Share count
90Mpeak FY2024
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HTLM, HomesToLife Ltd
Specialty Retail retail
We closely monitor HTL Marketing's loan utilization and repayment status on a monthly basis, and GHC provides quarterly updates regarding its continued ability to maintain the guarantee.
We conduct credit evaluations of customers and generally do not require collateral or other security from our customers.
HTL Marketing obtained the trade financing revolving and factoring facilities among various financial institutions in Singapore, in the aggregate principal amount of up to $33 million, which bear annual interest at the effective average rates of 5.52% to 5.94% with maturity of 90 days to 180 days.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$378M
+12.8% YoY · 298% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $378M 4-yr avg $261M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Export Sales (93%), Leather Trading (5%) and Retail Sales (2%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 5.1% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.8% to 12% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →The biggest segment, Export Sales, is also where the profit is made: 93% of revenue and 97% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Retail Sales ran a $1M operating loss.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
- Export Sales93%$350M97% of profit
- Leather Trading5%$19M3% of profit
- Retail Sales2%$9Mloss of $1M
By geographyEurope60%Asia Pacific27%North America13%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $6M | $326M | $335M | $378M | $378M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 26% | 25% | 28% | 28% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $743K | $17M | $10M | $19M | $19M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 12.4% | 5.3% | 2.8% | 5.1% | 5.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $815K | $10M | $8M | $17M | $17M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 15% | 22% | 20% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $2M | $19M | $385K | $13M | $13M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $56K | $116K | $209K | $506K | $506K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $863K | $8M | ($8M) | ($4M) | ($4M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $15K | $276K | $516K | $1M | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | $19M | $176K | $13M | $13M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 28.8% | 5.7% | 0.1% | 3.4% | 3.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2M | $19M | ($131K) | $12M | $12M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 28.8% | 5.7% | −0.0% | 3.3% | 3.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $12M | — | $12M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 5% | 85% | 79% | 59% | 59% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −32% | — | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $1M | $25M | $27M | $27M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $113K | $67M | $76M | $76M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $675K | $8M | $10M | $10M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $994K | $268K | — | $268K | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($206K) | $75M | $86M | $85M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $4M | $108M | $126M | $126M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $3M | $103M | $105M | $105M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $7M | $119M | $139M | $139M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | ($1M) | ($25M) | ($27M) | ($27M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | 19.5× | 9.1× | 13.8× | 13.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $16M | $12M | $11M | $28M | $28M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 13.3M | 88.3M | 89.7M | 89.7M | 89.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.45 | $3.69 | $3.74 | $4.21 | $4.21 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.06 | $0.12 | $0.09 | $0.18 | $0.18 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.13 | $0.21 | $0.00 | $0.14 | $0.14 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.13 | $0.21 | $-0.00 | $0.14 | $0.14 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $0.13 | — | $0.13 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.18 | $0.14 | $0.12 | $0.31 | $0.31 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×6.66 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +110.6%/yr | +110.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.7%/yr | +3.7%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | +44.3%/yr | +44.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +125.9%/yr | +125.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −36.0%/yr | −36.0%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
28%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$13Mowner earningsvs.$17Mnet incomelow FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2022FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $13M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $506K it takes just to hold its position. It put $630K more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $12M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $17M | $8M | $10M | $815K |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$506K | +$209K | +$116K | +$56K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$4M | −$8M | +$8M | +$863K |
| Cash from operations | $13M | $385K | $19M | $2M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$506K | −$209K | −$116K | −$15K |
| Owner earnings | $13M | $176K | $19M | $2M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$630K | −$307K | −$160K | — |
| Free cash flow | $12M | ($131K) | $19M | $2M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 0% | 6% | 29% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $506K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $630K of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F/A · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 13.8×ComfortableOperating income $19M ÷ interest expense $1M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $27M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $27M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 73 + DIO 13 − DPO 0 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 36%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thin through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 0%–29%; latest $13M = operating cash $13M − maintenance capex $506KIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 4 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $13M ÷ net income $17M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $13M
What this means
Of $13M Owner Earnings, $12M (91%) went back to shareholders, $12M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.24×ExpandingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $506K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $378M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.19×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.13/share (latest year $0.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 9% → 4% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 4% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth −14%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 14% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 2.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$126M
- Cash & short-term investments$27M
- Receivables$76M
- Inventory$10M
- Other current assets$13M
Current liabilities$105M
- Accounts payable$268K
- Other current liabilities$105M
Current ratio1.19×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$20Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$28Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$14MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2M$2M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $34M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2M · 6%
- Dividends$12M · 34%
- Retained (debt / cash)$21M · 60%
- Returned to owners$12M
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $12M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Net change in share count576.9%
The diluted count rose from 13M to 90M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.13/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($24M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $4M, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why HomesToLife Ltd is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.7% vs 17.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 17.3% early in the record and 1.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?576.9%
Diluted shares grew 576.9% over 2022–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BBYBest Buy Co. Inc. | $41.7B | 23% | 4.4% | 44% | 4% |
| WSMWilliams-Sonoma | $7.8B | 46% | 14.7% | 88% | 12% |
| GMEGameStop Corp. | $3.6B | 28% | -2.7% | -59% | 2% |
| RHRH | $3.4B | 44% | 11.7% | 29% | 9% |
| ARHSArhaus Inc. | $1.4B | 39% | 6.4% | 45% | 8% |
| HVTHaverty Furniture Companies Inc. | $759M | 56% | 5.7% | 12% | 5% |
| HTLMHomesToLife Ltd | $378M | 26% | 5.2% | — | 5% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 5.7% | — | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. HomesToLife Ltd's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what HomesToLife Ltd has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, HomesToLife Ltd earns about $17M on its 4.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25−16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25−14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $12M on 90M shares outstanding, per the 20-F/A cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $27M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1M) runs well above depreciation ($506K), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $13M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "HomesToLife Ltd (HTLM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HTLM, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← HTHT its page in the Manual HTT →
Industry order: ← HITI the Specialty Retail chapter HVT →