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RUSHB, Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B

We are a full-service, integrated retailer of commercial vehicles and related services.

Through our strategically located network of Rush Truck Centers, we provide one-stop service for the needs of our commercial vehicle customers, including retail sales of new and used commercial vehicles, aftermarket parts sales, service and repair facilities, financing, leasing and rental, and insurance products.

Strategy consists of providing solutions to the commercial vehicle industry through our network of commercial vehicle dealerships.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RUSHB · Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$7.1B

−5.2% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.9B 5-yr avg $6.7B

Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 16%

Operating margin 5.6% 5-yr avg 6.5%

ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 17%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 16% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.9% to 7.5% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 22% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$4.2B	$4.7B	$5.3B	$5.6B	$4.5B	$4.9B	$6.8B	$7.6B	$7.4B	$7.1B	$6.9B	RevenueRevenue
17%	18%	14%	14%	14%	17%	17%	16%	16%	15%	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
14%	13%	13%	14%	15%	15%	14%	13%	13%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$81M	$149M	$203M	$216M	$155M	$309M	$506M	$512M	$468M	$394M	$384M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.9%	3.2%	3.9%	3.9%	3.4%	6.3%	7.5%	6.8%	6.3%	5.6%	5.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$41M	$172M	$139M	$142M	$115M	$241M	$391M	$347M	$304M	$264M	$265M	Net incomeNet inc.
39%	—	24%	25%	24%	23%	23%	25%	23%	23%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$521M	$153M	$215M	$421M	$763M	$422M	$294M	$296M	$620M	$862M	$769M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$158M	$158M	$185M	$175M	$177M	$169M	$199M	$221M	$236M	$253M	$256M	DepreciationDeprec.
$310M	($193M)	($127M)	$85M	$451M	($11M)	($321M)	($303M)	$49M	$313M	$215M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$197M	$210M	$238M	$293M	$136M	$167M	$243M	$369M	$433M	$400M	$357M	CapexCapex
4.7%	4.5%	4.5%	5.3%	3.0%	3.4%	3.6%	4.9%	5.8%	5.7%	5.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$324M	($5M)	$30M	$246M	$627M	$255M	$51M	$75M	$383M	$609M	$513M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.7%	−0.1%	0.6%	4.4%	13.9%	5.2%	0.8%	1.0%	5.1%	8.6%	7.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$324M	($57M)	($23M)	$128M	$627M	$255M	$51M	($73M)	$187M	$462M	$411M	Free cash flowFCF
7.7%	−1.2%	−0.4%	2.3%	13.9%	5.2%	0.8%	−1.0%	2.5%	6.5%	6.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$681K	$2M	$0	$10M	$0	$269M	$21M	$16M	$16M	$24M	$24M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$9M	$18M	$22M	$41M	$45M	$51M	$56M	$58M	$59M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$44M	$34M	$121M	$58M	$25M	$34M	$94M	$212M	$16M	$195M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	10%	10%	10%	8%	14%	21%	18%	15%	13%	13%	ROICROIC
5%	17%	13%	12%	9%	16%	22%	19%	14%	12%	12%	Return on equityROE
—	17%	12%	11%	7%	14%	20%	16%	12%	9%	9%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$82M	$125M	$132M	$182M	$312M	$148M	$201M	$184M	$228M	$213M	$240M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$156M	$184M	$191M	$184M	$172M	$173M	$140M	$259M	$345M	$278M	$271M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$840M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$858M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.6B	InventoryInvent.
$98M	$108M	$127M	$134M	$111M	$122M	$172M	$162M	$244M	$231M	$320M	Accounts payablePayables
$899M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$920M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.1B	$2.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$993M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.1×	1.3×	1.3×	1.3×	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$290M	$291M	$291M	$292M	$292M	$370M	$416M	$421M	$427M	$442M	$442M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.8B	$4.4B	$4.6B	$4.4B	$4.5B	Total assetsAssets
$603M	$612M	$601M	$628M	$530M	$335M	$275M	$414M	$408M	$275M	$278M	Total debtDebt
$521M	$487M	$469M	$446M	$218M	$187M	$74M	$230M	$180M	$62M	$38M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.4×	11.3×	9.6×	7.1×	15.9×	127.3×	25.6×	9.5×	6.5×	8.2×	9.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$863M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
91.4M	92.2M	90.7M	84.5M	84.4M	86.8M	85.7M	83.7M	81.8M	80.7M	79.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$46.13	$51.12	$58.11	$65.80	$53.34	$56.20	$79.08	$90.44	$91.05	$87.51	$86.34	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.44	$1.87	$1.53	$1.67	$1.36	$2.78	$4.57	$4.15	$3.72	$3.27	$3.32	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.55	$-0.06	$0.33	$2.91	$7.43	$2.94	$0.60	$0.89	$4.69	$7.54	$6.42	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.55	$-0.62	$-0.25	$1.51	$7.43	$2.94	$0.60	$-0.87	$2.28	$5.72	$5.15	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.00	$0.10	$0.22	$0.27	$0.47	$0.52	$0.60	$0.68	$0.72	$0.74	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.16	$2.28	$2.63	$3.47	$1.61	$1.93	$2.84	$4.41	$5.29	$4.95	$4.48	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.44	$11.28	$11.77	$13.72	$15.03	$16.89	$20.35	$22.35	$26.17	$27.29	$28.41	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.4%/yr	+10.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+8.7%/yr	+0.3%/yr
EPS	+24.8%/yr	+19.1%/yr
Dividends / share	—	+22.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.7%/yr	+25.1%/yr
Book value / share	+12.5%/yr	+12.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-5.2%
“Our revenues from sales of new and used commercial vehicles decreased $385.3 million, or 7.9%, in 2025, compared to 2024. The decrease in new and used commercial vehicle revenues was primarily a result of weak demand for Class 8 trucks caused by the freight recession and uncertainty with respect to U.S. trade policy and engine emissions regulations.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

81Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

13%low FY2016

Gross margin

15%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.1×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$609Mowner earningsvs.$264Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $609M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $253M it takes just to hold its position. It put $147M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $462M.

Reported net income$264M

Owner earnings$609M · 9% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$264M	$304M	$347M	$391M	$241M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$253M	+$236M	+$221M	+$199M	+$169M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$32M	+$30M	+$30M	+$25M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$313M	+$49M	−$303M	−$321M	−$11M
Cash from operations	$862M	$620M	$296M	$294M	$422M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$253M	−$236M	−$221M	−$243M	−$167M
Owner earnings	$609M	$383M	$75M	$51M	$255M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$147M	−$197M	−$148M	—	—
Free cash flow	$462M	$187M	($73M)	$51M	$255M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	5%	1%	1%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $253M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $147M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $577M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 8.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $394M ÷ interest expense $48M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $62M · 0.2× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $213M − debt $275M

What this means
Netting $213M of cash and short-term investments against $275M of debt leaves $62M owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (0.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 94d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 14 + DIO 94 − DPO 14 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 4%–21%; 13% latest = NOPAT $302M ÷ invested capital $2.3B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $609M = operating cash $862M − maintenance capex $253M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $147M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $462M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $577M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.27×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $862M ÷ net income $264M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 42%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $253M ÷ Owner Earnings $609M

What this means
Of $609M Owner Earnings, $253M (42%) went back to shareholders, $58M dividends, $195M buybacks. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $163M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.58×

Expanding

Capex $400M ÷ depreciation $253M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.40×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $275M vs $599M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +160%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.94/share (latest year $3.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 6% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 31%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 1.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We use AI in our business and challenges with properly incorporating AI into our business and managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm and legal liability.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.2B

Cash & short-term investments$240M
Receivables$271M
Inventory$1.6B
Other current assets$54M

Current liabilities$1.5B

Debt due within a year$125K
Accounts payable$320M
Other current liabilities$1.2B

Current ratio1.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.37×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$693Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$125K due · $240M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−9.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$400M$123M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$86Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.7B · 59%
Dividends$300M · 7%
Buybacks$831M · 18%
Retained (debt / cash)$750M · 16%

Returned to owners$1.1B
44% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $300M as dividends and $831M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $831M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−12.6%
The diluted count fell from 91M to 80M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.72/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained23%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $239M, so each retained $1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	W.M. “Rusty” Rush	$8.5M	$13.7M	$255M
2022	W.M. “Rusty” Rush	$10.3M	$10.4M	$51M
2023	W.M. “Rusty” Rush	$10.7M	$17.4M	$75M
2024	W.M. “Rusty” Rush	$10.0M	$11.1M	$383M
2025	W.M. “Rusty” Rush	$10.2M	$10.5M	$609M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$32M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CVNACarvana	$20.3B	14%	-0.7%	-3%	-17%
MUSAMurphy USA	$19.4B	90%	3.6%	20%	3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc	$18.0B	17%	4.8%	14%	4%
CASYCasey's General	$17.6B	67%	4.3%	11%	4%
SAHSonic Automotive Inc.	$15.2B	15%	2.4%	14%	1%
RUSHBRush Enterprises Inc. Class B	$7.1B	16%	4.7%	12%	5%
CWHCamping World Holdings	$6.4B	30%	6.1%	18%	2%
CPRTCopart	$4.6B	89%	36.8%	26%	30%
Group median	—	24%	4.5%	14%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B has delivered.

Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B earns about $338M on its 4.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($338M) Net of stock comp (−$33M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($516M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+34%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $411M on 77M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $38M. The if-converted diluted count is 80M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($357M) runs well above depreciation ($256M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $516M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RUSHB against another business →

The owners of RUSHB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Rush Enterprises Inc. Class B (RUSHB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RUSHB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RUSHA its page in the Manual RVLV →

Industry order: ← RUSHA the Auto Dealers & Services chapter SAH →