Share count
767Mpeak FY2025
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OPENW, Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K
Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K market Overview Residential real estate is a massive offline market.
We are a leading e-commerce platform for residential real estate transactions and the largest U.S. iBuyer.
By leveraging artificial intelligence, data science and purpose-built software, we enable consumers to transact directly with Opendoor, eliminating traditional friction and intermediaries.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$4.4B
−15.2% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.9B 5-yr avg $8.0B
Revenue $720M −37.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −22.1% yr-ago −4.9%
Net income ($173M) yr-ago ($85M)
Net margin −24.0% yr-ago −7.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −6.6% through the cycle on a 7.3% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −20%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $1.8B | $4.7B | $2.6B | $8.0B | $15.6B | $6.9B | $5.2B | $4.4B | $3.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($241M) | ($341M) | ($253M) | ($662M) | ($1.4B) | ($275M) | ($392M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.4B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| ($237M) | ($326M) | ($231M) | ($635M) | ($1.3B) | ($237M) | ($359M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.4B) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| — | $2.2B | $2.2B | $9.5B | $6.6B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | 48% | — | 20% | — | 60% | 48% | — | 91% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| — | $1.1B | $482M | $1.9B | $3.0B | $2.1B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $2.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $669M | ($979M) | ($353M) | $1.7B | $1.1B | $813M | $106M | $1.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.7× | -2.3× | -2.7× | -4.0× | -2.4× | -1.8× | -2.4× | -2.2× | -3.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($414M) | ($733M) | $1.6B | $2.2B | $1.1B | $967M | $713M | $1.0B | $954M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 78.6M | 80.0M | 109M | 593M | 627M | 657M | 699M | 767M | 959M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-3.01 | $-4.08 | $-2.11 | $-1.07 | $-2.10 | $-0.36 | $-0.51 | $-1.66 | $-1.42 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $-5.27 | $-9.17 | $14.21 | $3.79 | $1.73 | $1.47 | $1.02 | $1.31 | $0.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×5.42 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −18.3%/yr | −24.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −26.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −32.9%/yr | −36.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | −37.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-15.2%
“Revenue Revenue decreased by $782 million, or 15%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease in revenue was primarily attributable to lower sales volumes during the year ended December 31, 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−20%low FY2022
Gross margin
8%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.1×peak FY2022
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($287M) ÷ interest expense $131M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $962M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Netting $962M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $106M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -25%–-15%; -20% latest = NOPAT ($227M) ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $1.0B = operating cash $1.0B − maintenance capex $12M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median -6%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a -6% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $159M of SBC) leaves $878M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($1.3B) · cash from operations $1.0B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.0B
What this means
Of $1.0B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.39×HarvestingCapex $12M ÷ depreciation $31M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 7.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $2.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-1.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.04/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −7% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −7% early, −6% lately, median −7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −8.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“This Executive Order establishes a federal policy favoring a uniform national AI regulatory framework designed to promote innovation and U.S. global competitiveness.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.2B
- Cash & short-term investments$999M
- Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$317M
- Debt due within a year$1.7B
Current ratio7.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio7.07×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.7B due · $999M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−37.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters8.3× → 7.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$951Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$847MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$7M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill$3M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$81Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $209M of capital spent building
$60M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 74% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio7,581:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$159M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWKCushman & Wakefield Ltd. | $10.3B | — | 2.2% | 4% | 1% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENWOpendoor Technologies Inc Series K | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| INVHInvitation Homes Inc. | $2.7B | — | 11.2% | 1% | 37% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38% | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 24% | 6.3% | 3% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.1B on 965M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Opendoor Technologies Inc Series K (OPENW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OPENW, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← OPEN its page in the Manual OPI →
Industry order: ← OPEN the Real Estate Development & Services chapter OPI →