Owner Scorecard


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TASK, TaskUs Inc.

TaskUs provides a suite of services to our clients that need assistance designing their customer experience programs and optimizing their operating environments, including D igital CX strategy, operational excellence and technology assessment and recommendations.

We deliver outsourced digital services that power the companies shaping the future.

By combining specialized human talent and intelligent technology, we solve complex operational challenges for global category leaders within AI, autonomous vehicles, robotics, social media, financial services, healthcare, and beyond.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TASK · TaskUs Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+19.0% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $965M
Operating margin 11.6% 5-yr avg 6.6%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Digital Customer Experience (56%), Trust and Safety (26%) and AI Services (18%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 10% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.1% to 12% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Digital Customer Experience at 56%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Digital Customer Experience56%$662M
  • Trust And Safety26%$307M
  • AI Services18%$214M
By geographyPhilippines54%Rest of World22%India13%United States11%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$360M$478M$761M$960M$924M$995M$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
25%24%44%27%25%24%21%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$37M$50M($54M)$84M$95M$92M$141M$141MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.2%10.5%−7.1%8.7%10.3%9.3%11.9%11.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$34M$35M($59M)$40M$46M$46M$102M$105MNet incomeNet inc.
22%37%39%38%25%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$44M$59M($33M)$147M$144M$139M$137M$147MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$20M$29M$38M$40M$40M$42M$43MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)$4M($49M)($221K)$5M$11M($36M)($28M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$20M$29M$59M$44M$31M$39M$64M$59MCapexCapex
5.6%6.0%7.8%4.6%3.4%3.9%5.4%4.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$24M$39M($62M)$103M$113M$100M$96M$105MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.6%8.1%−8.1%10.8%12.2%10.0%8.1%8.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$24M$30M($92M)$103M$113M$100M$74M$88MFree cash flowFCF
6.6%6.3%−12.1%10.8%12.2%10.0%6.2%7.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$23M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$135M$0$50M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$31M$112M$19M$28MBuybacksBuybacks
14%8%-8%9%10%10%17%17%ROICROIC
11%10%-15%9%10%9%17%38%Return on equityROE
−34%10%−29%9%10%38%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$38M$108M$64M$134M$126M$192M$212M$152MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$88M$163M$179M$177M$199M$254M$246MReceivablesReceiv.
$42M$41M$37M$26M$53M$45M$42MAccounts payablePayables
$46M$122M$142M$151M$146M$209M$203MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$211M$246M$341M$329M$435M$509M$449MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$115M$136M$110M$102M$152M$163M$163MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.8×3.1×3.2×2.9×3.1×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$196M$196M$217M$218M$217M$220M$219MGoodwillGoodwill
$708M$750M$902M$864M$953M$1.1B$982MTotal assetsAssets
$245M$238M$268M$264M$256M$241M$492MTotal debtDebt
$137M$175M$134M$138M$64M$30M$339MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.9×6.7×-8.3×7.0×4.4×4.3×7.6×7.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$298M$335M$379M$456M$441M$497M$600M$275MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%0.0%6.1%7.2%5.7%4.2%2.5%2.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
91.7M91.7M94.8M103M96.2M92.3M93.0M93.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.92$5.21$8.02$9.36$9.61$10.78$12.72$13.02Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.37$0.38$-0.62$0.39$0.48$0.50$1.10$1.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.26$0.42$-0.65$1.01$1.17$1.08$1.03$1.12Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.26$0.33$-0.97$1.01$1.17$1.08$0.79$0.95Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.47$0.00$0.53$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.22$0.31$0.63$0.43$0.32$0.42$0.68$0.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.24$3.65$4.00$4.44$4.58$5.38$6.45$2.95Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+21.7%/yr+19.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+25.9%/yr+19.5%/yr
EPS+19.9%/yr+23.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+20.9%/yr+16.7%/yr
Book value / share+12.1%/yr+12.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
93Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
17%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.3×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$96Mowner earningsvs.$102Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $96M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $42M it takes just to hold its position. It put $22M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $74M.

Reported net income$102M
Owner earnings$96M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$102M$46M$46M$40M($59M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$42M+$40M+$40M+$38M+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$30M+$42M+$53M+$69M+$46M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$36M+$11M+$5M−$221K−$49M
Cash from operations$137M$139M$144M$147M($33M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$42M−$39M−$31M−$44M−$29M
Owner earnings$96M$100M$113M$103M($62M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$22M−$30M
Free cash flow$74M$100M$113M$103M($92M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%10%12%11%-8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $42M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $22M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $66M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $141M ÷ interest expense $18M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $30M · 0.2× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $212M − debt $241M
    What this means

    Netting $212M of cash and short-term investments against $241M of debt leaves $30M owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -8%–17%; 17% latest = NOPAT $105M ÷ invested capital $630M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -8%–12%; latest $96M = operating cash $137M − maintenance capex $42M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 7 years. It chose to put $22M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $74M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $66M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $137M ÷ net income $102M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $28M ÷ Owner Earnings $96M
    What this means

    Of $96M Owner Earnings, $28M (29%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $28M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($30M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.53×
    Expanding
    Capex $64M ÷ depreciation $42M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.12×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $241M vs $346M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +1883%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.71/share (latest year $1.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 10% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −7.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“As technology evolves, more tasks currently performed by our team members may be replaced by automation, robotics, AI, chatbots and other technological advances, which puts our lower-skill tier one customer care offerings at risk.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$449M
  • Cash & short-term investments$152M
  • Receivables$246M
  • Other current assets$51M
Current liabilities$163M
  • Debt due within a year$17M
  • Accounts payable$42M
  • Other current liabilities$104M
Current ratio2.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.93×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$286Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$17M due · $152M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.2× → 2.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($92M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($258M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$548M$56M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $637M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$286M · 45%
  • Dividends$185M · 29%
  • Buybacks$189M · 30%
  • Returned to owners$374M

    91% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $185M as dividends and $189M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$23M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $23M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $189M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count1.5%

    The diluted count rose from 92M to 93M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$373M36% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity37%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$23Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $286M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership28%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$30M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TaskUs Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FAFirst Advantage Corporation$1.6B9.8%4%17%
TASKTaskUs Inc.$1.2B10.2%10%8%
FIVNFive9$1.1B57%-3.4%-5%9%
SSTKShutterstock Inc.$990M59%7.7%24%13%
EVTCEvertec Inc.$932M100%26.5%15%33%
CARGCarGurus Inc. Class A Common Stock$907M11.1%32%12%
NRDSNerdWallet Inc.$837M92%0.8%1%10%
RAMPLiveRamp Holdings Inc.$813M69%-24.1%-13%1%
Group median8.8%7%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TaskUs Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, TaskUs Inc. earns about $96M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+47%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $88M on 91M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $339M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($59M) runs well above depreciation ($43M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $106M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TaskUs Inc. (TASK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TASK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TARS its page in the Manual TBB →

Industry order: ← SY the IT Services & Consulting chapter TBRG →