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ULH, Universal Logistics Holdings Inc.

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

Universal Logistics Holdings, Inc. is a holding company whose subsidiaries provide customized transportation and logistics solutions across North America and select international markets.

Through our operating subsidiaries, we deliver an integrated portfolio of transportation and logistics services designed to support customers throughout their supply chains, including value-added, dedicated, intermodal and trucking services.

Our operations primarily serve customers in the automotive, industrial, retail, consumer goods, energy, and metals sectors.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ULH · Universal Logistics Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.6B

−15.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $1.8B

Operating margin −4.9% 5-yr avg 6.7%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 11%

Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Value-added services (46%) and Dedicated services (22%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 14% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 5.7% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.1% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Value-added services at 46%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Value-added services46%$712M
Dedicated services22%$338M
Intermodal services16%$252M
Truckload Services12%$183M
Brokerage services5%$74M

By geographyUnited States96%Mexico3%Canada1%Colombia0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.5B	RevenueRevenue
4%	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$47M	$25M	$84M	$65M	$80M	$103M	$240M	$145M	$203M	($64M)	($75M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%	2.1%	5.7%	4.3%	5.8%	5.9%	11.9%	8.8%	11.0%	−4.1%	−4.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$24M	$28M	$52M	$38M	$48M	$74M	$169M	$93M	$130M	($100M)	($109M)	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	—	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$69M	$84M	$95M	$128M	$99M	$83M	$213M	$210M	$112M	$183M	$132M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$37M	$47M	$54M	$75M	$74M	$68M	$77M	$77M	$124M	$146M	$146M	DepreciationDeprec.
$7M	$8M	($12M)	$16M	($23M)	($58M)	($32M)	$40M	($143M)	$136M	$94M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$97M	$63M	$67M	$80M	$91M	$39M	$117M	$241M	$252M	$224M	$181M	CapexCapex
9.1%	5.2%	4.6%	5.3%	6.5%	2.2%	5.8%	14.5%	13.6%	14.4%	11.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$32M	$37M	$28M	$48M	$9M	$44M	$137M	$133M	($12M)	$37M	($49M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.0%	3.0%	1.9%	3.2%	0.6%	2.5%	6.8%	8.0%	−0.6%	2.4%	−3.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($29M)	$20M	$28M	$48M	$9M	$44M	$96M	($30M)	($139M)	($41M)	($49M)	Free cash flowFCF
−2.7%	1.7%	1.9%	3.2%	0.6%	2.5%	4.8%	−1.8%	−7.5%	−2.6%	−3.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$174M	$76M	$1M	—	$0	$0	$216M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$8M	$8M	$11M	$15M	$6M	$11M	$14M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$26K	$1M	$930K	$25M	$5M	$0	$14M	$134K	$107K	$85K	—	BuybacksBuybacks
7%	6%	10%	7%	9%	11%	23%	12%	11%	-4%	-5%	ROICROIC
16%	17%	25%	18%	20%	24%	38%	17%	20%	-18%	-20%	Return on equityROE
11%	12%	20%	11%	18%	21%	35%	15%	18%	−21%	−22%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$16M	$17M	$6M	$8M	$9M	$14M	$47M	$13M	$19M	$27M	$28M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$145M	$171M	$216M	$211M	$259M	$341M	$351M	$288M	$294M	$261M	$257M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$9M	$5M	$7M	$7M	$8M	$14M	$11M	$12M	$8M	$10M	$9M	InventoryInvent.
$66M	$84M	$92M	$92M	$98M	$118M	$87M	$64M	$60M	$61M	$52M	Accounts payablePayables
$87M	$92M	$131M	$126M	$170M	$238M	$275M	$236M	$242M	$210M	$214M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$207M	$229M	$275M	$272M	$322M	$421M	$460M	$365M	$410M	$383M	$359M	Current assetsCur. assets
$145M	$199M	$221M	$250M	$273M	$313M	$287M	$260M	$305M	$318M	$318M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.2×	1.3×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$74M	$74M	$145M	$168M	$171M	$171M	$171M	$171M	$207M	$106M	$106M	GoodwillGoodwill
$570M	$611M	$843M	$935M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.7B	Total assetsAssets
$261M	$248M	$400M	$458M	$460M	$427M	$379M	$382M	$759M	$798M	$750M	Total debtDebt
$245M	$231M	$395M	$450M	$451M	$413M	$331M	$369M	$740M	$771M	$722M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.6×	2.6×	5.7×	3.8×	5.5×	8.8×	14.8×	6.0×	5.9×	-1.3×	-1.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$148M	$169M	$209M	$205M	$240M	$302M	$447M	$532M	$647M	$540M	$539M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3M	$101M	$101M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
28.4M	28.4M	28.4M	28.1M	27.0M	26.9M	26.5M	26.3M	26.3M	26.3M	26.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$37.76	$42.80	$51.49	$53.87	$51.52	$65.02	$76.09	$63.18	$70.06	$59.17	$58.57	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.85	$0.99	$1.84	$1.34	$1.78	$2.74	$6.37	$3.53	$4.93	$-3.79	$-4.15	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.12	$1.30	$1.00	$1.72	$0.32	$1.65	$5.16	$5.06	$-0.45	$1.40	$-1.86	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.01	$0.72	$1.00	$1.72	$0.32	$1.65	$3.64	$-1.15	$-5.28	$-1.56	$-1.86	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.28	$0.28	$0.38	$0.54	$0.21	$0.42	$0.53	$0.42	$0.42	$0.42	$0.42	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.43	$2.23	$2.35	$2.84	$3.36	$1.44	$4.42	$9.14	$9.55	$8.51	$6.87	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.20	$5.94	$7.37	$7.31	$8.87	$11.22	$16.87	$20.23	$24.56	$20.52	$20.44	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.1%/yr	+2.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+2.4%/yr	+34.3%/yr
Dividends / share	+4.6%/yr	+14.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+10.6%/yr	+20.4%/yr
Book value / share	+16.5%/yr	+18.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

26Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

−4%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

20.9×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$37Mowner earningsvs.($100M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $37M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $146M it takes just to hold its position. It put $78M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($41M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($100M)	$130M	$93M	$169M	$74M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$146M	+$124M	+$77M	+$77M	+$68M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$457K	+$779K	+$262K	+$222K	+$162K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$136M	−$143M	+$40M	−$32M	−$58M
Cash from operations	$183M	$112M	$210M	$213M	$83M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$146M	−$124M	−$77M	−$77M	−$39M
Owner earnings	$37M	($12M)	$133M	$137M	$44M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$78M	−$127M	−$164M	−$40M	—
Free cash flow	($41M)	($139M)	($30M)	$96M	$44M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	-1%	8%	7%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $146M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $78M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $457K), owner earnings is nearer $36M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”

Restated past financials

“As a result, the Company restated those financial statements and recorded an additional goodwill impairment charge of approximately $43.2 million.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($64M) ÷ interest expense $49M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $756M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $27M + ST investments $15M − debt $798M

What this means
Netting $42M of cash and short-term investments against $798M of debt leaves $756M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -4%–23%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($51M) ÷ invested capital $1.3B

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -1%–8%; latest $37M = operating cash $183M − maintenance capex $146M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put $78M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($41M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $457K of SBC) leaves $36M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $183M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($100M) · cash from operations $183M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 30%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $11M ÷ Owner Earnings $37M

What this means
Of $37M Owner Earnings, $11M (30%) went back to shareholders, $11M dividends, $85K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($457K SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.53×

Expanding

Capex $224M ÷ depreciation $146M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.20×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $798M vs $65M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +18%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.55/share (latest year $-3.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 5% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth −11%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · −4.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$359M

Cash & short-term investments$28M
Receivables$257M
Inventory$9M
Other current assets$64M

Current liabilities$318M

Debt due within a year$116M
Accounts payable$52M
Other current liabilities$150M

Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$42Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$116M due · $28M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$327Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$931M$180M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.3B · 99%
Dividends$106M · 8%
Buybacks$47M · 4%

Returned to owners$153M
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $106M as dividends and $47M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$146M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $146M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $261M to $750M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $47M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−7.2%
The diluted count fell from 28M to 26M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.42/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($403M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $20M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$214M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity20%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$467Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building

$105M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 22% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Tim Phillips	$1.0M	$896k	$44M
2022	Tim Phillips	$1.1M	$2.1M	$137M
2023	Tim Phillips	$1.2M	$909k	$133M
2024	Tim Phillips	$1.2M	$2.3M	($12M)
2025	Tim Phillips	$1.2M	−$633k	$37M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership73.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio26:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$457K
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Universal Logistics Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$261M → $750M
Debt rose from $261M to $750M while owner earnings went from about $32M to $53M — about 8.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 14 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$911M · 59% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2025: Automotive customers represented approximately 45% of total revenues; Our top customer, General Motors, represented approximately 25% of revenues; and Our top ten customers represented approximately 59% of revenues.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LSTRLandstar	$4.7B	—	6.9%	48%	5%
ARCBArcBest	$4.0B	—	3.4%	10%	4%
SAIASaia, Inc.	$3.2B	—	10.4%	14%	10%
WERNWerner Enterprises	$2.9B	—	8.0%	12%	5%
ULHUniversal Logistics Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	—	5.8%	10%	3%
CVLGCovenant Logistics Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	4.4%	6%	3%
MRTNMarten Transport	$884M	—	8.8%	11%	—
HTLDHeartland Express Inc.	$806M	—	14.2%	12%	3%
Group median	—	—	7.4%	11%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Universal Logistics Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Universal Logistics Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Universal Logistics Holdings Inc. earns about $43M on its 2.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($43M) Net of stock comp (−$1M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($14M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−39%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($49M) on 26M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $722M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($181M) runs well above depreciation ($146M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($14M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ULH against another business →

The owners of ULH: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Universal Logistics Holdings Inc. (ULH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ULH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ULCC its page in the Manual ULS →

Industry order: ← TFII the Trucking & Logistics chapter UPS →