← All companies ← SMFG Manual SNDL → ← SLP Software SNAP →
SMWB, Similarweb Ltd.
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −21% through the cycle on a 77% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −8 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 6 regions, the largest United States at 55%.
- United States55%$154M
- Europe16%$46M
- Asia Pacific12%$35M
- United Kingdom9%$25M
- Other6%$18M
- Israel2%$5M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $71M | $93M | $138M | $193M | $218M | $250M | $283M | $283M | RevenueRevenue |
| 71% | 77% | 77% | 72% | 78% | 78% | 80% | 80% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($16M) | ($20M) | ($66M) | ($88M) | ($29M) | ($10M) | ($24M) | ($24M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −22.8% | −21.0% | −48.0% | −45.5% | −13.2% | −3.9% | −8.3% | −8.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($18M) | ($22M) | ($69M) | ($84M) | ($29M) | ($11M) | ($33M) | ($33M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($10M) | ($4M) | ($28M) | ($46M) | ($3M) | $30M | $15M | $15M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $2M | $3M | $11M | $10M | $11M | $9M | $9M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $6M | $16M | $38M | $27M | $16M | $31M | $39M | $39M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $284K | $748K | $2M | $28M | $2M | $1M | $1M | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 0.8% | 1.7% | 14.6% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($10M) | ($5M) | ($30M) | ($57M) | ($5M) | $29M | $13M | $13M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −14.1% | −4.8% | −21.7% | −29.3% | −2.1% | 11.5% | 4.7% | 4.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($10M) | ($5M) | ($30M) | ($74M) | ($5M) | $29M | $13M | $13M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −14.1% | −4.8% | −21.7% | −38.5% | −2.1% | 11.5% | 4.7% | 4.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | -81% | -381% | -189% | -42% | -141% | -141% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −81% | −381% | −189% | −42% | −141% | −141% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | $54M | $129M | $78M | $72M | $64M | $72M | $72M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $25M | $31M | $38M | $48M | $51M | $54M | $54M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4M | $11M | $7M | $8M | $12M | $14M | $14M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $21M | $20M | $31M | $39M | $39M | $40M | $40M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $88M | $188M | $142M | $146M | $141M | $150M | $150M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $108M | $134M | $181M | $184M | $177M | $197M | $197M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.8× | 1.4× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $3M | $11M | $13M | $13M | $25M | $39M | $39M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $104M | $227M | $246M | $239M | $243M | $261M | $261M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | ($54M) | ($129M) | ($78M) | ($72M) | ($64M) | ($72M) | ($72M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -14.2× | -11.7× | -35.0× | — | — | — | — | -12.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($129M) | ($145M) | $85M | $22M | $16M | $28M | $23M | $23M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 13.4M | 14.4M | 53.2M | 75.7M | 77.8M | 80.8M | 84.8M | 87.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.26 | $6.47 | $2.59 | $2.55 | $2.80 | $3.09 | $3.33 | $3.25 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.32 | $-1.52 | $-1.30 | $-1.10 | $-0.38 | $-0.14 | $-0.39 | $-0.38 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.74 | $-0.31 | $-0.56 | $-0.75 | $-0.06 | $0.36 | $0.16 | $0.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.74 | $-0.31 | $-0.56 | $-0.98 | $-0.06 | $0.36 | $0.16 | $0.15 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.05 | $0.04 | $0.37 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-9.62 | $-10.04 | $1.60 | $0.29 | $0.20 | $0.34 | $0.28 | $0.27 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×3.68 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.42 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −7.3%/yr | −12.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −3.0%/yr | −19.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $33M loss into $13M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($33M) | ($11M) | ($29M) | ($84M) | ($69M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$9M | +$11M | +$10M | +$11M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$39M | +$31M | +$16M | +$27M | +$38M |
| Cash from operations | $15M | $30M | ($3M) | ($46M) | ($28M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1M | −$1M | −$2M | −$11M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | $13M | $29M | ($5M) | ($57M) | ($30M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$18M | — |
| Free cash flow | $13M | $29M | ($5M) | ($74M) | ($30M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 5% | 12% | -2% | -29% | -22% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -12.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($24M) ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $72M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $72M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 70 + DIO 0 − DPO 88 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $13M = operating cash $15M − maintenance capex $1M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -5%)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a -5% median across 7 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($33M) · cash from operations $15M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.17×HarvestingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $9M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $283M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.76×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.28/share (latest year $-0.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −31% → −8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −31% early to −8% lately, median −21% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2021 · −48.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$72M
- Receivables$54M
- Other current assets$24M
- Accounts payable$14M
- Other current liabilities$183M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| SMWBSimilarweb Ltd. | $283M | 77% | -21.0% | — | -5% |
| OOMAOoma Inc. | $274M | 61% | -2.7% | -11% | 1% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| Group median | — | 77% | 0.7% | — | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Similarweb Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Similarweb Ltd. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $13M on 87M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $72M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SMFG its page in the Manual SNDL →
Industry order: ← SLP the Software chapter SNAP →