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LAUR, Laureate Education Inc.

Education Services capital-intensive Cyclical

Education markets in Mexico and Peru present an attractive long-term opportunity, primarily because of the large and growing imbalance between the supply and demand for affordable, quality higher education in those markets.

Our institutions in Mexico and Peru operate within scaled country networks, which provide advantages in terms of shared infrastructure, technology, curricula and operational best practices.

O ur students are enrolled at traditional, campus-based institutions offering multi-year degrees, with an average program length of four years, similar to leading private and public higher education institutions in developed markets such as the United States and Europe.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LAUR · Laureate Education Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.7B

+8.6% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.4B

Gross margin 27% 5-yr avg 27%

Operating margin 24.0% 5-yr avg 18.7%

ROIC 27% 5-yr avg 17%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 7.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −32% and 25% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

100% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Mexico52%$877M
Peru48%$824M
United States0%$142K

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.3B	$3.3B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
16%	17%	21%	22%	22%	25%	27%	27%	27%	28%	27%	Gross marginGross mgn
7%	9%	23%	19%	19%	19%	5%	4%	3%	3%	3%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$291M	$235M	($27M)	$36M	($329M)	($5M)	$270M	$339M	$374M	$431M	$417M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
8.8%	7.1%	−2.3%	3.0%	−32.1%	−0.4%	21.7%	22.8%	23.9%	25.3%	24.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$372M	$91M	$370M	$938M	($613M)	$192M	$70M	$108M	$296M	$282M	$280M	Net incomeNet inc.
8%	—	16%	3%	—	43%	—	56%	29%	29%	28%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$192M	$192M	$397M	$340M	$260M	($156M)	$178M	$251M	$233M	$366M	$370M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
—	—	—	—	—	$101M	$59M	$70M	$68M	$74M	$74M	DepreciationDeprec.
($218M)	$36M	$16M	($612M)	$860M	($460M)	$41M	$66M	($140M)	($3M)	$3M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$240M	$274M	$238M	$156M	$75M	$50M	$53M	$56M	$72M	$103M	$107M	CapexCapex
7.3%	8.2%	20.8%	12.8%	7.3%	4.6%	4.2%	3.8%	4.6%	6.1%	6.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($48M)	($82M)	$159M	$184M	$185M	($207M)	$125M	$194M	$161M	$263M	$264M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.5%	−2.5%	13.9%	15.2%	18.0%	−19.0%	10.1%	13.1%	10.3%	15.5%	15.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($48M)	($82M)	$159M	$184M	$185M	($207M)	$125M	$194M	$161M	$263M	$264M	Free cash flowFCF
−1.5%	−2.5%	13.9%	15.2%	18.0%	−19.0%	10.1%	13.1%	10.3%	15.5%	15.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$835K	$17M	$1M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$264M	$100M	$381M	$282M	$0	$102M	$215M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
7%	4%	-0%	1%	-10%	-0%	15%	16%	28%	26%	27%	ROICROIC
59%	6%	18%	33%	-27%	17%	9%	11%	31%	24%	27%	Return on equityROE
59%	6%	18%	33%	−27%	17%	9%	11%	31%	24%	27%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$296M	$319M	$78M	$62M	$750M	$325M	$85M	$89M	$91M	$147M	$157M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$335M	$311M	$225M	$260M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$260M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$87M	$70M	$65M	$63M	$41M	$27M	$43M	$43M	$35M	$57M	$46M	Accounts payablePayables
$248M	$241M	$160M	$197M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$215M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$916M	$1.4B	$544M	$226M	$224M	$227M	$318M	$271M	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$805M	$372M	$381M	$453M	$368M	$473M	$475M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×	0.9×	1.0×	0.9×	1.8×	1.5×	0.6×	0.5×	0.6×	0.7×	0.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.8B	$1.8B	$579M	$606M	$575M	$547M	$583M	$661M	$563M	$637M	$635M	GoodwillGoodwill
$7.1B	$7.4B	$6.8B	$6.5B	$5.0B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.3B	Total assetsAssets
$3.6B	$3.0B	$2.8B	$1.3B	$1.0B	$157M	$234M	$167M	$102M	$129M	$217M	Total debtDebt
$3.3B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$1.2B	$299M	($168M)	$149M	$78M	$11M	($18M)	$60M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.7×	0.7×	-0.1×	0.3×	-3.3×	-0.1×	16.4×	16.1×	20.7×	40.4×	36.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$632M	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.8B	$2.3B	$1.1B	$776M	$950M	$960M	$1.2B	$1.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.9%	0.9%	1.1%	1.3%	0.9%	0.7%	0.5%	0.5%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
134M	172M	213M	222M	210M	190M	168M	158M	154M	149M	142M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$24.57	$19.33	$5.38	$5.46	$4.89	$5.73	$7.38	$9.40	$10.18	$11.45	$12.22	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.77	$0.53	$1.74	$4.23	$-2.92	$1.01	$0.41	$0.68	$1.93	$1.89	$1.96	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.36	$-0.48	$0.75	$0.83	$0.88	$-1.09	$0.75	$1.23	$1.05	$1.77	$1.85	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.36	$-0.48	$0.75	$0.83	$0.88	$-1.09	$0.75	$1.23	$1.05	$1.77	$1.85	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.79	$1.59	$1.12	$0.70	$0.36	$0.27	$0.31	$0.36	$0.47	$0.69	$0.75	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.70	$9.14	$9.69	$12.69	$10.86	$6.01	$4.61	$6.02	$6.24	$7.99	$7.37	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−8.1%/yr	+18.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+15.0%/yr
EPS	−4.1%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−10.0%/yr	+14.3%/yr
Book value / share	+6.1%/yr	−5.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

149Mpeak FY2019

ROIC

26%low FY2020

Gross margin

28%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-0.1×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$263Mowner earningsvs.$282Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $282M of profit but $263M of owner earnings: $18M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$282M

Owner earnings$263M · 15% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$282M	$296M	$108M	$70M	$192M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$74M	+$68M	+$70M	+$59M	+$101M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$13M	+$8M	+$7M	+$9M	+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$3M	−$140M	+$66M	+$41M	−$460M
Cash from operations	$366M	$233M	$251M	$178M	($156M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$103M	−$72M	−$56M	−$53M	−$50M
Owner earnings	$263M	$161M	$194M	$125M	($207M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	15%	10%	13%	10%	-19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $250M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 40.4×

Comfortable

Operating income $431M ÷ interest expense $11M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$18M

Net cash

Cash $147M − debt $129M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $18M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 39d

Tight

DSO 56 + DIO 0 − DPO 17 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -10%–28%; 26% latest = NOPAT $304M ÷ invested capital $1.2B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 26% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -19%–18%; latest $263M = operating cash $366M − maintenance capex $103M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $250M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.30×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $366M ÷ net income $282M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 82%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $215M ÷ Owner Earnings $263M

What this means
Of $263M Owner Earnings, $215M (82%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $215M buybacks. Net of $13M stock comp, the real buyback was about $202M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.38×

Expanding

Capex $103M ÷ depreciation $74M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.67×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $129M vs ($155M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −18%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.63/share (latest year $2.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 24% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −32.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.1%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, our efforts may be materially adversely affected by increased competition in the online education market and our competitors' increasing use of artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning or because of problems with the performance or reliability of our online program infrastructure.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$271M

Cash & short-term investments$157M
Receivables$260M

Current liabilities$475M

Accounts payable$46M
Other current liabilities$429M

Current ratio0.57×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.57×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.33×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($204M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$247Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($961M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$668M$507M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $580M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$130Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$114M

'27$94M

'28$69M

'29$59M

'30$53M

later$340M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$114Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$728Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$451Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$129M

Lease obligations (present value)$451M

Total fixed claims on the business$580M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $580M, of which the leases are 78%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.3B · 58%
Buybacks$1.3B · 60%

Returned to owners$1.3B
144% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$408M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $408M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $138M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count5.9%
The diluted count rose from 134M to 142M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained26%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($763M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $196M, so each retained $1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$803M36% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity54%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$19Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building

$23M written down across 1 year (2016): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership1.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio1,595:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Laureate Education Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.9%
Diluted shares grew 5.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.3B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $969M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ALHAlliance Laundry Holdings Inc.	$1.7B	—	18.6%	—	9%
LAURLaureate Education Inc.	$1.7B	23%	7.9%	6%	12%
ZWSZurn Elkay Water Solutions Corporation	$1.7B	40%	13.4%	7%	10%
AZZAZZ Inc.	$1.7B	24%	13.1%	7%	10%
SXTSensient Technologies	$1.6B	33%	12.3%	9%	6%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.	$1.6B	95%	-12.2%	-8%	-1%
CCOClear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	—	12.3%	11%	-3%
LINCLincoln Educational Services Corporation	$518M	57%	4.1%	11%	1%
Group median	—	36%	12.3%	7%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Laureate Education Inc. has delivered.

Laureate Education Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Laureate Education Inc. earns about $199M on its 11.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($199M) Net of stock comp (−$13M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+28%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $264M on 140M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $60M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LAUR against another business →

The owners of LAUR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Laureate Education Inc. (LAUR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LAUR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LASR its page in the Manual LAZ →

Industry order: ← KLC the Education Services chapter LFS →