Owner Scorecard


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LGCL, Lucas GC Limited

Software asset-light

Our capability to constantly innovate remains an important differentiator as we continue to deliver new functions on our platforms.

Our results of operations have shown that this synergistic and thriving business model allows us to penetrate the recruitment market at scale without direct salesforce.

By further leveraging our growing database and powerful AI-enabled technologies, we are able to analyze user behavior and intent more precisely, address corporate customers' in-depth needs in a broader array of business scenarios, and introduce new functions to better serve the entire workforce spectrum.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · US listing is the ordinary share
LGCL · Lucas GC Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥1.0B
−2.0% YoY · 12% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥1.0B 5-yr avg CN¥1000M
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 30%
Operating margin 1.9% 5-yr avg 3.8%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 26%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin −5% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 4.1% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 1.9%–5.7% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −8 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 27%, above 15% in 2 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2021–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥652MCN¥767MCN¥1.5BCN¥1.1BCN¥1.0BCN¥1.0BRevenueRevenue
27%28%28%34%34%34%Gross marginGross mgn
CN¥37MCN¥32MCN¥68MCN¥28MCN¥20MCN¥20MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.7%4.1%4.6%2.6%1.9%1.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
CN¥40MCN¥36MCN¥78MCN¥40MCN¥10MCN¥10MNet incomeNet inc.
-1%-2%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
CN¥61M(CN¥15M)(CN¥36M)CN¥20MCN¥35MCN¥35MOperating cash flowOp. cash
CN¥2MCN¥3MCN¥4MCN¥9MCN¥13MCN¥13MDepreciationDeprec.
CN¥19M(CN¥55M)(CN¥119M)(CN¥28M)CN¥12MCN¥12MWorking capital & otherWC & other
CN¥24MCN¥14MCN¥12MCN¥45MCN¥83MCN¥83MCapexCapex
3.7%1.8%0.8%4.2%8.0%8.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
CN¥59M(CN¥18M)(CN¥41M)CN¥12MCN¥22MCN¥22MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.1%−2.4%−2.8%1.1%2.1%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
CN¥36M(CN¥29M)(CN¥49M)(CN¥24M)(CN¥48M)(CN¥48M)Free cash flowFCF
5.6%−3.8%−3.3%−2.3%−4.6%−4.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
47%41%12%6%6%ROICROIC
31%40%15%3%3%Return on equityROE
31%40%15%3%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
CN¥48MCN¥30MCN¥33MCN¥35MCN¥35MCash & investmentsCash+inv
CN¥103MCN¥28MCN¥61MCN¥31MCN¥31MReceivablesReceiv.
CN¥87MCN¥35MCN¥47MCN¥36MCN¥36MAccounts payablePayables
CN¥16M(CN¥7M)CN¥14M(CN¥5M)(CN¥5M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
CN¥196MCN¥231MCN¥263MCN¥225MCN¥225MCurrent assetsCur. assets
CN¥123MCN¥95MCN¥138MCN¥140MCN¥140MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×2.4×1.9×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
CN¥241MCN¥292MCN¥403MCN¥454MCN¥454MTotal assetsAssets
(CN¥48M)(CN¥30M)(CN¥33M)(CN¥35M)(CN¥35M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1054.1×73.7×15.4×7.3×7.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
CN¥116MCN¥194MCN¥263MCN¥311MCN¥311MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
2.0M2.0M2.0M2.0M2.4M79.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
CN¥334.21CN¥392.79CN¥755.26CN¥536.47CN¥432.57CN¥13.12Revenue / shareRev/sh
CN¥20.40CN¥18.66CN¥40.06CN¥20.22CN¥4.09CN¥0.12EPS (diluted)EPS
CN¥30.28CN¥-9.46CN¥-20.86CN¥5.89CN¥9.23CN¥0.28Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
CN¥18.70CN¥-14.78CN¥-24.86CN¥-12.34CN¥-19.83CN¥-0.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
CN¥12.37CN¥7.03CN¥6.20CN¥22.53CN¥34.55CN¥1.05Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
CN¥59.37CN¥99.48CN¥132.59CN¥129.19CN¥3.92Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/40 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×32.98 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
4-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.7%/yr+6.7%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share−25.7%/yr−25.7%/yr (4-yr)
EPS−33.1%/yr−33.1%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+29.3%/yr+29.3%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share+29.6%/yr (3-yr)+29.6%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2021–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
2Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2025
Gross margin
34%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

CN¥22Mowner earningsvs.CN¥10Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2021FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned CN¥22M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥13M it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥70M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (CN¥48M).

Reported net incomeCN¥10M
Owner earningsCN¥22M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeCN¥10MCN¥40MCN¥78MCN¥36MCN¥40M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+CN¥13M+CN¥9M+CN¥4M+CN¥3M+CN¥2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+CN¥12M−CN¥28M−CN¥119M−CN¥55M+CN¥19M
Cash from operationsCN¥35MCN¥20M(CN¥36M)(CN¥15M)CN¥61M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−CN¥13M−CN¥9M−CN¥4M−CN¥3M−CN¥2M
Owner earningsCN¥22MCN¥12M(CN¥41M)(CN¥18M)CN¥59M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−CN¥70M−CN¥36M−CN¥8M−CN¥10M−CN¥23M
Free cash flow(CN¥48M)(CN¥24M)(CN¥49M)(CN¥29M)CN¥36M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%1%-3%-2%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥13M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥70M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income CN¥20M ÷ interest expense CN¥3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash CN¥30M + ST investments CN¥5M − debt CN¥0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥35M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 11 + DIO 0 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -6%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range -3%–9%; latest CN¥22M = operating cash CN¥35M − maintenance capex CN¥13M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 5 years. It chose to put CN¥70M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (CN¥48M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops CN¥35M ÷ net income CN¥10M

    In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 6% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 6.29×
    Expanding
    Capex CN¥83M ÷ depreciation CN¥13M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥1.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.61×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (5-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥15.30/share (latest year CN¥3.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥111.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2021–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 5
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 5% → 2% (2-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to 2% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 1.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“By leveraging our established AI infrastructure and GPT capabilities, we gained significant development efficiencies and enabling the maintenance of our competitive positioning.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥225M
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥35M
  • ReceivablesCN¥31M
  • Other current assetsCN¥159M
Current liabilitiesCN¥140M
  • Accounts payableCN¥36M
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥104M
Current ratio1.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.61×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥86Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥311Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥86MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥458KCN¥458K of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2021–2025

Over the record, the business generated CN¥65M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • ReinvestedCN¥178M · 275%
  • BuybacksCN¥856K · 1%
  • Returned to ownersCN¥856K

    3% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥0 as dividends and CN¥856K as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−CN¥114M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran CN¥114M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran CN¥856K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count3971.9%

    The diluted count rose from 2M to 79M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥203M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell CN¥2M, so each retained CN¥1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Lucas GC Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.

All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.6% vs 3.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.3% early in the record and 1.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3971.9%

    Diluted shares grew 3971.9% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent CN¥856K on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.32×

    Across the record the business reported CN¥204M of net income but generated CN¥65M of operating cash, a 0.32-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TRIPTripAdvisor Inc.$1.9B93%6.9%9%10%
TEMTempus AI Inc.$1.3B-59.8%-210%-37%
LGCLLucas GC LimitedCN¥1.0B28%4.1%27%1%
BMBLBumble Inc.$966M71%-14.5%-6%
DOCNDigitalOcean$901M60%-2.6%-0%15%
DVDoubleVerify$748M83%12.5%7%18%
MGNIMagnite Inc.$714M62%-18.6%-13%18%
EVEREverQuote Inc.$693M94%-3.7%-34%1%
Group median71%-3.2%-3%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Lucas GC Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lucas GC Limited has delivered.

Lucas GC Limited’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Lucas GC Limited earns about $2M on its 1.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($7M) on 3M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $5M. The if-converted diluted count is 79M, 2748% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($12M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lucas GC Limited (LGCL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LGCL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LFS its page in the Manual LGO →

Industry order: ← LDOS the Software chapter LSPD →