Owner Scorecard


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RVLV, Revolve Group

REVOLVE, we offer an assortment of premium apparel, footwear, beauty and accessories from emerging, established and owned brands.

As a trusted premium lifestyle brand and a go-to online source for discovery and inspiration, we deliver exceptional service and an engaging customer experience with a vast yet curated offering totaling over 140,000 apparel and footwear styles, as well as beauty and accessories.

Our dynamic platform connects a deeply engaged community of millions of consumers, thousands of global fashion influencers and over 1,600 emerging, established and owned brands.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RVLV · Revolve Group
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+8.5% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.1B
Gross margin 54% 5-yr avg 53%
Operating margin 5.9% 5-yr avg 6.2%
ROIC 29% 5-yr avg 40%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is REVOLVE (86%) and FWRD (14%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 6.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.1% to 12% — on a steadier 53% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 39%, above 15% in 8 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

REVOLVE is 86% of revenue, with FWRD the other meaningful segment at 14%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • REVOLVE86%$1.1B
  • FWRD14%$172M
By geographyUnited States79%International21%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$400M$499M$601M$581M$891M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
48%53%54%53%55%54%52%53%54%54%Gross marginGross mgn
14%13%13%12%10%10%12%13%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$21M$42M$48M$61M$105M$73M$22M$51M$74M$75MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.1%8.4%8.0%10.5%11.8%6.6%2.1%4.6%6.1%5.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$5M$31M$36M$57M$100M$59M$28M$50M$62M$64MNet incomeNet inc.
26%24%5%5%23%25%24%26%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$16M$27M$46M$74M$62M$23M$43M$27M$59M$64MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$3M$4M$5M$5M$5M$5M$4M$5M$5MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M($8M)$4M$9M($47M)($46M)$4M($37M)($17M)($17M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$3M$12M$2M$2M$5M$4M$6M$11M$15MCapexCapex
0.6%0.6%2.1%0.4%0.2%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.9%1.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$14M$24M$42M$71M$60M$18M$39M$22M$55M$59MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.6%4.7%7.0%12.3%6.7%1.7%3.7%2.0%4.5%4.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$14M$24M$34M$71M$60M$18M$39M$21M$48M$49MFree cash flowFCF
3.6%4.7%5.6%12.3%6.7%1.7%3.7%1.9%3.9%3.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$41M$31M$12M$2MBuybacksBuybacks
21%49%56%107%102%39%12%22%25%29%ROICROIC
11%38%27%28%31%15%7%11%12%12%Return on equityROE
11%38%27%28%31%15%7%11%12%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$16M$65M$146M$218M$235M$245M$257M$292M$336MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$12M$10M$17M$26MReceivablesReceiv.
$102M$104M$95M$171M$215M$204M$229M$252M$245MInventoryInvent.
$20M$30M$39M$54M$51M$48M$45M$56M$71MAccounts payablePayables
$87M$79M$61M$122M$170M$168M$194M$212M$201MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$139M$199M$277M$440M$518M$529M$561M$647M$688MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$82M$102M$106M$160M$181M$190M$196M$231M$271MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×2.0×2.6×2.7×2.9×2.8×2.9×2.8×2.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2MGoodwillGoodwill
$162M$232M$306M$480M$579M$609M$666M$765M$821MTotal assetsAssets
($16M)($65M)($146M)($218M)($235M)($245M)($257M)($292M)($336M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$48M$80M$131M$200M$317M$380M$385M$438M$513M$528MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.3%0.3%0.6%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.9%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
7.3M7.4M7.7M72.1M74.5M74.5M73.6M71.7M72.1M72.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$54.44$67.12$77.86$8.06$11.96$14.78$14.52$15.76$17.00$17.58Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.73$4.13$4.62$0.79$1.34$0.79$0.38$0.69$0.86$0.89EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.94$3.18$5.45$0.99$0.81$0.25$0.53$0.31$0.76$0.81Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.94$3.18$4.35$0.99$0.81$0.25$0.53$0.29$0.67$0.68Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.31$0.41$1.61$0.03$0.03$0.07$0.06$0.08$0.16$0.20Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.54$10.74$16.94$2.78$4.25$5.09$5.23$6.11$7.11$7.30Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/6 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×9.34 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−13.5%/yr+16.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−11.0%/yr−5.2%/yr
EPS+2.0%/yr+1.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.0%/yr+37.4%/yr
Book value / share+1.1%/yr+20.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
72Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
25%low FY2023
Gross margin
54%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$55Mowner earningsvs.$62Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $55M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5M it takes just to hold its position. It put $7M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $48M.

Reported net income$62M
Owner earnings$55M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$62M$50M$28M$59M$100M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$5M+$4M+$5M+$5M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$10M+$6M+$6M+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$17M−$37M+$4M−$46M−$47M
Cash from operations$59M$27M$43M$23M$62M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5M−$4M−$4M−$5M−$2M
Owner earnings$55M$22M$39M$18M$60M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$7M−$1M
Free cash flow$48M$21M$39M$18M$60M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%2%4%2%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $44M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $292M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $292M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 5 + DIO 161 − DPO 36 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -8%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 2%–12%; latest $55M = operating cash $59M − maintenance capex $5M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $44M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $59M ÷ net income $62M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2M ÷ Owner Earnings $55M
    What this means

    Of $55M Owner Earnings, $2M (4%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($11M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.48×
    Expanding
    Capex $11M ÷ depreciation $5M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.81×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +94%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.65/share (latest year $0.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 7% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 4% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 2.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +6.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Issues relating to our use of new and evolving technologies such as AI may cause us to experience brand or reputational harm, competitive harm, legal liability and new or enhanced governmental or regulatory scrutiny, and to incur additional costs to resolve such issues.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$688M
  • Cash & short-term investments$336M
  • Receivables$26M
  • Inventory$245M
  • Other current assets$81M
Current liabilities$271M
  • Accounts payable$71M
  • Other current liabilities$200M
Current ratio2.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$418Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 2.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$524Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$395MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$33M$33M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $378M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$49M · 13%
  • Buybacks$86M · 23%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$244M · 65%
  • Returned to owners$86M

    25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $86M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $86M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count885.6%

    The diluted count rose from 7M to 72M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained4%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($341M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $12M, so each retained $1 added about 0.04 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mike Karanikolas$473k$473k$60M
2022Mike Karanikolas$984k$484k$18M
2023Mike Karanikolas$981k$481k$39M
2024Mike Karanikolas$482k$482k$22M
2025Mike Karanikolas$485k$485k$55M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Revolve Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.4% vs 5.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.1% early in the record and 3.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?885.6%

    Diluted shares grew 885.6% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $86M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PTRNPattern Group Inc. Series A$2.5B44%3.9%3%
GCTGigaCloud Technology Inc$1.3B11.2%84%13%
EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting$1.3B79%7.7%6%7%
SFIXStitch Fix Inc.$1.3B44%-3.0%-35%3%
LESLLeslie's$1.2B41%13.1%38%3%
RVLVRevolve Group$1.2B53%6.6%39%4%
BBBYBed Bath & Beyond Inc.$1.0B23%-4.3%-201%-3%
HNSTThe Honest Company Inc.$371M33%-11.3%-23%-4%
Group median44%5.3%6%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Revolve Group has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Revolve Group earns about $55M on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $49M on 71M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $336M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($15M) runs well above depreciation ($5M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $59M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Revolve Group (RVLV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RVLV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RUSHB its page in the Manual RVTY →

Industry order: ← REAL the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter SFIX →