN¥-25.14 | CN¥0.20 | CN¥1.80 | CN¥1.15 | CN¥1.91 | CN¥1.85 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥-0.54 | CN¥2.49 | CN¥8.77 | CN¥2.00 | CN¥-26.10 | CN¥0.20 | CN¥1.80 | CN¥0.47 | CN¥1.51 | CN¥1.46 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.13 | CN¥0.44 | CN¥1.78 | CN¥1.59 | CN¥0.11 | CN¥0.23 | CN¥1.04 | CN¥1.04 | CN¥1.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| CN¥-5.20 | CN¥-5.34 | CN¥11.17 | CN¥35.87 | CN¥16.87 | CN¥17.59 | CN¥17.88 | CN¥11.28 | CN¥7.69 | CN¥7.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.51 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +56.3%/yr | −3.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −11.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +100.3%/yr | −10.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | −26.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−58%low FY2024
Gross margin
67%low FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
CN¥312Mowner earningsvs.(CN¥323M)net incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned CN¥312M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥104M it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥65M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was CN¥247M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (CN¥323M) | (CN¥1.0B) | (CN¥7M) | CN¥13M | (CN¥3.1B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥104M | +CN¥61M | +CN¥51M | +CN¥69M | +CN¥108M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +CN¥635M | +CN¥1.2B | +CN¥310M | −CN¥27M | −CN¥1.2B |
| Cash from operations | CN¥416M | CN¥258M | CN¥354M | CN¥55M | (CN¥4.2B) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥104M | −CN¥61M | −CN¥41M | −CN¥19M | −CN¥108M |
| Owner earnings | CN¥312M | CN¥197M | CN¥313M | CN¥36M | (CN¥4.3B) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥65M | −CN¥117M | — | — | −CN¥164M |
| Free cash flow | CN¥247M | CN¥80M | CN¥313M | CN¥36M | (CN¥4.5B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 5% | 4% | 11% | 1% | -65% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥104M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥65M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥3.3BNet cashCash CN¥596M + ST investments CN¥2.7B − debt CN¥32M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥3.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -152%–14%; -58% latest = NOPAT (CN¥398M) ÷ invested capital CN¥689MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -58% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -65%–60%; latest CN¥312M = operating cash CN¥416M − maintenance capex CN¥104MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 9 years. It chose to put CN¥65M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was CN¥247M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? CN¥416MLoss, but cash-generativeNet income (CN¥323M) · cash from operations CN¥416M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks CN¥343M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥312M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against CN¥312M of Owner Earnings, CN¥343M (110%) went back to shareholders, CN¥0 dividends, CN¥343M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.63×ExpandingCapex CN¥169M ÷ depreciation CN¥104M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥6.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.94×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥32M vs (CN¥265M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −966%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥-2.73/share (latest year CN¥-1.92), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥7.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −27% → −13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −27% early to −13% lately, median −8% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −94.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +7.4%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsCN¥4.0B
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥3.3B
- InventoryCN¥55M
- Other current assetsCN¥621M
Current liabilitiesCN¥4.2B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥4.2B
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(CN¥265M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(CN¥965M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥169MCN¥137M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥2.3Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ITGartner Inc. | $6.5B | 67% | 14.1% | 40% | 18% |
| PSNParsons Corporation | $6.4B | 22% | 5.0% | 6% | 7% |
| SSNCSS&C Technologies | $6.3B | 47% | 21.8% | 7% | 25% |
| TOSTToast Inc. | $6.2B | 19% | -13.4% | -38% | -1% |
| GOTUGaotu Techedu Inc. | CN¥6.1B | 72% | -8.2% | -26% | 5% |
| SNAPSnap Inc. | $5.9B | 55% | -32.4% | -24% | -4% |
| HUBBHubbell | $5.8B | 31% | 14.1% | 14% | 12% |
| CVSACovista Inc. | $1.8B | 52% | 13.2% | 8% | 16% |
| Group median | — | 50% | 9.1% | 7% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, every three representing two Class”; Gaotu Techedu Inc. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gaotu Techedu Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Gaotu Techedu Inc. earns about $46M on its 5.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $36M on 253M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2024-12-31; net cash $483M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($25M) runs well above depreciation ($15M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $46M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gaotu Techedu Inc. (GOTU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GOTU, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GOOS its page in the Manual GPRK →
Industry order: ← GHC the Education Services chapter KLC →