Owner Scorecard


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PRSU, Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.

Casinos & Gaming capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

We draw our guests from major markets, including the U.S., Canada, Asia Pacific, Western Europe, and Central America.

The experiences that we offer are grouped and marketed as "collections" based on geographic region.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PRSU · Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$452M
+23.4% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $466M 5-yr avg $395M
Gross margin 92% 5-yr avg 92%
Operating margin 30.4% 5-yr avg 8.9%
Owner-earnings margin −0% 5-yr avg 0%
Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Services (75%) and Products (25%).
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 17% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 91% and operating margin about 6.3% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −28% and 31% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −86 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Services is 75% of revenue, with Products the other meaningful line at 25%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Services75%$341M
  • Products25%$112M
By geographyCanada54%United States29%Iceland14%Costa Rica3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$415M$507M$299M$350M$366M$452M$466MRevenueRevenue
86%88%91%92%92%92%Gross marginGross mgn
16%16%18%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$77M$86M$78M$79M($116M)($47M)$69M$108M($45M)$55M$142MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.4%6.6%6.3%6.1%−28.0%−9.3%23.0%31.0%−12.4%12.2%30.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$42M$58M$49M$22M($374M)($93M)$23M$16M$369M$23M$29MNet incomeNet inc.
33%44%26%10%20%45%2%42%37%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$100M$112M$91M$108M($80M)($38M)$73M$105M$57M$86M$81MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$43M$55M$57M$59M$57M$54M$36M$38M$43M$46M$45MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M($12M)($20M)$20M$235M($7M)$6M$42M($366M)$10M$749KWorking capital & otherWC & other
$50M$57M$83M$76M$54M$58M$57M$62M$56M$75M$82MCapexCapex
4.1%4.3%6.7%5.8%12.9%11.4%19.0%17.8%15.3%16.6%17.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$51M$56M$7M$32M($134M)($96M)$17M$42M$718K$11M($929K)Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.2%4.3%0.6%2.5%−32.2%−18.9%5.5%12.1%0.2%2.5%−0.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$51M$56M$7M$32M($134M)($96M)$17M$42M$718K$11M($929K)Free cash flowFCF
4.2%4.3%0.6%2.5%−32.2%−18.9%5.5%12.1%0.2%2.5%−0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$196M$2M$5M$91M$0$8M$25M$41K$16M$108M$108MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$8M$8M$8M$8M$4M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$722K$2M$17M$0$3M$0$0$0$0$10MBuybacksBuybacks
9%8%9%-20%-9%-8%4%ROICROIC
12%13%11%5%-390%-1475%160%37%70%4%5%Return on equityROE
10%12%9%3%−394%n/m160%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$21M$54M$45M$62M$40M$62M$60M$27M$50M$31M$35MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$105M$105M$109M$126M$18M$92M$122M$8M$9M$9M$8MReceivablesReceiv.
$31M$18M$17M$17M$9M$9M$11M$9M$10M$12M$12MInventoryInvent.
$68M$77M$72M$87M$21M$70M$73M$15M$22M$21M$21MAccounts payablePayables
$68M$45M$54M$57M$6M$31M$60M$3M($3M)$254K($2M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$175M$209M$214M$261M$91M$198M$240M$236M$117M$64M$205MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$346M$333M$390M$237M$98M$175M$211M$233M$76M$79M$134MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.6×0.5×1.1×0.9×1.1×1.1×1.0×1.5×0.8×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$254M$271M$261M$288M$100M$112M$121M$124M$103M$150M$128MGoodwillGoodwill
$870M$920M$923M$1.3B$853M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$845M$965M$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$249M$209M$230M$340M$400M$459M$470M$449M$74M$159M$223MTotal debtDebt
$228M$155M$185M$278M$361M$398M$410M$421M$24M$128M$188MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
13.0×10.4×8.0×5.6×-6.5×-1.7×17.0×18.2×-3.2×6.2×14.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$357M$429M$436M$467M$96M$6M$15M$43M$526M$582M$534MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.8%0.4%0.6%0.6%1.5%2.6%2.6%3.0%1.6%1.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
20.2M20.4M20.4M20.3M20.3M20.4M20.6M20.9M21.4M28.4M27.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$59.72$64.05$60.64$64.22$20.49$24.86$14.54$16.80$17.11$15.94$16.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.09$2.83$2.41$1.09$-18.45$-4.54$1.13$0.77$17.21$0.80$1.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.50$2.72$0.36$1.58$-6.60$-4.69$0.80$2.03$0.03$0.39$-0.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.50$2.72$0.36$1.58$-6.60$-4.69$0.80$2.03$0.03$0.39$-0.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40$0.40$0.40$0.40$0.20$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.47$2.77$4.08$3.75$2.64$2.84$2.76$2.99$2.63$2.64$2.94Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.71$21.03$21.38$23.05$4.73$0.31$0.71$2.08$24.55$20.50$19.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−13.7%/yr−4.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−18.6%/yr
EPS−10.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.8%/yr+0.0%/yr
Book value / share+1.6%/yr+34.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
4%low FY2020
Gross margin
92%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
11.5×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11Mowner earningsvs.$23Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $23M of profit but $11M of owner earnings: $12M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$23M
Owner earnings$11M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$23M$369M$16M$23M($93M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$46M+$43M+$38M+$36M+$54M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$7M+$11M+$9M+$8M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$10M−$366M+$42M+$6M−$7M
Cash from operations$86M$57M$105M$73M($38M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$75M−$56M−$62M−$57M−$58M
Owner earnings$11M$718K$42M$17M($96M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%0%12%6%-19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $4M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $108M ÷ interest expense $9M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $128M · 1.2× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $31M − debt $159M
    What this means

    Netting $31M of cash and short-term investments against $159M of debt leaves $128M owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 7 + DIO 128 − DPO 221 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -20%–9%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $11M = operating cash $86M − maintenance capex $75M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $4M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $86M ÷ net income $23M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $11M
    What this means

    Of $11M Owner Earnings, $10M (92%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $10M buybacks. Net of $7M stock comp, the real buyback was about $3M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.63×
    Expanding
    Capex $75M ÷ depreciation $46M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $452M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.81×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $159M vs ($15M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +173%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.97/share (latest year $0.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 10% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −22%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 22% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −28.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$205M
  • Cash & short-term investments$35M
  • Receivables$8M
  • Inventory$12M
  • Other current assets$152M
Current liabilities$134M
  • Debt due within a year$18M
  • Accounts payable$21M
  • Other current liabilities$94M
Current ratio1.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.45×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$72Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$18M due · $35M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+37.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$331Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($188M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$205M$9M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$24Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $614M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$628M · 102%
  • Dividends$37M · 6%
  • Buybacks$33M · 5%
  • Returned to owners$70M

    $37M as dividends and $33M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$83M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $83M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$50.62

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $20M, about $50.62 each.

  • Net change in share count38.1%

    The diluted count rose from 20M to 28M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−30%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($65M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $20M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.30 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$226M23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity26%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$451Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $628M of capital spent building

$186M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 41% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Moster$6.3M$6.5M($96M)
2022Moster$6.3M$2.3M$17M
2023Moster$7.0M$10.4M$42M
2024Messrs. Barry$3.7M$4.1M$718K
2024Moster$6.9M$9.2M$718K
2025Messrs. Barry$5.4M$3.9M$11M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$7M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?38.1%

    Diluted shares grew 38.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $33M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MTNVail Resorts Inc.$3.0B18.3%12%18%
PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc.$1.7B18.6%16%10%
PLNTPlanet Fitness$1.3B81%28.6%16%20%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation$1.2B30%11.4%8%4%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.$1.0B-3.4%-3%7%
MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.$863M12.6%13%
BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A$732M-5.6%-3%-10%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.$452M91%6.3%4%2%
Group median81%12.0%10%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc. has delivered.

Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($929K) on 27M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $188M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Pursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc. (PRSU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRSU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRS its page in the Manual PRTA →

Industry order: ← PRKS the Casinos & Gaming chapter RSI →