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LPL, LG Display Co., Ltd.
LG Display makes the flat panels that go inside other companies' products — the screens used in televisions, monitors, laptops, phones and tablets. It sells these panels to electronics manufacturers, including its affiliate LG Electronics, which fit them into finished goods. The money comes from building panels in large fabrication plants and shipping them in volume, so earnings turn on the price each panel fetches and the cost to make it.
According to OMDIA, we had a global market share for display panels of nine inches or larger of approximately 13% and for those smaller than nine inches of approximately 16%, each based on sales revenue in 2025.
We currently operate fabrication facilities, which include separately designated sets of fabrication production lines housed in certain facilities, located in our fabrication complexes in Gumi and Paju, Korea and in Guangzhou, China.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by IT (35%) and Mobile and Others (34%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The first question is whether a panel is a franchise or a commodity, and the filing answers plainly: when supply runs ahead of demand, the buyers exert downward pressure on price and the declines are sharp. So the levers are the cost position and the discipline of capacity — whether this plant can make a panel cheaper than the next plant, and whether the industry adds factories faster than the world buys screens. Watch too the lean on one affiliated customer and the plants paid for with borrowed money bound by financial covenants; in the bad case, prices set by the buyer meet fixed costs and debt that do not bend. The record below holds the margins and the debt.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −9%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest IT at 35%.
- IT35%₩9.42T
- Mobile and Others34%₩8.94T
- TV22%₩5.97T
- Auto9%₩2.28T
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| ₩28.38T | ₩26.50T | ₩27.79T | ₩24.34T | ₩23.48T | ₩24.26T | ₩29.88T | ₩26.15T | ₩21.33T | ₩26.62T | ₩26.62T | RevenueRevenue |
| 15% | 14% | 19% | 13% | 8% | 11% | 18% | 4% | 2% | 10% | 10% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ₩1.69T | ₩1.56T | ₩2.47T | ₩207.7B | (₩2.86T) | (₩36.5B) | ₩2.23T | (₩2.34T) | (₩1.86T) | (₩522.9B) | ₩2.23T | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.0% | 5.9% | 8.9% | 0.9% | −12.2% | −0.2% | 7.5% | −9.0% | −8.7% | −2.0% | 8.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ₩966.6B | ₩906.7B | ₩1.80T | (₩207.2B) | (₩2.83T) | (₩94.9B) | ₩1.19T | (₩3.07T) | (₩2.73T) | (₩2.56T) | (₩2.56T) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 30% | 30% | 18% | — | — | — | 25% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ₩2.73T | ₩3.64T | ₩6.76T | ₩4.48T | ₩2.71T | ₩2.28T | ₩5.75T | ₩3.01T | ₩1.68T | ₩2.41T | ₩2.41T | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ₩3.38T | ₩3.02T | ₩3.21T | ₩3.55T | ₩3.70T | ₩4.13T | ₩4.50T | ₩4.56T | ₩4.21T | ₩5.13T | ₩5.13T | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (₩1.62T) | (₩287.4B) | ₩1.75T | ₩1.14T | ₩1.84T | (₩1.76T) | ₩66.6B | ₩1.53T | ₩202.7B | (₩151.3B) | (₩151.3B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ₩2.36T | ₩3.74T | ₩6.59T | ₩7.94T | ₩6.93T | ₩2.60T | ₩3.14T | ₩5.08T | ₩3.48T | ₩2.13T | ₩2.13T | CapexCapex |
| 8.3% | 14.1% | 23.7% | 32.6% | 29.5% | 10.7% | 10.5% | 19.4% | 16.3% | 8.0% | 8.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ₩361.6B | (₩95.0B) | ₩171.8B | (₩3.46T) | (₩4.22T) | (₩316.6B) | ₩2.61T | (₩2.07T) | (₩1.80T) | ₩282.0B | ₩282.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.3% | −0.4% | 0.6% | −14.2% | −18.0% | −1.3% | 8.7% | −7.9% | −8.4% | 1.1% | 1.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ₩361.6B | (₩95.0B) | ₩171.8B | (₩3.46T) | (₩4.22T) | (₩316.6B) | ₩2.61T | (₩2.07T) | (₩1.80T) | ₩282.0B | ₩282.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.3% | −0.4% | 0.6% | −14.2% | −18.0% | −1.3% | 8.7% | −7.9% | −8.4% | 1.1% | 1.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ₩178.9B | ₩178.9B | ₩178.9B | ₩178.9B | — | — | — | ₩232.6B | — | — | ₩232.6B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -10% | -9% | -3% | — | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 7% | 13% | -1% | -25% | -1% | 9% | -31% | -38% | -39% | -39% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 6% | 11% | −3% | — | — | — | −33% | — | — | −43% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| ₩751.7B | ₩1.59T | ₩2.63T | ₩2.41T | ₩3.41T | ₩4.27T | ₩3.61T | ₩1.99T | ₩2.43T | ₩2.35T | ₩2.35T | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | ₩4.96T | ₩4.33T | ₩2.83T | ₩3.15T | ₩3.52T | ₩4.57T | ₩2.36T | ₩3.35T | ₩3.87T | ₩3.87T | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | ₩2.29T | ₩2.35T | ₩2.69T | ₩2.05T | ₩2.17T | ₩3.35T | ₩2.87T | ₩2.53T | ₩2.67T | ₩2.67T | InventoryInvent. |
| — | ₩7.25T | ₩6.68T | ₩5.52T | ₩5.21T | ₩5.69T | ₩7.93T | ₩5.23T | ₩5.87T | ₩6.55T | ₩6.55T | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | ₩10.48T | ₩10.47T | ₩8.80T | ₩10.25T | ₩11.10T | ₩13.19T | ₩9.44T | ₩9.50T | ₩10.12T | ₩10.12T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | ₩7.06T | ₩8.98T | ₩9.95T | ₩10.98T | ₩11.01T | ₩13.99T | ₩13.96T | ₩13.89T | ₩15.86T | ₩15.86T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.5× | 1.2× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | ₩24.88T | ₩29.16T | ₩33.18T | ₩35.57T | ₩35.07T | ₩38.15T | ₩35.69T | ₩35.76T | ₩32.86T | ₩32.86T | Total assetsAssets |
| — | ₩113.2B | ₩0 | — | ₩696.8B | ₩394.9B | ₩613.7B | ₩11.00T | ₩12.11T | ₩8.50T | ₩8.50T | Total debtDebt |
| — | (₩1.47T) | (₩2.63T) | — | (₩2.71T) | (₩3.88T) | (₩3.00T) | ₩9.01T | ₩9.68T | ₩6.15T | ₩6.15T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 5.4× | 5.9× | 9.2× | 0.6× | -6.4× | -0.0× | 2.4× | -2.4× | -1.1× | -0.3× | 1.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ₩12.70T | ₩12.96T | ₩14.37T | ₩13.98T | ₩11.34T | ₩11.40T | ₩13.12T | ₩9.88T | ₩7.23T | ₩6.54T | ₩6.54T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 358M | 358M | 358M | 358M | 358M | 358M | 358M | 381M | 381M | 471M | 358M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ₩79325.43 | ₩74071.86 | ₩77666.28 | ₩68014.26 | ₩65607.98 | ₩67804.63 | ₩83501.21 | ₩68660.63 | ₩56003.35 | ₩56477.91 | ₩74382.84 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ₩2701.26 | ₩2534.02 | ₩5038.22 | ₩-579.18 | ₩-7908.28 | ₩-265.09 | ₩3315.06 | ₩-8064.29 | ₩-7177.35 | ₩-5437.86 | ₩-7161.80 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ₩1010.55 | ₩-265.62 | ₩480.04 | ₩-9664.44 | ₩-11795.01 | ₩-884.80 | ₩7299.89 | ₩-5430.14 | ₩-4725.86 | ₩598.46 | ₩788.19 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ₩1010.55 | ₩-265.62 | ₩480.04 | ₩-9664.44 | ₩-11795.01 | ₩-884.80 | ₩7299.89 | ₩-5430.14 | ₩-4725.86 | ₩598.46 | ₩788.19 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ₩500.00 | ₩500.00 | ₩500.00 | ₩500.00 | — | — | — | ₩610.63 | — | — | ₩650.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ₩6609.51 | ₩10440.98 | ₩18424.11 | ₩22196.37 | ₩19359.09 | ₩7253.40 | ₩8779.46 | ₩13335.48 | ₩9143.85 | ₩4519.31 | ₩5952.04 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ₩35506.98 | ₩36208.58 | ₩40170.07 | ₩39068.13 | ₩31693.64 | ₩31847.49 | ₩36663.72 | ₩25938.53 | ₩18987.85 | ₩13882.71 | ₩18283.88 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −3.7%/yr | −3.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −5.7%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +2.9%/yr (7-yr) | +4.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −4.1%/yr | −25.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | −9.9%/yr | −15.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a ₩2.56T loss into ₩282.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (₩2.56T) | (₩2.73T) | (₩3.07T) | ₩1.19T | (₩94.9B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +₩5.13T | +₩4.21T | +₩4.56T | +₩4.50T | +₩4.13T |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −₩151.3B | +₩202.7B | +₩1.53T | +₩66.6B | −₩1.76T |
| Cash from operations | ₩2.41T | ₩1.68T | ₩3.01T | ₩5.75T | ₩2.28T |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −₩2.13T | −₩3.48T | −₩5.08T | −₩3.14T | −₩2.60T |
| Owner earnings | ₩282.0B | (₩1.80T) | (₩2.07T) | ₩2.61T | (₩316.6B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | -8% | -8% | 9% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income ₩2.23T ÷ interest expense ₩1.82T
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ₩6.15T · 2.8× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash ₩2.02T + ST investments ₩328.6B − debt ₩8.50T
What this means
Netting ₩2.35T of cash and short-term investments against ₩8.50T of debt leaves ₩6.15T owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -10%–-3%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest ₩282.0B = operating cash ₩2.41T − maintenance capex ₩2.13T (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -1%)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ₩2.41TLoss, but cash-generativeNet income (₩2.56T) · cash from operations ₩2.41T
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ₩232.6B ÷ Owner Earnings ₩282.0B
What this means
Of ₩282.0B Owner Earnings, ₩232.6B (82%) went back to shareholders, ₩232.6B dividends, ₩0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.42×HarvestingCapex ₩2.13T ÷ depreciation ₩5.13T
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · ₩26.62T
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.64×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · ₩8.50T vs (₩5.74T) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −328%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are ₩-5578.61/share (latest year ₩-5125.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is ₩13084.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → −7% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to −7% lately, median −0% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −47%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2019 · −12.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments₩2.35T
- Receivables₩3.87T
- Inventory₩2.67T
- Other current assets₩1.23T
- Debt due within a year₩969.6B
- Other current liabilities₩14.89T
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Dec 31, 2024 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to ₩2.63T against the ₩630M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4178 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2015–2024
Over the record, the business generated ₩35.46T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested₩43.99T · 124%
- Dividends₩948.2B · 3%
- Returned to owners₩948.2B
₩948.2B as dividends and ₩0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−₩9.48T
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ₩9.48T beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (358M to 358M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record₩610.63/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈₩2.66T · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Of our top ten end-brand customers, two of them each accounted for more than 10% of our sales on an individual basis for each of the past three years.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LPLLG Display Co., Ltd. | ₩26.62T | 12% | 0.4% | -9% | -1% |
| NVDANVIDIA Corp. | $215.9B | 62% | 32.8% | 46% | 44% |
| AVGOBroadcom Inc. | $63.9B | 59% | 25.4% | 13% | 42% |
| AMDAdvanced Micro Devices | $34.6B | 45% | 7.2% | 6% | 7% |
| JBLJabil Inc. | $29.8B | 8% | 3.2% | 18% | 2% |
| AMATApplied Materials Inc. | $28.4B | 46% | 27.9% | 36% | 22% |
| FLEXFlex Ltd. | $27.9B | 7% | 3.3% | 15% | 0% |
| APHAmphenol Corporation | $23.1B | 32% | 20.4% | 18% | 14% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 13.8% | 16% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one-half of one share of Common”; LG Display Co., Ltd. reports in KRW, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at KRW 1 = $0.0007 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in KRW.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LG Display Co., Ltd. has delivered.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $191M on 1000M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $4.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LOTWW its page in the Manual LSE →
Industry order: ← LFUS the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter MEI →