Share count
272Mpeak FY2023
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QFIN, Qfin Holdings Inc.
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
CN¥19.2B
+11.9% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥19.2B 5-yr avg CN¥17.2B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 26%, above 12% in 9 of 9 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| CN¥788M | CN¥4.4B | CN¥9.2B | CN¥13.6B | CN¥16.6B | CN¥16.6B | CN¥16.3B | CN¥17.2B | CN¥19.2B | CN¥19.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| CN¥2M | CN¥10M | (CN¥42M) | CN¥77M | CN¥126M | — | — | — | — | CN¥126M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| CN¥12M | CN¥44M | CN¥487M | CN¥699M | CN¥965M | CN¥1.6B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.8B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥3.6B | Credit-loss provisionProvision |
| CN¥165M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥5.8B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥4.3B | CN¥6.2B | CN¥6.0B | CN¥6.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 23% | 28% | 16% | 14% | 18% | 16% | 19% | 21% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| 5.3% | 16.2% | 12.3% | 14.3% | 17.2% | 9.9% | 9.3% | 13.0% | 10.5% | 10.5% | Return on assetsROA |
| 22% | 27% | 35% | 37% | 38% | 21% | 19% | 26% | 25% | 25% | Return on equityROE |
| 22% | 27% | 35% | 37% | 38% | 21% | 19% | 26% | 25% | 25% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 22% | 27% | 35% | 37% | 38% | 21% | 20% | 26% | 25% | 25% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| CN¥3.1B | CN¥7.3B | CN¥20.4B | CN¥24.4B | CN¥33.5B | CN¥40.3B | CN¥45.8B | CN¥48.1B | CN¥56.9B | CN¥56.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥41M | CN¥42M | CN¥45M | CN¥45M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| CN¥734M | CN¥4.4B | CN¥7.2B | CN¥9.5B | CN¥15.2B | CN¥18.8B | CN¥21.9B | CN¥24.2B | CN¥24.1B | CN¥24.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 198M | 203M | 301M | 307M | 321M | 322M | 329M | 303M | 272M | 244M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥0.83 | CN¥5.89 | CN¥8.31 | CN¥11.40 | CN¥17.94 | CN¥12.44 | CN¥12.99 | CN¥20.59 | CN¥21.96 | CN¥24.51 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥3.70 | CN¥21.90 | CN¥23.97 | CN¥30.92 | CN¥47.31 | CN¥58.53 | CN¥66.78 | CN¥79.72 | CN¥88.60 | CN¥98.90 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| CN¥3.70 | CN¥21.90 | CN¥23.96 | CN¥30.90 | CN¥47.29 | CN¥58.51 | CN¥66.61 | CN¥79.54 | CN¥88.40 | CN¥98.67 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.48 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +43.3%/yr | +9.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +18.5%/yr |
| EPS | +50.6%/yr | +14.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +49.3%/yr | +77.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +48.7%/yr | +23.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
CN¥19.2Blow FY2017
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 25%Very high (≥17%)Net income CN¥6.0B ÷ equity CN¥24.1BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill CN¥45M − intangibles CN¥11M)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 56%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 42.3%Well capitalizedEquity CN¥24.1B ÷ assets CN¥56.9B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 2871%ElevatedProvision for credit losses CN¥3.6B ÷ net interest income CN¥126M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“For example, our AI-powered voice system, which we utilize for the collection of delinquent loans, primarily conducting quality inspections on the recordings of collection calls, analyzing the effectiveness and content of completed collections and optimizing future communication strategies, has significantly reduced th…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsCN¥49.5B
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥7.5B
- Other current assetsCN¥41.9B
Current liabilitiesCN¥20.4B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥20.4B
Current ratio2.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.43×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥29.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥24.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥16.7BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥266MCN¥18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥789Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AXPAmerican Express Company | $72.2B | 30% | 35% | 73% | 4.3% |
| QFINQfin Holdings Inc. | CN¥19.2B | 26% | 26% | — | 0.1% |
| DFSDiscover Financial Services | $17.9B | 25% | 26% | 39% | 8.6% |
| BKKTBakkt Inc. | $2.3B | -146% | -252% | — | 0.5% |
| GDOTGreen DOT Corp | $2.0B | 5% | 13% | — | -0.1% |
| UPSTUpstart | $1.0B | -7% | -8% | — | 0.0% |
| SOFISoFi Technologies | $3.6B | -6% | -9% | 85% | 3.6% |
| SYFSynchrony Financial | $19.0B | 21% | 25% | 27% | 15.5% |
| Group median | — | 13% | 19% | — | 2.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each representing two Class”; Qfin Holdings Inc. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Qfin Holdings Inc.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered22%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity26%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $3.5B on 122M shares, a 26% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Qfin Holdings Inc. (QFIN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/QFIN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PXS its page in the Manual QGEN →
Industry order: ← PWP the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter RHLD →