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KMDA, Kamada Ltd.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Cyclical

A pharmaceutical business, where patents grant a temporary monopoly the pipeline must keep refilling.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F

KMDA · Kamada Ltd.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$180M

+12.1% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $180M 5-yr avg $143M

Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 38%

Operating margin 14.5% 5-yr avg 7.4%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%

Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 36% and operating margin about 7.2% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −7.1% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 34% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 regions, the largest U.S.A at 55%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

U.S.A55%$100M
Israel16%$30M
Latin America13%$24M
Canada6%$11M
Europe5%$9M
Asia4%$7M
Others0%$56K

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
											Income statement
$77M	$103M	$114M	$127M	$133M	$104M	$129M	$143M	$161M	$180M	$180M	RevenueRevenue
28%	31%	36%	39%	36%	29%	36%	39%	43%	42%	42%	Gross marginGross mgn
($5M)	$7M	$19M	$23M	$19M	($696K)	$5M	$10M	$20M	$26M	$26M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−7.1%	7.2%	16.8%	17.9%	14.4%	−0.7%	3.5%	7.1%	12.5%	14.5%	14.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($7M)	$7M	$22M	$22M	$17M	($2M)	($2M)	$8M	$14M	$20M	$20M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	4%	-10%	3%	8%	—	—	2%	-8%	14%	14%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$2M	$4M	$11M	$28M	$19M	($9M)	$29M	$4M	$48M	$25M	$25M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$2M	$2M	DepreciationDeprec.
$6M	($6M)	($15M)	$2M	($1M)	($8M)	$30M	($5M)	$32M	$4M	$3M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$4M	$3M	$2M	$5M	$4M	$4M	$6M	$11M	$10M	$10M	CapexCapex
3.4%	4.1%	2.5%	1.8%	4.1%	3.6%	2.9%	4.1%	6.7%	5.5%	5.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($744K)	$1M	$8M	$25M	$16M	($10M)	$28M	$3M	$46M	$24M	$24M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.0%	1.1%	6.7%	19.9%	11.9%	−9.5%	21.3%	2.2%	28.6%	13.2%	13.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($744K)	($559K)	$8M	$25M	$14M	($13M)	$25M	($2M)	$37M	$16M	$16M	Free cash flowFCF
−1.0%	−0.5%	6.7%	19.9%	10.2%	−12.1%	19.2%	−1.1%	22.9%	8.7%	8.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-7%	9%	20%	24%	16%	-0%	—	5%	11%	12%	11%	ROICROIC
-10%	8%	20%	16%	10%	-1%	-1%	3%	6%	8%	8%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$10M	$13M	$18M	$74M	$109M	$19M	$34M	$56M	$78M	$75M	$115M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$20M	$31M	$28M	$23M	$22M	$35M	$27M	$20M	$22M	$27M	$27M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$26M	$21M	$29M	$43M	$42M	$67M	$69M	$88M	$79M	$85M	$85M	InventoryInvent.
$16M	$18M	$17M	$25M	$8M	$7M	$8M	$25M	$28M	$23M	$23M	Accounts payablePayables
$29M	$34M	$40M	$42M	$57M	$95M	$88M	$84M	$73M	$89M	$89M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$77M	$97M	$111M	$144M	$178M	$130M	$139M	$170M	$184M	$193M	$193M	Current assetsCur. assets
$27M	$29M	$24M	$33M	$25M	$54M	$76M	$50M	$49M	$47M	$47M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×	3.3×	4.7×	4.4×	7.1×	2.4×	1.8×	3.4×	3.7×	4.1×	4.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	—	$147M	$30M	$30M	$30M	$30M	GoodwillGoodwill
$100M	$122M	$138M	$174M	$211M	$319M	$322M	$355M	$372M	$379M	$379M	Total assetsAssets
$2M	$2M	$688K	$746K	$274K	$20M	$22M	$15M	—	—	$15M	Total debtDebt
($8M)	($11M)	($17M)	($73M)	($109M)	$1M	($12M)	($40M)	—	—	($99M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-43.5×	90.8×	112.0×	77.8×	72.3×	-2.5×	5.0×	7.8×	30.4×	30.4×	30.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$67M	$89M	$112M	$135M	$179M	$177M	$176M	$244M	$259M	$269M	$269M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
36.4M	38.0M	40.3M	40.3M	44.1M	44.8M	44.8M	48.8M	57.5M	57.6M	57.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.13	$2.71	$2.84	$3.15	$3.02	$2.31	$2.89	$2.92	$2.80	$3.13	$3.13	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.18	$0.18	$0.55	$0.55	$0.39	$-0.05	$-0.05	$0.17	$0.25	$0.35	$0.35	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.02	$0.03	$0.19	$0.63	$0.36	$-0.22	$0.62	$0.06	$0.80	$0.41	$0.41	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.02	$-0.01	$0.19	$0.63	$0.31	$-0.28	$0.55	$-0.03	$0.64	$0.27	$0.27	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07	$0.11	$0.07	$0.06	$0.12	$0.08	$0.08	$0.12	$0.19	$0.17	$0.17	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.83	$2.36	$2.79	$3.36	$4.05	$3.95	$3.93	$5.00	$4.51	$4.67	$4.66	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.4%/yr	+0.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+2.9%/yr
EPS	—	−2.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+10.0%/yr	+6.6%/yr
Book value / share	+10.9%/yr	+2.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

58Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

12%low FY2016

Gross margin

42%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$24Mowner earningsvs.$20Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $24M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2M it takes just to hold its position. It put $8M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $16M.

Reported net income$20M

Owner earnings$24M · 13% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$20M	$14M	$8M	($2M)	($2M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2M	+$1M	+$1M	+$1M	+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$4M	+$32M	−$5M	+$30M	−$8M
Cash from operations	$25M	$48M	$4M	$29M	($9M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2M	−$1M	−$1M	−$1M	−$1M
Owner earnings	$24M	$46M	$3M	$28M	($10M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$8M	−$9M	−$5M	−$3M	−$3M
Free cash flow	$16M	$37M	($2M)	$25M	($13M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	29%	2%	21%	-10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $8M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 30.4×

Comfortable

Operating income $26M ÷ interest expense $864K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$99M

Net cash

Cash $75M + ST investments $39M − debt $15M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $99M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 271d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 55 + DIO 298 − DPO 82 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 11%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range -7%–24%; 11% latest = NOPAT $23M ÷ invested capital $209M

Industry peers: median -66%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -10%–29%; latest $24M = operating cash $25M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median -254%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put $8M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $16M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.25×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $25M ÷ net income $20M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 48%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $24M

What this means
Of $24M Owner Earnings, $12M (48%) went back to shareholders, $12M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 6.01×

Expanding

Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $2M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $180M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $15M vs $146M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +91%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.25/share (latest year $0.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 11% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +80%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 80% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −7.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +5.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$193M

Cash & short-term investments$115M
Receivables$27M
Inventory$85M

Current liabilities$47M

Debt due within a year$4M
Accounts payable$23M
Other current liabilities$20M

Current ratio4.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.28×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$146Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $115M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$104Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$23M$7M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $160M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$51M · 32%
Dividends$12M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$97M · 61%

Returned to owners$12M
8% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $12M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $13M and cash and short-term investments rose $105M.
Net change in share count58.4%
The diluted count rose from 36M to 58M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.20/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($89M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $22M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$165M44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity11%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $51M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kamada Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?58.4%
Diluted shares grew 58.4% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
RYTMRhythm Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$190M	90%	-238.1%	-67%	-176%
MRVIMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc.	$186M	53%	16.8%	-32%	21%
STOKStoke Therapeutics Inc.	$184M	—	-559.3%	-79%	-254%
KMDAKamada Ltd.	$180M	36%	9.8%	11%	9%
CYRXCryoPort Inc.	$176M	46%	-44.0%	-14%	-17%
PHATPhathom Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$175M	86%	-502.2%	—	-483%
SNDXSyndax Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$172M	—	-3263.2%	-64%	-2251%
LQDALiquidia Corporation	$158M	76%	-419.6%	-163%	-266%
Group median	—	65%	-328.9%	-64%	-215%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Kamada Ltd. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kamada Ltd. has delivered.

Kamada Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Kamada Ltd. earns about $17M on its 9.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($17M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($24M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+41%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−58%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $16M on 58M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $99M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $24M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh KMDA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kamada Ltd. (KMDA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KMDA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KLAR its page in the Manual KMRK →

Industry order: ← JNJ the Pharmaceuticals chapter KNSA →