Share count
220Mpeak FY2025
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REAX, The Real Brokerage Inc.
Real estate market is substantially reliant on the monetary policies of the federal government and its agencies and is particularly affected by the policies of the United States' Federal Reserve Board, which regulates the supply of money and credit in the U.S., which in turn impacts interest rates.
As interest rates fall, refinancing generally becomes a larger portion of the mortgage market.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.0B
+55.7% YoY · 160% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $885M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by North American Brokerage (99%) and One Real Mortgage (0%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −5.2% through the cycle on a 9.1% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −223%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →North American Brokerage is 99% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- North American Brokerage99%$2.0B
- One Real Mortgage0%$6M
- One Real Title0%$5M
- Other Operating0%$889K
By geographyUnited States89%Canada11%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $17M | $122M | $382M | $689M | $1.3B | $2.0B | $2.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($4M) | ($12M) | ($21M) | ($28M) | ($26M) | ($8M) | ($32M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($4M) | ($11M) | ($20M) | ($26M) | ($25M) | ($6M) | ($30M) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $22M | $40M | $44M | $65M | $102M | $127M | $102M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($21M) | ($29M) | ($18M) | ($28M) | ($66M) | ($50M) | ($66M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -18.9× | -17.0× | -16.9× | -42.0× | — | — | -22.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $6M | $27M | $22M | $37M | $30M | $52M | $30M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 41.8M | 162M | 178M | 178M | 191M | 220M | 210M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-0.08 | $-0.07 | $-0.11 | $-0.15 | $-0.13 | $-0.03 | $-0.14 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.14 | $0.17 | $0.12 | $0.21 | $0.16 | $0.24 | $0.14 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×3.87 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +86.6%/yr | +86.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +1685.0%/yr (1-yr) | +1685.0%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +67.2%/yr | +67.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.4%/yr | +10.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−40%low FY2022
Gross margin
8%low FY2022
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -22.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($30M) ÷ interest expense $1M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $49M + ST investments $17M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $66M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 3 + DIO 0 − DPO 0 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $39M = operating cash $39M − maintenance capex $172K; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (5-yr median 3%)Industry peers: median -1%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 5 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($32M) · cash from operations $39M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $40M ÷ Owner Earnings $39M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $39M of Owner Earnings, $40M (103%) went back to shareholders, $339K dividends, $39M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.09×HarvestingCapex $172K ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 6 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.11/share (latest year $-0.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −10% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −10% early to −2% lately, median −5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2020 · −16.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“During 2025, investments in automation and AI-enabled workflows contributed to improvements in operating expense per transaction, despite continued growth in agent count and transaction volume.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$88M
- Cash & short-term investments$66M
- Receivables$17M
- Other current assets$5M
Current liabilities$72M
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$71M
Current ratio1.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.91×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$16Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$18Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$16MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$96K$96K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$26Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| REAXThe Real Brokerage Inc. | $2.0B | 9% | -4.5% | -223% | 3% |
| FORForestar Group Inc Common Stock | $1.7B | 21% | 14.3% | 7% | -11% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38% | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 5.0% | -4% | 1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. The Real Brokerage Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The Real Brokerage Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, The Real Brokerage Inc. earns about $39M on its 2.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+156%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+156%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $39M on 189M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $66M. The if-converted diluted count is 210M, 11% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "The Real Brokerage Inc. (REAX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/REAX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← RDY its page in the Manual RELX →
Industry order: ← OPI the Real Estate Development & Services chapter RITR →