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HTLD, Heartland Express Inc.

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive Cyclical

We are a short, medium, and long-haul truckload carrier and transportation services provider.

We primarily provide nationwide asset-based dry van truckload service for major shippers across the United States, along with cross-border freight and other transportation services offered through third party partnerships in Mexico.

We focus on providing high quality service to targeted customers with a high density of freight in our operating areas.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HTLD · Heartland Express Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$806M

−23.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $763M 5-yr avg $927M

Operating margin −6.0% 5-yr avg 6.3%

ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin −8% 5-yr avg −0%

Free cash flow margin −8% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 14% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −7.1% and 19% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 19% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$613M	$607M	$611M	$597M	$645M	$607M	$968M	$1.2B	$1.0B	$806M	$763M	RevenueRevenue
$86M	$64M	$90M	$94M	$93M	$105M	$188M	$42M	($20M)	($57M)	($46M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.0%	10.5%	14.7%	15.8%	14.5%	17.4%	19.5%	3.5%	−1.9%	−7.1%	−6.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$56M	$75M	$73M	$73M	$71M	$79M	$134M	$15M	($30M)	($52M)	($43M)	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	—	21%	25%	25%	25%	26%	26%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$156M	$110M	$147M	$146M	$179M	$123M	$195M	$165M	$144M	$89M	$87M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$106M	$104M	$101M	$101M	$110M	$104M	$133M	$199M	$182M	$159M	$153M	DepreciationDeprec.
($7M)	($70M)	($28M)	($30M)	($4M)	($61M)	($73M)	($50M)	($8M)	($20M)	($24M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$86M	$184M	$169M	$164M	$204M	$133M	$161M	$209M	$110M	$156M	$151M	CapexCapex
14.0%	30.3%	27.7%	27.4%	31.7%	21.8%	16.6%	17.3%	10.5%	19.4%	19.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$70M	$6M	$45M	$45M	$68M	$19M	$34M	($43M)	$35M	($67M)	($64M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.4%	0.9%	7.4%	7.6%	10.6%	3.2%	3.5%	−3.6%	3.3%	−8.3%	−8.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$70M	($75M)	($23M)	($17M)	($25M)	($9M)	$34M	($43M)	$35M	($67M)	($64M)	Free cash flowFCF
11.4%	−12.3%	−3.7%	−2.9%	−3.9%	−1.5%	3.5%	−3.6%	3.3%	−8.3%	−8.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$87M	$0	$62M	$0	$0	$676M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$46M	$6M	$6M	$5M	$6M	$6M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$15M	$0	$25M	$0	$26M	$32M	$0	$0	$7M	$10M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
15%	12%	16%	10%	11%	14%	12%	3%	-2%	-5%	-4%	ROICROIC
11%	13%	12%	11%	10%	11%	16%	2%	-4%	-7%	-6%	Return on equityROE
10%	12%	11%	10%	9%	5%	15%	1%	−4%	−8%	−7%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$129M	$75M	$161M	$77M	$114M	$158M	$49M	$28M	$13M	$18M	$51M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$47M	$64M	$49M	$57M	$56M	$53M	$140M	$103M	$92M	$74M	$78M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$12M	$14M	$11M	$11M	$13M	$21M	$63M	$38M	$35M	$33M	$41M	Accounts payablePayables
$34M	$50M	$38M	$46M	$43M	$32M	$77M	$65M	$56M	$41M	$37M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$202M	$171M	$233M	$152M	$193M	$233M	$230M	$169M	$129M	$115M	$143M	Current assetsCur. assets
$66M	$75M	$65M	$63M	$71M	$72M	$157M	$123M	$120M	$110M	$113M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.1×	2.3×	3.6×	2.4×	2.7×	3.3×	1.5×	1.4×	1.1×	1.0×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$100M	$132M	$132M	$168M	$168M	$168M	$321M	$323M	$323M	$323M	$323M	GoodwillGoodwill
$738M	$789M	$806M	$899M	$951M	$929M	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$17M	—	$70M	—	$0	$401M	$292M	$194M	$156M	$156M	Total debtDebt
—	($58M)	—	($6M)	—	($158M)	$352M	$264M	$181M	$137M	$105M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$506M	$575M	$616M	$685M	$724M	$727M	$855M	$865M	$823M	$755M	$749M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
83.4M	83.3M	82.4M	82.0M	81.4M	79.6M	79.0M	79.1M	78.8M	77.9M	77.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$7.35	$7.29	$7.41	$7.28	$7.92	$7.63	$12.26	$15.27	$13.30	$10.34	$9.84	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.68	$0.90	$0.88	$0.89	$0.87	$1.00	$1.69	$0.19	$-0.38	$-0.67	$-0.56	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.84	$0.07	$0.55	$0.55	$0.84	$0.24	$0.43	$-0.55	$0.44	$-0.86	$-0.83	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.84	$-0.89	$-0.28	$-0.21	$-0.31	$-0.12	$0.43	$-0.55	$0.44	$-0.86	$-0.83	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08	$0.08	$0.08	$0.08	$0.08	$0.58	$0.08	$0.08	$0.06	$0.08	$0.08	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.03	$2.21	$2.05	$2.00	$2.51	$1.67	$2.03	$2.64	$1.39	$2.00	$1.94	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.07	$6.90	$7.47	$8.35	$8.89	$9.13	$10.83	$10.94	$10.44	$9.69	$9.67	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.9%/yr	+5.5%/yr
Dividends / share	+0.0%/yr	+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+7.6%/yr	−4.4%/yr
Book value / share	+5.3%/yr	+1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

78Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

−5%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

5.2×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($67M)owner earningsvs.($52M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $52M loss but ($67M) of owner earnings: $14M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($52M)	($30M)	$15M	$134M	$79M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$159M	+$182M	+$199M	+$133M	+$104M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$2M	+$1M	+$2M	+$1M	+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$20M	−$8M	−$50M	−$73M	−$61M
Cash from operations	$89M	$144M	$165M	$195M	$123M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$156M	−$110M	−$209M	−$161M	−$104M
Owner earnings	($67M)	$35M	($43M)	$34M	$19M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	—	−$28M
Free cash flow	($67M)	$35M	($43M)	$34M	($9M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-8%	3%	-4%	4%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer ($69M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $137M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $18M − debt $156M

What this means
Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $156M of debt leaves $137M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -5%–16%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($45M) ÷ invested capital $893M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–11%; latest ($67M) = operating cash $89M − maintenance capex $156M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves ($69M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $89M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($52M) · cash from operations $89M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.98×

Maintaining

Capex $156M ÷ depreciation $159M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $806M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.04×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $156M vs $4M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −133%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.29/share (latest year $-0.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 13% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to −2% lately, median 14% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −17%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · −7.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We do not currently use AI in any material capacity, and such lack of use may put us at a competitive disadvantage to any competitors who use AI in a material capacity.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$143M

Cash & short-term investments$51M
Receivables$78M
Other current assets$14M

Current liabilities$113M

Accounts payable$41M
Other current liabilities$72M

Current ratio1.27×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.27×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$31Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$358Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$153M$3M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.6B · 108%
Dividends$102M · 7%
Buybacks$115M · 8%

Returned to owners$218M
102% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $102M as dividends and $115M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$339M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $339M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $77M.
Average price paid for buybacks$15.56
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $115M, about $15.56 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $8.66 (2025) to $17.92 (2018); its heaviest year, 2021, paid $17.79 ($32M).
Net change in share count−7.0%
The diluted count fell from 83M to 77M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.08/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 0% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained−24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($276M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $65M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$392M33% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity43%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$825Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.6B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership41.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Heartland Express Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.9% vs 6.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.6% early in the record and −2.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 10% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $47M to $78M while revenue grew 24%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 10% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$480M · 63% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our 25, 10, and 5 largest customers accounted for approximately 63%, 47%, and 32% of our operating revenues, respectively, in 2025.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LSTRLandstar	$4.7B	—	6.9%	48%	5%
ARCBArcBest	$4.0B	—	3.4%	10%	4%
SAIASaia, Inc.	$3.2B	—	10.4%	14%	10%
WERNWerner Enterprises	$2.9B	—	8.0%	12%	5%
ULHUniversal Logistics Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	—	5.8%	10%	3%
CVLGCovenant Logistics Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	4.4%	6%	3%
MRTNMarten Transport	$884M	—	8.8%	11%	—
HTLDHeartland Express Inc.	$806M	—	14.2%	12%	3%
Group median	—	—	7.4%	11%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Heartland Express Inc. has delivered.

Heartland Express Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Heartland Express Inc. earns about $28M on its 3.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −8.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($28M) Net of stock comp (−$2M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($64M) on 77M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $105M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HTLD against another business →

The owners of HTLD: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Heartland Express Inc. (HTLD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HTLD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HTH its page in the Manual HTO →

Industry order: ← FWRD the Trucking & Logistics chapter HUBG →