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SHO, Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Cyclical

All of our hotels are operated under nationally recognized brands, except the Oceans Edge Resort & Marina, which operates independently.

As of December 31, 2025, our third-party managers included: subsidiaries of Marriott International, Inc. or Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.

Our hotels and resorts are located in highly desirable markets and possess unique attributes that are difficult to replicate.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SHO · Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$960M

+6.0% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $986M 5-yr avg $855M

Operating margin 30.3% 5-yr avg 12.1%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Room (61%), Food and Beverage (29%) and Other Operating (10%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −134% and 26% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Room is 61% of revenue, with Food and Beverage the other meaningful line at 29%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Room61%$583M
Food and Beverage29%$279M
Other Operating10%$99M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$268M	$509M	$912M	$986M	$906M	$960M	$986M	RevenueRevenue
2%	2%	3%	3%	11%	8%	4%	3%	3%	3%	3%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$189M	$186M	$299M	$176M	($358M)	$45M	$105M	$248M	$77M	$61M	$299M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.9%	15.6%	25.8%	15.8%	−133.5%	8.8%	11.5%	25.1%	8.5%	6.4%	30.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$117M	$132M	$236M	$122M	($418M)	$14M	$73M	$192M	$28M	$8M	$23M	Net incomeNet inc.
-1%	-6%	1%	-0%	—	1%	0%	2%	-4%	3%	1%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$288M	$307M	$305M	$291M	($117M)	$28M	$209M	$198M	$170M	$182M	$195M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$163M	$159M	$146M	$148M	$137M	$129M	$126M	$127M	$125M	$135M	$136M	DepreciationDeprec.
$136K	$8M	($87M)	$12M	$154M	($127M)	($494K)	($131M)	$8M	$30M	$27M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$182M	$115M	$159M	$96M	$51M	$64M	$129M	$110M	$157M	$103M	$106M	CapexCapex
15.3%	9.6%	13.7%	8.6%	19.2%	12.5%	14.1%	11.2%	17.4%	10.7%	10.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$106M	$192M	$146M	$195M	($168M)	($35M)	$81M	$88M	$13M	$79M	$89M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.9%	16.1%	12.6%	17.5%	−62.8%	−6.9%	8.9%	8.9%	1.4%	8.2%	9.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$106M	$192M	$146M	$195M	($168M)	($35M)	$81M	$88M	$13M	$79M	$89M	Free cash flowFCF
8.9%	16.1%	12.6%	17.5%	−62.8%	−6.9%	8.9%	8.9%	1.4%	8.2%	9.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M	$174M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$174M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$163M	$178M	$170M	$156M	$14M	$25M	$60M	$91M	$86M	$86M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	$50M	$104M	—	$108M	$56M	$27M	$103M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	6%	10%	6%	-12%	2%	4%	9%	3%	2%	—	ROICROIC
5%	5%	9%	5%	-20%	1%	3%	9%	1%	0%	1%	Return on equityROE
—	−1%	2%	−2%	−28%	−0%	2%	6%	−3%	−4%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$370M	$488M	$809M	$817M	$368M	$120M	$101M	$426M	$107M	$109M	$91M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M	$34M	$34M	$35M	$9M	$29M	$42M	$31M	$34M	$34M	$45M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1M	$1M	$1M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1M	InventoryInvent.
—	—	—	—	—	$48M	$57M	—	—	—	$45M	Accounts payablePayables
$41M	$36M	$35M	$35M	$9M	($19M)	($15M)	$31M	$34M	$34M	$1M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$568M	$728M	$908M	$914M	$435M	$282M	$214M	—	—	—	$227M	Current assetsCur. assets
$409M	$243M	$233M	$326M	$91M	$176M	$381M	—	—	—	$147M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	3.0×	3.9×	2.8×	4.8×	1.6×	0.6×	—	—	—	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$990K	$990K	$990K	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$990K	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.7B	$3.9B	$4.0B	$3.9B	$3.0B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$3.0B	Total assetsAssets
$936M	$990M	$983M	$975M	$748M	$611M	$816M	$819M	$845M	$930M	$955M	Total debtDebt
$566M	$502M	$174M	$158M	$380M	$491M	$715M	$393M	$738M	$821M	$864M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.8×	3.6×	6.3×	3.2×	-6.7×	1.4×	3.3×	4.8×	1.5×	1.2×	5.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%	3.6%	2.5%	1.2%	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	0.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
215M	222M	226M	226M	216M	216M	213M	206M	203M	194M	189M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.53	$5.38	$5.13	$4.94	$1.24	$2.35	$4.29	$4.79	$4.47	$4.94	$5.22	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.55	$0.59	$1.05	$0.54	$-1.93	$0.06	$0.34	$0.93	$0.14	$0.04	$0.12	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.49	$0.86	$0.65	$0.86	$-0.78	$-0.16	$0.38	$0.43	$0.06	$0.41	$0.47	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.49	$0.86	$0.65	$0.86	$-0.78	$-0.16	$0.38	$0.43	$0.06	$0.41	$0.47	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.73	$0.79	$0.75	$0.72	$0.06	$0.12	$0.29	$0.45	$0.44	$0.46	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.85	$0.52	$0.70	$0.43	$0.24	$0.29	$0.60	$0.53	$0.78	$0.53	$0.56	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.55	$11.42	$11.79	$11.41	$9.49	$10.17	$9.80	$10.52	$10.38	$10.01	$10.09	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.2%/yr	+31.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−2.1%/yr	—
EPS	−24.8%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−6.1%/yr (8-yr)	−9.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	−5.1%/yr	+17.4%/yr
Book value / share	−1.6%/yr	+1.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

194Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

2%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

10.4×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$79Mowner earningsvs.$8Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $8M of profit into $79M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$8M

Owner earnings$79M · 8% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$8M	$28M	$192M	$73M	$14M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$135M	+$125M	+$127M	+$126M	+$129M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$10M	+$11M	+$11M	+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$30M	+$8M	−$131M	−$494K	−$127M
Cash from operations	$182M	$170M	$198M	$209M	$28M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$103M	−$157M	−$110M	−$129M	−$64M
Owner earnings	$79M	$13M	$88M	$81M	($35M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	1%	9%	9%	-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $70M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $299M ÷ interest expense $53M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.0B · 3.4× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $109M − debt $1.1B

What this means
Netting $109M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $1.0B owed, about 3.4× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -12%–10%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -63%–17%; latest $79M = operating cash $182M − maintenance capex $103M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $70M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 22.14×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $182M ÷ net income $8M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 240%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $189M ÷ Owner Earnings $79M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $79M of Owner Earnings, $189M (240%) went back to shareholders, $86M dividends, $103M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $9M stock comp, the real buyback was about $94M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.77×

Harvesting

Capex $103M ÷ depreciation $135M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $960M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.56×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs ($167M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Near

Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −53%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.41/share (latest year $0.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 19% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 13% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −12%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 12% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −133.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.1%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 9 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Further, any adoption of AI by us or by third parties may pose new security challenges.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2023

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$227M

Cash & short-term investments$91M
Receivables$45M
Inventory$1M
Other current assets$89M

Current liabilities$147M

Debt due within a year$2M
Accounts payable$45M
Other current liabilities$100M

Current ratio1.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.54×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.62×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$80Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$2M due · $91M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2023 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($879M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$964M$19M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$51Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.2B · 63%
Dividends$943M · 51%
Buybacks$449M · 24%

Returned to owners$1.4B
200% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $943M as dividends and $449M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$696M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $696M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $278M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $449M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−12.2%
The diluted count fell from 215M to 189M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.44/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Bryan A. Giglia	$8.2M	$8.5M	($35M)
2021	Bryan A. Giglia	$2.9M	$2.9M	($35M)
2022	Bryan A. Giglia	$3.1M	$3.0M	$81M
2022	Bryan A. Giglia	$5.4M	$4.5M	$81M
2023	Bryan A. Giglia	$4.1M	$4.3M	$88M
2024	Bryan A. Giglia	$3.9M	$7.3M	$13M
2025	Bryan A. Giglia	$4.5M	−$688k	$79M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.2% vs 12.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.5% early in the record and 6.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 5% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $41M to $46M while revenue grew −17%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.	$7.0B	—	12.1%	12%	8%
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.	$1.1B	32%	9.8%	4%	10%
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.	$960M	—	13.6%	5%	9%
CVEOCiveo Corporation (Canada)	$639M	24%	-4.6%	-6%	9%
MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc.	$545M	—	17.8%	13%	19%
Group median	—	—	13.3%	5%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. earns about $85M on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($85M) Net of stock comp (−$9M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+19%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−12%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $89M on 186M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $864M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SHO against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. (SHO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SHO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SHLS its page in the Manual SHOE →

Industry order: ← RXO the Hotels & Resorts chapter SPCE →