Share count
48Mpeak FY2023
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MSGE, Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.
Entertainment is a leader in live entertainment experiences, comprised of iconic venues and marquee entertainment content.
Utilizing the Company's powerful brands and live entertainment expertise, the Company delivers unique experiences that set the standard for excellence and innovation while forging deep connections with diverse and passionate audiences.
Enhancing the live entertainment experience for our customers .
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$863M
−2.6% YoY · 97% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $246M +1.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 6.5% yr-ago 11.3%
Net income $5M yr-ago $8M
Net margin 2.1% yr-ago 3.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Ticketing and venue license fee revenues (53%), Sponsorship and Signage, Suite and Advertising Commission Revenues (29%) and Food, Beverage and Merchandise Revenues (17%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 13% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −413% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Ticketing and venue license fee revenues at 53%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Ticketing and venue license fee revenues53%$453M
- Sponsorship and Signage, Suite And Advertising Commission Revenues29%$253M
- Food, Beverage And Merchandise Revenues17%$151M
- Other1%$6M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $57M | $582M | $780M | $886M | $863M | $935M | RevenueRevenue |
| 238% | 29% | 23% | 23% | 25% | 26% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($237M) | ($6M) | $105M | $112M | $122M | $124M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −412.8% | −1.0% | 13.5% | 12.6% | 14.2% | 13.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($219M) | ($133M) | $77M | $144M | $37M | $49M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 2% | — | 43% | 38% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| ($148M) | $95M | $136M | $111M | $115M | $341M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $72M | $70M | $60M | $54M | $58M | $57M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($42M) | $120M | ($33M) | ($118M) | ($8M) | $205M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $0 | $25M | $51M | $40M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -104% | -1% | 21% | 20% | 13% | 25% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $318M | $58M | $76M | $33M | $43M | $323M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $103M | $64M | $77M | $67M | $90M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $3M | $3M | $4M | $4M | $3M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $11M | $16M | $27M | $12M | $17M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $94M | $51M | $55M | $58M | $76M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $341M | $295M | $219M | $237M | $539M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $545M | $541M | $506M | $502M | $753M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.5× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $69M | $69M | $69M | $69M | $69M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $664M | $646M | $615M | $599M | $578M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $606M | $570M | $582M | $556M | $255M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -7.0× | -0.1× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 2.4× | 2.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $499M | ($1M) | ($69M) | ($23M) | ($13M) | $48M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 70.7% | 6.8% | 4.1% | 3.5% | 3.2% | 3.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 51.8M | 51.8M | 52.3M | 48.6M | 48.3M | 47.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.11 | $11.24 | $14.92 | $18.23 | $17.85 | $19.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.22 | $-2.58 | $1.47 | $2.97 | $0.77 | $1.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $9.63 | $-0.03 | $-1.33 | $-0.48 | $-0.28 | $1.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
13%low FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2022FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $122M ÷ interest expense $51M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $556M · 4.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $43M − debt $599M
What this means
Netting $43M of cash and short-term investments against $599M of debt leaves $556M owed, about 4.6× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median, range -104%–21%; 13% latest = NOPAT $70M ÷ invested capital $543MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $115M ÷ net income $37M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $863M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.47×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $599M vs ($265M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.81/share (latest year $0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −207% → 13% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −207% early to 13% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −412.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$539M
- Cash & short-term investments$323M
- Receivables$90M
- Inventory$3M
- Other current assets$123M
Current liabilities$753M
- Debt due within a year$30M
- Accounts payable$17M
- Other current liabilities$706M
Current ratio0.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.71×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.43×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($215M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$30M due · $323M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($85M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$609M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$287Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$31Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$602Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$599M
Lease obligations (present value)$602M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 50%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jun 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Dolan | $9.3M | $10.6M | $77M |
| 2024 | Mr. Dolan | $10.2M | $10.9M | $144M |
| 2025 | Mr. Dolan | $14.2M | $16.5M | $37M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio567:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Casinos & Gaming
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MTNVail Resorts Inc. | $3.0B | — | 18.3% | 12% | 18% |
| PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc. | $1.7B | — | 18.6% | 16% | 10% |
| PLNTPlanet Fitness | $1.3B | 81% | 28.6% | 16% | 20% |
| LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation | $1.2B | 30% | 11.4% | 8% | 4% |
| MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp. | $1.0B | — | -3.4% | -3% | 7% |
| MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. | $863M | — | 12.6% | 13% | — |
| BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A | $732M | — | -5.6% | -3% | -10% |
| PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc. | $452M | 91% | 6.3% | 4% | 2% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.0% | 10% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered14%/yr’21→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. (MSGE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MSGE, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MSFT its page in the Manual MSGS →
Industry order: ← GENI the Casinos & Gaming chapter MSGS →