Owner Scorecard


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RES, RPC

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

RPC is a Delaware corporation originally organized in 1984 as a holding company for several OFS companies and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.

RPC acts as a holding company for the following service companies: Cudd Energy Services, Cudd Pressure Control, Thru Tubing Solutions, Pintail Completions and Patterson Services.

Selected overhead including centralized support services and regulatory compliance are classified as Corporate.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RES · RPC
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.6B
+15.0% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.4B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 2.0% 5-yr avg 8.9%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 14%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 2.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −52% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 9.1% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$729M$1.6B$1.7B$1.2B$598M$865M$1.6B$1.6B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7BRevenueRevenue
17%34%31%25%20%23%32%33%27%24%23%Gross marginGross mgn
21%10%10%14%21%14%9%10%11%11%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($239M)$226M$210M($114M)($310M)$16M$288M$245M$98M$45M$35MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−32.8%14.2%12.2%−9.3%−51.8%1.9%18.0%15.1%6.9%2.8%2.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($141M)$163M$175M($87M)($212M)$7M$218M$195M$91M$32M$21MNet incomeNet inc.
30%21%56%25%24%19%43%53%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$102M$134M$389M$209M$78M$48M$201M$395M$349M$201M$193MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$217M$164M$163M$170M$96M$73M$83M$108M$133M$161M$168MDepreciationDeprec.
$15M($203M)$41M$117M$186M($39M)($106M)$84M$116M($4M)($10M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$34M$118M$243M$251M$65M$68M$140M$181M$220M$148M$148MCapexCapex
4.7%7.4%14.1%20.5%10.9%7.8%8.7%11.2%15.5%9.1%8.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$68M$16M$226M$39M$13M($20M)$118M$287M$217M$53M$44MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.3%1.0%13.1%3.2%2.2%−2.3%7.4%17.7%15.3%3.3%2.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$68M$16M$146M($41M)$13M($20M)$62M$214M$129M$53M$44MFree cash flowFCF
9.3%1.0%8.5%−3.4%2.2%−2.3%3.9%13.2%9.1%3.3%2.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$79M$153M$153MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$11M$43M$101M$32M$9M$35M$34M$35M$35MDividends paidDiv. paid
$3M$27M$43M$7M$826K$567K$918K$21M$10M$3MBuybacksBuybacks
-28%19%20%-12%-45%1%30%23%11%3%2%ROICROIC
-18%18%18%-10%-34%1%25%19%8%3%2%Return on equityROE
−19%13%8%−14%24%16%5%−0%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$132M$91M$116M$50M$84M$82M$126M$223M$326M$210M$201MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$169M$378M$324M$243M$162M$259M$417M$325M$277M$328M$375MReceivablesReceiv.
$108M$115M$130M$101M$83M$79M$97M$111M$108M$119M$120MInventoryInvent.
$71M$103M$103M$53M$41M$74M$115M$85M$84M$120M$161MAccounts payablePayables
$207M$389M$350M$290M$204M$263M$398M$351M$300M$327M$334MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$479M$640M$619M$437M$428M$492M$703M$727M$733M$704M$735MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$101M$145M$143M$101M$80M$131M$179M$152M$182M$217M$235MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.7×4.4×4.3×4.3×5.4×3.8×3.9×4.8×4.0×3.2×3.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$32M$32M$32M$32M$32M$32M$32M$51M$51M$83M$81MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$791M$864M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5BTotal assetsAssets
-350.9×531.0×429.5×-342.2×-830.1×8.4×469.0×718.3×134.7×14.8×9.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$807M$912M$950M$830M$632M$642M$858M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%0.7%0.5%0.7%1.5%0.8%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.8%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
214M214M213M212M212M213M213M213M211M212M214MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.40$7.44$8.09$5.76$2.82$4.06$7.51$7.60$6.69$7.67$8.18Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.66$0.76$0.82$-0.41$-1.00$0.03$1.02$0.92$0.43$0.15$0.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.32$0.08$1.06$0.18$0.06$-0.09$0.55$1.35$1.03$0.25$0.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.32$0.08$0.69$-0.20$0.06$-0.09$0.29$1.00$0.61$0.25$0.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.20$0.48$0.15$0.04$0.16$0.16$0.17$0.17Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.16$0.55$1.14$1.18$0.31$0.32$0.65$0.85$1.04$0.70$0.69Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.77$4.25$4.47$3.91$2.97$3.01$4.02$4.80$5.10$5.18$5.13Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.4%/yr+22.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.6%/yr+32.7%/yr
Dividends / share+14.1%/yr+59.9%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share+17.9%/yr+18.0%/yr
Book value / share+3.6%/yr+11.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+15.0%
    “Revenues of $1.6 billion for 2025 increased 15.0% compared to 2024, with both Technical Services segment and Support Services segment revenues increasing. The increase in revenues was primarily due to revenues from recently acquired Pintail of $295.8 million, partially offset by lower pressure pumping activity levels compared to the prior year.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
212Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
3%low FY2020
Gross margin
24%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$53Mowner earningsvs.$32Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $32M of profit into $53M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$32M
Owner earnings$53M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$32M$91M$195M$218M$7M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$161M+$133M+$108M+$83M+$73M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$12M+$9M+$8M+$6M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$4M+$116M+$84M−$106M−$39M
Cash from operations$201M$349M$395M$201M$48M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$148M−$133M−$108M−$83M−$68M
Owner earnings$53M$217M$287M$118M($20M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$87M−$73M−$57M
Free cash flow$53M$129M$214M$62M($20M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%15%18%7%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $40M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $45M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $210M − debt $30M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $180M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 74 + DIO 35 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -45%–30%; 3% latest = NOPAT $25M ÷ invested capital $919M
    Industry peers: median 0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $53M = operating cash $201M − maintenance capex $148M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $40M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $201M ÷ net income $32M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $38M ÷ Owner Earnings $53M
    What this means

    Of $53M Owner Earnings, $38M (72%) went back to shareholders, $35M dividends, $3M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($12M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.92×
    Maintaining
    Capex $148M ÷ depreciation $161M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.24×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $30M vs $487M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +62%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.48/share (latest year $0.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −2% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 8% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −51.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Competitors may deploy AI-enabled tools more quickly or effectively than we do, improving their cost structure, responsiveness and utilization and increasing competitive pressure.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$735M
  • Cash & short-term investments$201M
  • Receivables$375M
  • Inventory$120M
  • Other current assets$39M
Current liabilities$235M
  • Accounts payable$161M
  • Other current liabilities$74M
Current ratio3.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.61×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$500Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+36.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.6× → 3.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$918Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$350MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$23M$23M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.5B · 70%
  • Dividends$300M · 14%
  • Buybacks$117M · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$223M · 11%
  • Returned to owners$417M

    41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $300M as dividends and $117M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$7.49

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $35M, about $7.49 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $5.79 (2022) to $7.74 (2023), and 2023, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($21M).

  • Net change in share count−0.2%

    The diluted count barely moved (214M to 214M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.17/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$181M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$232Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ben M. Palmer$1.4M$1.9M($20M)
2022Ben M. Palmer$2.1M$3.3M$118M
2022Ben M. Palmer$2.3M$3.1M$118M
2023Ben M. Palmer$2.4M$1.9M$287M
2024Ben M. Palmer$1.9M$1.2M$217M
2025Ben M. Palmer$3.2M$2.8M$53M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$12M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 28% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why RPC is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OIIOceaneering International$2.6B12%2.6%5%4%
ACDCProFrac Holding Corp.$1.9B-2.5%-3%3%
RESRPC$1.6B26%4.8%7%5%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.$1.6B95%-12.2%-8%-1%
WTTRSelect Water Solutions$1.4B12%1.9%-0%6%
NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp$1.3B13%7.4%8%9%
HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc.$1.3B12%3.3%1%9%
PUMPProPetro Holding Corp.$1.3B0.1%0%7%
Group median12%2.3%0%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what RPC has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, RPC earns about $87M on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $44M on 222M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $171M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RPC (RES), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RES, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← REPX its page in the Manual REX →

Industry order: ← PUMP the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter RIG →