Owner Scorecard


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RELX, RELX PLC PLC

Revenue is led by Risk (36%) and Scientific Technical and Medical (28%), with 3 more segments behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in GBP · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
RELX · RELX PLC PLC
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
£9.6B
+1.7% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue £9.6B 5-yr avg £8.8B
Gross margin 66% 5-yr avg 65%
Operating margin 31.6% 5-yr avg 28.9%
ROIC 26%
Owner-earnings margin 29% 5-yr avg 28%
Free cash flow margin 29% 5-yr avg 28%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 65% and operating margin about 26% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (21%–32% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 21%, above 15% in 4 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Risk at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Risk36%£3.5B
  • Scientific Technical And Medical28%£2.7B
  • Legal19%£1.8B
  • Exhibitions12%£1.2B
  • Print and print-related activities4%£399M
By geographyNorth America58%Europe21%Rest Of World21%United Kingdom7%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
£6.9B£7.3B£7.5B£7.9B£7.1B£7.2B£8.6B£9.2B£9.4B£9.6B£9.6BRevenueRevenue
64%64%65%65%65%65%64%65%65%66%66%Gross marginGross mgn
£1.7B£1.9B£2.0B£2.1B£1.5B£1.9B£2.3B£2.7B£2.9B£3.0B£3.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
24.8%26.0%26.2%26.7%21.4%26.0%27.2%29.3%30.3%31.6%31.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
£1.1B£1.6B£1.4B£1.5B£1.2B£1.5B£1.6B£1.8B£1.9B£2.1B£2.1BNet incomeNet inc.
21%4%17%18%18%18%23%22%24%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
£1.7B£1.9B£2.0B£2.1B£1.6B£2.0B£2.4B£2.5B£2.6B£2.8B£2.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
£671M£657M£652M£739M£905M£785M£787M£794M£783M£752M£752MDepreciationDeprec.
(£80M)(£391M)(£89M)(£155M)(£533M)(£240M)(£20M)(£118M)(£109M)£19M£19MWorking capital & otherWC & other
£51M£51M£56M£47M£43M£28M£36M£30M£20M£21M£21MCapexCapex
0.7%0.7%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.2%0.2%0.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
£1.7B£1.9B£1.9B£2.0B£1.6B£2.0B£2.4B£2.4B£2.6B£2.8B£2.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
24.5%25.4%25.7%25.9%21.8%27.4%27.7%26.5%27.4%29.4%29.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
£1.7B£1.9B£1.9B£2.0B£1.6B£2.0B£2.4B£2.4B£2.6B£2.8B£2.8BFree cash flowFCF
24.5%25.4%25.7%25.9%21.8%27.4%27.7%26.5%27.4%29.4%29.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
£683M£762M£796M£842M£880M£920M£983M£1.1B£1.1B£1.2B£1.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
£700M£700M£700M£600M£150MBuybacksBuybacks
20%26%21%24%14%26%ROICROIC
51%72%61%69%58%46%43%51%56%87%87%Return on equityROE
21%39%27%31%16%17%17%21%23%37%37%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
£162M£111M£114M£138M£88M£113M£334M£155M£119M£131M£131MCash & investmentsCash+inv
£2.0B£1.9B£2.0B£2.1B£1.9B£2.0B£2.4B£2.3B£2.5B£2.5B£2.5BReceivablesReceiv.
£3.5B£3.3B£3.4B£3.5B£3.3B£3.3B£4.0B£4.0B£4.1B£4.3B£4.3BAccounts payablePayables
(£1.5B)(£1.4B)(£1.4B)(£1.4B)(£1.3B)(£1.3B)(£1.6B)(£1.6B)(£1.6B)(£1.8B)(£1.8B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
£2.4B£2.2B£2.4B£2.4B£2.3B£2.4B£3.1B£2.9B£3.0B£3.0B£3.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
£5.3B£4.5B£4.4B£3.7B£5.2B£5.5B£5.7B£6.0B£6.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.5×0.5×0.6×0.6×0.5×0.5×0.5×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
£6.4B£6.0B£6.9B£6.8B£7.2B£7.4B£8.4B£8.0B£8.2B£7.9B£7.9BGoodwillGoodwill
£13.7B£12.6B£14.0B£13.8B£14.1B£13.9B£15.8B£14.9B£15.1B£14.8B£14.8BTotal assetsAssets
£4.6B£5.0B£5.7B£5.1B£6.6B£131M£6.4BTotal debtDebt
£4.4B£4.8B£5.5B£5.0B£6.5B£18M£6.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.7×9.3×9.1×6.7×8.7×12.6×11.3×8.3×9.4×10.2×10.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
£2.3B£2.3B£2.3B£2.2B£2.1B£3.2B£3.8B£3.5B£3.5B£2.4B£2.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
2.06B2.02B1.98B1.94B1.93B1.93B1.92B1.89B1.87B1.83B1.82BShares out (diluted)Shares
£3.34£3.64£3.79£4.05£3.69£3.76£4.46£4.84£5.06£5.23£5.27Revenue / shareRev/sh
£0.56£0.82£0.72£0.77£0.64£0.76£0.85£0.94£1.04£1.13£1.14EPS (diluted)EPS
£0.82£0.92£0.98£1.05£0.81£1.03£1.23£1.28£1.39£1.53£1.55Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
£0.82£0.92£0.98£1.05£0.81£1.03£1.23£1.28£1.39£1.53£1.55Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
£0.33£0.38£0.40£0.43£0.46£0.48£0.51£0.56£0.60£0.64£0.65Dividends / shareDiv/sh
£0.02£0.03£0.03£0.02£0.02£0.01£0.02£0.02£0.01£0.01£0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
£1.10£1.13£1.18£1.11£1.09£1.68£1.97£1.83£1.87£1.29£1.30Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.1%/yr+7.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.2%/yr+13.7%/yr
EPS+8.1%/yr+12.1%/yr
Dividends / share+7.7%/yr+7.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.2%/yr−12.5%/yr
Book value / share+1.8%/yr+3.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.8Bpeak FY2016
ROIC
14%low FY2020
Gross margin
66%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.2×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

£2.8Bowner earningsvs.£2.1Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned £2.1B of profit into £2.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income£2.1B
Owner earnings£2.8B · 29% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income£2.1B£1.9B£1.8B£1.6B£1.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+£752M+£783M+£794M+£787M+£785M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+£19M−£109M−£118M−£20M−£240M
Cash from operations£2.8B£2.6B£2.5B£2.4B£2.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−£21M−£20M−£30M−£36M−£28M
Owner earnings£2.8B£2.6B£2.4B£2.4B£2.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue29%27%26%28%27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income £3.0B ÷ interest expense £298M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? £6.3B · 2.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash £131M − debt £6.4B
    What this means

    Netting £131M of cash and short-term investments against £6.4B of debt leaves £6.3B owed, about 2.1× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 94 + DIO 0 − DPO 482 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 14%–26%; 26% latest = NOPAT £2.3B ÷ invested capital £8.6B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 26% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 22%–29%; latest £2.8B = operating cash £2.8B − maintenance capex £21M
    Industry peers: median 22%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops £2.8B ÷ net income £2.1B

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks £1.2B ÷ Owner Earnings £2.8B
    What this means

    Of £2.8B Owner Earnings, £1.2B (42%) went back to shareholders, £1.2B dividends, £0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.03×
    Harvesting
    Capex £21M ÷ depreciation £752M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · £9.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.49×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · £6.4B vs (£3.0B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +37%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are £1.06/share (latest year £1.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is £1.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 26% → 30% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 26% early to 30% lately, median 26% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 21.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“Strong growth continues to be driven across segments by our deeply embedded, AI-enabled analytics and decision tools.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets£3.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments£131M
  • Receivables£2.5B
  • Other current assets£361M
Current liabilities£6.0B
  • Debt due within a year£131M
  • Accounts payable£4.3B
  • Other current liabilities£1.6B
Current ratio0.49×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.49×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(£3.0B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash£131M due · £131M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(£8.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(£9.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases£6.5B£97M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated £21.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested£383M · 2%
  • Dividends£9.2B · 43%
  • Buybacks£2.9B · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)£9.2B · 42%
  • Returned to owners£12.1B

    57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, £9.2B as dividends and £2.9B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran £2.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−11.8%

    The diluted count fell from 2062M to 1819M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record£0.64/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained21%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (£3.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew £783M, so each retained £1 added about 0.21 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles£11.0B75% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring£0over 10 years buying other businesses, against £383M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why RELX PLC PLC is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EBAYeBay Inc.$11.1B76%23.3%16%22%
RELXRELX PLC PLC£9.6B65%26.4%21%26%
WDAYWorkday Inc.$9.6B99%-4.7%-4%22%
CPAYCorpay Inc.$4.5B98%43.9%11%37%
FOURShift4 Payments$4.2B23%1.9%-1%9%
CARTMaplebear Inc.$3.7B74%2.4%21%18%
MSCIMSCI Inc.$3.1B80%52.3%38%46%
ETSYEtsy Inc.$2.9B70%10.5%24%26%
Group median75%16.9%18%24%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares (each representing one RELX PLC ordinary”; RELX PLC PLC reports in GBP, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at GBP 1 = $1.349 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in GBP.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what RELX PLC PLC has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, RELX PLC PLC earns about $3.4B on its 26.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.8B on 1819M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $8.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RELX PLC PLC (RELX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RELX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← REAX its page in the Manual RERE →

Industry order: ← RDWR the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter RELY →