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RDWR, Radware Ltd.
We are a provider of application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments.
Our Solutions" under the captions "Recent Solution Offering Activities" and "Recent Partnerships Activities."
Our solutions secure the digital experience by providing infrastructure, application, and network protection and availability services to companies globally.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −1.1% through the cycle on a 82% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest EMEA at 37%.
- EMEA37%$111M
- United States31%$93M
- Asia Pacific22%$66M
- America - other11%$32M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $197M | $211M | $234M | $252M | $250M | $286M | $293M | $261M | $275M | $302M | $302M | RevenueRevenue |
| 82% | 81% | 82% | 82% | 82% | 82% | 82% | 80% | 81% | 81% | 81% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($13M) | ($7M) | $8M | $17M | $6M | $18M | ($3M) | ($32M) | ($4M) | $11M | $11M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −6.5% | −3.2% | 3.2% | 6.7% | 2.5% | 6.4% | −1.1% | −12.1% | −1.4% | 3.8% | 3.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($9M) | ($7M) | $12M | $23M | $10M | $8M | ($166K) | ($22M) | $6M | $20M | $20M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 21% | 12% | 31% | — | — | — | 52% | 31% | 31% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $38M | $31M | $49M | $53M | $64M | $72M | $32M | ($4M) | $72M | $50M | $50M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $10M | $11M | $10M | $11M | $11M | $10M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $12M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $37M | $28M | $28M | $19M | $44M | $54M | $21M | $6M | $54M | $18M | $18M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $9M | $7M | $9M | $8M | $9M | $6M | $9M | $5M | $5M | $9M | $9M | CapexCapex |
| 4.8% | 3.4% | 3.8% | 3.2% | 3.5% | 2.0% | 3.0% | 2.1% | 1.9% | 2.8% | 2.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $29M | $24M | $40M | $45M | $55M | $66M | $23M | ($9M) | $66M | $42M | $42M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.8% | 11.5% | 17.2% | 17.7% | 22.1% | 23.1% | 8.0% | −3.4% | 24.1% | 13.8% | 13.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $29M | $24M | $40M | $45M | $55M | $66M | $23M | ($9M) | $66M | $42M | $42M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.8% | 11.5% | 17.2% | 17.7% | 22.1% | 23.1% | 8.0% | −3.4% | 24.1% | 13.8% | 13.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $22M | $413K | $4M | $25M | $45M | $52M | $59M | $63M | $839K | $10M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -5% | -2% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 3% | -1% | -12% | -1% | 3% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| -3% | -2% | 3% | 6% | 2% | 2% | -0% | -8% | 2% | 6% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| −3% | −2% | 3% | 6% | 2% | 2% | −0% | −8% | 2% | 6% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $80M | $65M | $45M | $41M | $55M | $93M | $46M | $71M | $99M | $105M | $105M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $19M | $16M | $17M | $23M | $17M | $13M | $18M | $20M | $17M | $35M | $35M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $17M | $19M | $18M | $14M | $14M | $12M | $11M | $16M | $14M | $13M | $13M | InventoryInvent. |
| $6M | $5M | $4M | $6M | $4M | $4M | $6M | $4M | $6M | $7M | $7M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $31M | $30M | $31M | $30M | $27M | $20M | $23M | $32M | $25M | $41M | $41M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $267M | $250M | $359M | $222M | $348M | $321M | $334M | $376M | $321M | $317M | $317M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $85M | $107M | $118M | $126M | $144M | $166M | $164M | $155M | $168M | $194M | $194M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.1× | 2.3× | 3.0× | 1.8× | 2.4× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 2.4× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $30M | $32M | $32M | $41M | $41M | $41M | $68M | $68M | $68M | $68M | $68M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $430M | $471M | $533M | $595M | $623M | $635M | $644M | $572M | $619M | $671M | $671M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($80M) | ($65M) | ($45M) | ($41M) | ($55M) | ($93M) | ($46M) | ($71M) | ($99M) | ($105M) | ($105M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $300M | $315M | $364M | $395M | $388M | $370M | $332M | $284M | $316M | $349M | $349M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 43.9M | 43.5M | 47.7M | 48.5M | 47.7M | 47.5M | 44.9M | 42.9M | 43.4M | 44.7M | 43.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.48 | $4.86 | $4.91 | $5.19 | $5.24 | $6.03 | $6.53 | $6.09 | $6.34 | $6.75 | $7.00 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.20 | $-0.17 | $0.25 | $0.47 | $0.20 | $0.16 | $-0.00 | $-0.50 | $0.14 | $0.45 | $0.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.66 | $0.56 | $0.85 | $0.92 | $1.16 | $1.39 | $0.52 | $-0.21 | $1.53 | $0.93 | $0.96 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.66 | $0.56 | $0.85 | $0.92 | $1.16 | $1.39 | $0.52 | $-0.21 | $1.53 | $0.93 | $0.96 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.21 | $0.17 | $0.19 | $0.17 | $0.18 | $0.12 | $0.20 | $0.13 | $0.12 | $0.19 | $0.20 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.83 | $7.25 | $7.63 | $8.15 | $8.14 | $7.79 | $7.39 | $6.63 | $7.29 | $7.82 | $8.10 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.7%/yr | +5.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.8%/yr | −4.3%/yr |
| EPS | — | +17.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.3%/yr | +1.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.5%/yr | −0.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $20M of profit into $42M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $20M | $6M | ($22M) | ($166K) | $8M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$12M | +$12M | +$12M | +$12M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$18M | +$54M | +$6M | +$21M | +$54M |
| Cash from operations | $50M | $72M | ($4M) | $32M | $72M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$9M | −$5M | −$5M | −$9M | −$6M |
| Owner earnings | $42M | $66M | ($9M) | $23M | $66M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 24% | -3% | 8% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $105M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $105M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 42 + DIO 83 − DPO 45 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -0%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -3%–24%; latest $42M = operating cash $50M − maintenance capex $9MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $50M ÷ net income $20M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $42M
What this means
Of $42M Owner Earnings, $10M (25%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $10M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.73×HarvestingCapex $9M ÷ depreciation $12M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $302M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.63×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.04/share (latest year $0.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −2% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −2% early, −3% lately, median −1%.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −12.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.2%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We expect competition to intensify in the future, including as a result of the integration of AI technologies into the markets in which we compete, and we may lose market share if we are unable to compete effectively. 13 Most of our competitors have greater financial, personnel and other resources than we have, which m…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$105M
- Receivables$35M
- Inventory$13M
- Other current assets$163M
- Accounts payable$7M
- Other current liabilities$187M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $458M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$76M · 17%
- Buybacks$283M · 62%
- Retained (debt / cash)$99M · 22%
- Returned to owners$283M
74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $283M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $283M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.6%
The diluted count fell from 44M to 43M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Radware Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GETYGetty Images Holdings Inc. | $981M | 73% | 19.2% | — | 10% |
| PRTHPriority Technology Holdings Inc. | $953M | 30% | 8.0% | 16% | 6% |
| NUTXNutex Health Inc. | $875M | 39% | -12.8% | -182% | 10% |
| EEXEmerald Holding Inc. | $463M | 71% | 7.0% | 3% | 23% |
| RMNIRimini Street Inc. (DE) | $422M | 62% | 8.3% | — | 8% |
| RPAYRepay Holdings Corporation | $309M | 76% | -20.6% | -4% | 24% |
| RDWRRadware Ltd. | $302M | 82% | 0.7% | 0% | 16% |
| PAYSPaysign Inc. | $82M | 50% | 5.4% | — | 51% |
| Group median | — | 67% | 6.2% | 0% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Radware Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Radware Ltd. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Radware Ltd. earns about $48M on its 16.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $42M on 43M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $105M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← RDCM its page in the Manual RDY →
Industry order: ← RBA the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter RELX →