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TAL, TAL Education Group

Education Services asset-light Cyclical

Revenue is Learning Services and Others (65%) and Learning Content Solutions (35%).

Latest annual: FY2026 20-F · 1 ADS = 0.333333 ordinary shares

TAL · TAL Education Group

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$3.0B

+33.7% YoY · −8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.0B 5-yr avg $2.4B

Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 54%

Operating margin 9.2% 5-yr avg −3.7%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg −3%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 13% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.1%) on a 54% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −18 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Learning Services and Others is 65% of revenue, with Learning Content Solutions the other meaningful line at 35%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026

Learning Services and Others65%$1.9B
Learning Content Solutions35%$1.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMFeb 2026
											Income statement
$1.0B	$1.7B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$4.5B	$4.4B	$1.0B	$1.5B	$2.3B	$3.0B	$3.0B	RevenueRevenue
50%	49%	55%	55%	54%	50%	57%	54%	53%	55%	55%	Gross marginGross mgn
$135M	$209M	$342M	$137M	($438M)	($615M)	($91M)	($69M)	($3M)	$276M	$276M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.9%	12.2%	13.3%	4.2%	−9.7%	−14.0%	−8.9%	−4.6%	−0.1%	9.2%	9.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$112M	$195M	$365M	($128M)	($143M)	($1.2B)	($132M)	($4M)	$84M	$530M	$530M	Net incomeNet inc.
23%	19%	17%	—	—	—	—	—	31%	23%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$379M	$685M	$194M	$856M	$955M	($939M)	$7M	$306M	$398M	$601M	$601M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$29M	$51M	$77M	$100M	$137M	$171M	$35M	$24M	$46M	$69M	$69M	DepreciationDeprec.
$238M	$440M	($247M)	$884M	$961M	$54M	$104M	$287M	$268M	$3M	$3M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$71M	$126M	$138M	$178M	$245M	$246M	$110M	$113M	$112M	$93M	$93M	CapexCapex
6.8%	7.4%	5.4%	5.4%	5.5%	5.6%	10.8%	7.6%	5.0%	3.1%	3.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$350M	$634M	$118M	$756M	$818M	($1.1B)	($28M)	$282M	$352M	$533M	$533M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
33.6%	37.0%	4.6%	23.1%	18.2%	−25.3%	−2.7%	18.9%	15.6%	17.7%	17.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$308M	$559M	$56M	$678M	$710M	($1.2B)	($103M)	$193M	$286M	$508M	$508M	Free cash flowFCF
29.5%	32.6%	2.2%	20.7%	15.8%	−27.0%	−10.1%	13.0%	12.7%	16.9%	16.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$41M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	$10M	$196M	$66M	$234M	$13M	$644M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
26%	15%	23%	—	-16%	-20%	-4%	-2%	-0%	9%	8%	ROICROIC
17%	12%	15%	-5%	-3%	-29%	-3%	-0%	2%	14%	14%	Return on equityROE
17%	9%	15%	−5%	—	—	—	—	—	—	14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$700M	$1.5B	$1.5B	$2.2B	$5.9B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$16M	$50M	$43M	$26M	$26M	$45M	$53M	$94M	$72M	$72M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$3M	$5M	$8M	$26M	$39M	$22M	$39M	$68M	$105M	$143M	$143M	InventoryInvent.
$23M	$58M	$106M	$118M	$354M	$90M	$60M	$127M	$146M	$153M	$153M	Accounts payablePayables
($20M)	($36M)	($49M)	($49M)	($289M)	($42M)	$24M	($6M)	$53M	$62M	$62M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$871M	$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$8.2B	$3.6B	$3.5B	$3.7B	$4.1B	$3.8B	$3.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$667M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.8B	$3.4B	$903M	$784M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.5×	1.5×	1.4×	2.4×	4.0×	4.4×	3.4×	2.9×	2.2×	2.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$267M	$291M	$414M	$379M	$454M	—	—	$157K	$155K	$46M	$46M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B	$3.1B	$3.7B	$5.6B	$12.1B	$5.1B	$4.7B	$4.9B	$5.5B	$5.9B	$5.9B	Total assetsAssets
$225M	$225M	$0	$262M	$270M	—	—	—	—	—	$532M	Total debtDebt
($475M)	($1.3B)	($1.5B)	($2.0B)	($5.7B)	—	—	—	—	—	($2.7B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
10.2×	12.5×	19.4×	11.6×	-25.9×	-78.1×	—	—	—	—	35.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$644M	$1.6B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$5.2B	$4.0B	$3.8B	$3.7B	$3.8B	$3.8B	$3.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
189M	194M	200M	198M	204M	215M	213M	203M	205M	193M	193M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.53	$8.83	$12.80	$16.52	$22.08	$20.44	$4.80	$7.33	$10.96	$15.60	$15.60	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.60	$1.00	$1.82	$-0.64	$-0.70	$-5.42	$-0.62	$-0.02	$0.41	$2.75	$2.75	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.86	$3.26	$0.59	$3.82	$4.02	$-5.17	$-0.13	$1.39	$1.72	$2.76	$2.76	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.63	$2.88	$0.28	$3.42	$3.49	$-5.52	$-0.48	$0.95	$1.39	$2.63	$2.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.21	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.38	$0.65	$0.69	$0.90	$1.20	$1.15	$0.52	$0.55	$0.54	$0.48	$0.48	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.42	$8.34	$12.40	$12.69	$25.55	$18.76	$18.09	$18.01	$18.35	$19.56	$19.56	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.2%/yr	−6.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+4.5%/yr	−7.2%/yr
EPS	+18.5%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+2.8%/yr	−16.7%/yr
Book value / share	+21.4%/yr	−5.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

193Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

9%low FY2022

Gross margin

55%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$533Mowner earningsvs.$530Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $533M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $69M it takes just to hold its position. It put $25M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $508M.

Reported net income$530M

Owner earnings$533M · 18% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$530M	$84M	($4M)	($132M)	($1.2B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$69M	+$46M	+$24M	+$35M	+$171M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$3M	+$268M	+$287M	+$104M	+$54M
Cash from operations	$601M	$398M	$306M	$7M	($939M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$69M	−$46M	−$24M	−$35M	−$171M
Owner earnings	$533M	$352M	$282M	($28M)	($1.1B)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$25M	−$66M	−$89M	−$75M	−$75M
Free cash flow	$508M	$286M	$193M	($103M)	($1.2B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	18%	16%	19%	-3%	-25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $69M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $25M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 35.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $276M ÷ interest expense $8M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$2.7B

Net cash

Cash $1.5B + ST investments $1.7B − debt $532M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 6d

Tight

DSO 9 + DIO 39 − DPO 41 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -0%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -20%–26%; 8% latest = NOPAT $214M ÷ invested capital $2.8B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 18%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -25%–37%; latest $533M = operating cash $601M − maintenance capex $69M

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.13×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $601M ÷ net income $530M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 121%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $644M ÷ Owner Earnings $533M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $533M of Owner Earnings, $644M (121%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $644M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.36×

Expanding

Capex $93M ÷ depreciation $69M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.17×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $532M vs $2.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −9%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.05/share (latest year $2.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 13% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 1% lately, median −0% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth −1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −14.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.3%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.8B

Cash & short-term investments$3.2B
Receivables$72M
Inventory$143M
Other current assets$389M

Current liabilities$1.8B

Debt due within a year$270M
Accounts payable$153M
Other current liabilities$1.3B

Current ratio2.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.09×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.83×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$270M due · $3.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$3.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$1.7BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$641M$109M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$833Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $3.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$1.4B · 42%
Dividends$41M · 1%
Buybacks$1.2B · 34%
Retained (debt / cash)$805M · 23%

Returned to owners$1.2B
45% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $41M as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $307M and cash and short-term investments rose $2.5B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count2.3%
The diluted count rose from 189M to 193M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TAL Education Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?17.4% vs 25.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 25.0% early in the record and 17.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$225M → $532M
Debt rose from $225M to $532M while owner earnings went from about $367M to $389M — about 0.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?0% → 5% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $3M to $143M while revenue grew 188%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (0% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DOCUDocuSign	$3.2B	78%	-6.7%	-10%	16%
ENVAEnova International Inc.	$3.2B	50%	21.6%	10%	56%
MSCIMSCI Inc.	$3.1B	80%	52.3%	38%	46%
HUBSHubSpot Inc.	$3.1B	81%	-6.5%	-6%	13%
TALTAL Education Group	$3.0B	54%	2.0%	-0%	18%
OKTAOkta Inc.	$2.9B	72%	-30.8%	-8%	7%
CVSACovista Inc.	$1.8B	52%	13.2%	8%	16%
APEIAmerican Public Education Inc.	$649M	60%	7.3%	13%	9%
Group median	—	66%	4.7%	4%	16%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each three representing one Class”; TAL Education Group reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TAL Education Group has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, TAL Education Group earns about $540M on its 17.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($540M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($533M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $508M on 579M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $2.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($93M) runs well above depreciation ($69M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $533M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TAL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TAL Education Group (TAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TAK its page in the Manual TATT →

Industry order: ← STRA the Education Services chapter UTI →