Owner Scorecard


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MRTN, Marten Transport

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive

We are one of the leading temperature-sensitive truckload carriers in the United States, specializing in transporting and distributing food and other consumer packaged goods that require a temperature-controlled or insulated environment.

Approximately 59% of our Truckload and Dedicated revenue in 2025 resulted from hauling temperature-sensitive products and 41% from hauling dry freight.

We provide regional truckload carrier services in the Southeast, West Coast, Midwest, South Central and Northeast regions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MRTN · Marten Transport
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$884M
−8.3% YoY · 0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $864M 5-yr avg $1.0B
Operating margin 2.2% 5-yr avg 7.4%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Truckload (48%) and Dedicated (32%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 8.7% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.6% to 11% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The largest slice of sales is Truckload at 48%, but the profit engine is Dedicated: 32% of revenue and 67% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Intermodal ran a $2M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Truckload48%$422M3% of profit
  • Dedicated32%$278M67% of profit
  • Brokerage17%$150M29% of profit
  • Intermodal4%$34Mloss of $2M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$671M$698M$788M$843M$874M$974M$1.3B$1.1B$964M$884M$864MRevenueRevenue
$58M$57M$70M$76M$93M$112M$143M$90M$33M$23M$19MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.7%8.1%8.9%9.1%10.7%11.5%11.3%8.0%3.4%2.6%2.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$33M$90M$55M$61M$70M$85M$110M$70M$27M$17M$14MNet incomeNet inc.
41%23%21%26%24%23%25%26%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$134M$122M$154M$156M$190M$171M$219M$164M$135M$93M$90MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$82M$85M$89M$95M$103M$103M$111M$117M$112M$105M$103MDepreciationDeprec.
$18M($54M)$11M$252K$17M($17M)($2M)($25M)($6M)($31M)($29M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M$4M$5M$42M$52M$55M$20M$20M$20M$20M$20MDividends paidDiv. paid
$8M$0$4M$0$597K$0$42M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
8%11%10%11%13%14%18%10%3%2%2%ROICROIC
8%17%10%10%11%13%16%9%4%2%2%Return on equityROE
7%16%9%3%3%5%13%7%1%−0%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$488K$16M$57M$31M$66M$57M$81M$53M$17M$43M$70MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$69M$75M$83M$91M$83M$99M$121M$106M$90M$86M$92MReceivablesReceiv.
$14M$16M$16M$23M$26M$20M$37M$37M$26M$29M$28MAccounts payablePayables
$55M$58M$67M$68M$58M$79M$83M$69M$64M$57M$64MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$93M$117M$164M$154M$176M$187M$236M$197M$139M$172M$196MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$61M$64M$72M$76M$90M$94M$124M$110M$94M$92M$94MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.8×2.3×2.0×2.0×2.0×1.9×1.8×1.5×1.9×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$654M$690M$754M$797M$832M$871M$966M$990M$969M$950M$947MTotal assetsAssets
$437M$526M$576M$598M$620M$652M$704M$757M$768M$768M$764MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
81.7M82.3M82.7M82.7M83.2M83.4M82.0M81.4M81.5M81.5M81.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.22$8.49$9.52$10.20$10.51$11.67$15.42$13.90$11.83$10.84$10.59Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.41$1.10$0.67$0.74$0.84$1.02$1.35$0.86$0.33$0.21$0.18EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.04$0.05$0.07$0.51$0.63$0.66$0.24$0.24$0.24$0.24$0.24Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.35$6.39$6.96$7.23$7.46$7.81$8.59$9.30$9.43$9.42$9.37Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.1%/yr+0.6%/yr
EPS−7.0%/yr−23.9%/yr
Dividends / share+22.1%/yr−17.5%/yr
Book value / share+6.5%/yr+4.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
82Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
2%low FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $43M + ST investments $138K − debt $27M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $16M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–18%; 2% latest = NOPAT $16M ÷ invested capital $752M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $93M ÷ net income $17M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $884M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $27M vs $79M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −36%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.47/share (latest year $0.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 9% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 5% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2025 · 2.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$196M
  • Cash & short-term investments$70M
  • Receivables$92M
  • Other current assets$34M
Current liabilities$94M
  • Debt due within a year$19M
  • Accounts payable$28M
  • Other current liabilities$47M
Current ratio2.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$101Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$19M due · $70M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−8.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$764Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$13MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$28M$416K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021$1.4M$1.4M$85M
2021Randolph L. Marten$1.6M$85M
2022$1.7M$1.8M$110M
2023$1.1M$1.1M$70M
2024$1.1M$890k$27M
2025$1.2M$921k$17M
2025$1.5M$551k$17M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership22.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Marten Transport is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.7% vs 8.6%

    The operating margin averaged 8.6% early in the record and 4.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$613M · 71% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “In 2025, our top 30 customers accounted for approximately 71% of our revenue excluding fuel surcharges, and our top ten customers accounted for 50% of our revenue.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LSTRLandstar$4.7B6.9%48%5%
ARCBArcBest$4.0B3.4%10%4%
SAIASaia, Inc.$3.2B10.4%14%10%
WERNWerner Enterprises$2.9B8.0%12%5%
ULHUniversal Logistics Holdings Inc.$1.6B5.8%10%3%
CVLGCovenant Logistics Group Inc.$1.2B4.4%6%3%
MRTNMarten Transport$884M8.8%11%
HTLDHeartland Express Inc.$806M14.2%12%3%
Group median7.4%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Marten Transport is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−0%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Marten Transport (MRTN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MRTN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MRSH its page in the Manual MRVI →

Industry order: ← LSTR the Trucking & Logistics chapter NCEW →