Share count
753Mpeak FY2015
← All companies ← TGB Manual THCH → ← SOBO Pipelines & Midstream TRGP →
TGS, Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS
Transportadora de Gas del Sur owns and runs a pipeline network that moves natural gas across southern Argentina, carrying it from the producing basins to the distribution companies and large industrial users that burn it. It earns most of its keep as a regulated carrier, paid a tariff to ship gas it does not own. Alongside that, it takes a cut of the gas stream to strip out and sell natural gas liquids — products such as propane and butane — a separate, commodity-priced trade.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
ARS 1.22T
+23.7% YoY · 65% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue ARS 1.22T 5-yr avg ARS 805.1B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 24% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- The transport pipes are the kind of asset no one builds twice, so the first test is whether that monopoly-like position translates into real pricing power — and here it does not rest with the company but with a regulator who sets the tariff, which the filing itself names as the thing its revenues and operating margins depend on. Watch whether allowed tariffs track the cost of operating and replacing the system, because in a high-inflation, weak-currency economy a regulator who lets them lag can quietly turn a franchise into a money-loser. The liquids arm carries the opposite problem: it sells into prices it does not control, so it adds earnings without adding durability. The figures for margins, returns and the debt load are in the record below.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| ARS 4.2B | ARS 14.6B | ARS 30.7B | ARS 71.3B | ARS 99.8B | ARS 164.3B | ARS 539.7B | ARS 1.12T | ARS 986.1B | ARS 1.22T | ARS 1.22T | RevenueRevenue |
| 35% | 32% | 40% | 52% | 50% | 51% | 46% | 42% | 37% | 53% | 53% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ARS 688M | ARS 2.9B | ARS 9.5B | ARS 29.9B | ARS 40.6B | ARS 60.7B | ARS 206.7B | ARS 355.7B | ARS 253.6B | ARS 560.3B | ARS 560.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 16.3% | 19.9% | 31.1% | 41.9% | 40.7% | 36.9% | 38.3% | 31.9% | 25.7% | 45.9% | 45.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (ARS 172M) | ARS 1M | ARS 9M | ARS 24M | ARS 26.3B | ARS 9.7B | ARS 127.0B | ARS 219.2B | ARS 51.2B | ARS 370.2B | ARS 370.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 54% | 24% | 57% | 38% | 35% | 46% | 36% | 36% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ARS 467M | ARS 4.1B | ARS 8.5B | ARS 26.8B | ARS 27.7B | ARS 83.8B | ARS 183.8B | ARS 240.2B | ARS 412.8B | ARS 484.2B | ARS 484.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ARS 261M | ARS 2.1B | ARS 3.1B | ARS 4.7B | ARS 7.6B | ARS 18.1B | ARS 58.3B | ARS 132.7B | ARS 132.0B | ARS 129.7B | ARS 129.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ARS 378M | ARS 2.0B | ARS 5.4B | ARS 22.1B | (ARS 6.2B) | ARS 56.1B | (ARS 1.5B) | (ARS 111.7B) | ARS 229.6B | (ARS 15.7B) | (ARS 15.7B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ARS 402M | ARS 1.0B | ARS 3.0B | ARS 17.0B | ARS 32.7B | ARS 22.8B | ARS 58.5B | ARS 171.6B | ARS 294.2B | ARS 289.8B | ARS 289.8B | CapexCapex |
| 9.5% | 6.9% | 9.7% | 23.8% | 32.8% | 13.9% | 10.8% | 15.4% | 29.8% | 23.8% | 23.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ARS 206M | ARS 3.1B | ARS 5.6B | ARS 22.1B | ARS 20.1B | ARS 65.7B | ARS 125.3B | ARS 107.4B | ARS 280.8B | ARS 354.5B | ARS 354.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.9% | 21.2% | 18.1% | 31.0% | 20.2% | 40.0% | 23.2% | 9.6% | 28.5% | 29.1% | 29.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ARS 65M | ARS 3.1B | ARS 5.6B | ARS 9.8B | (ARS 5.0B) | ARS 61.0B | ARS 125.3B | ARS 68.5B | ARS 118.7B | ARS 194.4B | ARS 194.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.5% | 21.2% | 18.1% | 13.7% | −5.0% | 37.1% | 23.2% | 6.1% | 12.0% | 15.9% | 15.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ARS 0 | ARS 227M | ARS 9K | ARS 9.1B | ARS 20.1B | ARS 47K | ARS 0 | ARS 0 | — | — | ARS 0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | ARS 0 | ARS 0 | ARS 3.0B | ARS 5.3B | ARS 8.0B | ARS 0 | ARS 0 | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 14% | 2% | 8% | 26% | 3% | 17% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | −1% | 0% | −9% | 3% | 2% | 8% | 26% | — | — | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| ARS 2.2B | ARS 4.4B | ARS 8.2B | ARS 52.6B | ARS 39.1B | ARS 42.6B | ARS 58.5B | ARS 20.3B | ARS 14.4B | ARS 60.0B | ARS 60.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | ARS 1.2B | ARS 3.0B | ARS 4.8B | ARS 8.8B | ARS 9.3B | ARS 20.7B | ARS 52.8B | ARS 110.6B | ARS 156.0B | ARS 156.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ARS 241M | ARS 371M | ARS 385M | ARS 1.1B | ARS 1.2B | ARS 5.2B | ARS 15.4B | ARS 12.4B | ARS 16.7B | ARS 3.7B | ARS 3.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| ARS 241M | ARS 1.6B | ARS 3.4B | ARS 5.9B | ARS 10.0B | ARS 14.5B | ARS 36.1B | ARS 65.2B | ARS 127.3B | ARS 159.7B | ARS 159.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | ARS 1.9B | ARS 6.9B | ARS 11.0B | ARS 10.8B | ARS 12.2B | ARS 39.5B | ARS 66.0B | ARS 260.3B | ARS 369.0B | ARS 369.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| ARS 6.6B | ARS 8.9B | ARS 44.9B | ARS 95.3B | ARS 130.2B | ARS 378.1B | ARS 1.26T | ARS 2.79T | ARS 3.32T | ARS 3.39T | ARS 3.39T | Total assetsAssets |
| — | ARS 3.9B | ARS 6.6B | ARS 31.7B | ARS 45.7B | ARS 66.2B | ARS 102.4B | ARS 294.6B | ARS 1.03T | ARS 580.1B | ARS 580.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | (ARS 499M) | (ARS 1.6B) | (ARS 20.9B) | ARS 6.6B | ARS 23.6B | ARS 43.9B | ARS 274.4B | ARS 1.01T | ARS 520.1B | ARS 520.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.5× | 1.1× | 3.2× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 2.0× | 0.9× | 0.2× | 2.7× | 2.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ARS 18.6B | ARS 30.0B | ARS 52.9B | ARS 97.8B | ARS 192.5B | ARS 604.5B | ARS 1.59T | ARS 832.2B | ARS 1.86T | ARS 2.23T | ARS 2.23T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 794M | 794M | 794M | 788M | 788M | 762M | 753M | 753M | 753M | 753M | 753M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ARS 5.32 | ARS 18.43 | ARS 38.63 | ARS 90.48 | ARS 126.57 | ARS 215.48 | ARS 717.00 | ARS 1482.14 | ARS 1309.91 | ARS 1620.39 | ARS 1620.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ARS -0.22 | ARS 0.00 | ARS 0.01 | ARS 0.03 | ARS 33.38 | ARS 12.67 | ARS 168.67 | ARS 291.14 | ARS 68.03 | ARS 491.74 | ARS 491.74 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ARS 0.26 | ARS 3.91 | ARS 7.00 | ARS 28.09 | ARS 25.55 | ARS 86.21 | ARS 166.42 | ARS 142.71 | ARS 373.02 | ARS 470.93 | ARS 470.93 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ARS 0.08 | ARS 3.91 | ARS 7.00 | ARS 12.41 | ARS -6.34 | ARS 80.00 | ARS 166.42 | ARS 91.05 | ARS 157.63 | ARS 258.19 | ARS 258.19 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ARS 0.00 | ARS 0.29 | ARS 0.00 | ARS 11.50 | ARS 25.44 | ARS 0.00 | ARS 0.00 | ARS 0.00 | — | — | ARS 0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ARS 0.51 | ARS 1.28 | ARS 3.76 | ARS 21.58 | ARS 41.53 | ARS 29.97 | ARS 77.75 | ARS 227.99 | ARS 390.78 | ARS 385.00 | ARS 385.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ARS 23.47 | ARS 37.81 | ARS 66.64 | ARS 124.08 | ARS 244.13 | ARS 792.98 | ARS 2116.18 | ARS 1105.47 | ARS 2475.35 | ARS 2967.09 | ARS 2967.09 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +88.8%/yr | +66.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +130.3%/yr | +79.1%/yr |
| EPS | — | +71.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +109.0%/yr | +56.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +71.2%/yr | +64.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
53%low FY2016
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
ARS 354.5Bowner earningsvs.ARS 370.2Bnet incomelow FY2015
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2015FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business earned ARS 354.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ARS 129.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put ARS 160.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ARS 194.4B.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ARS 370.2B | ARS 51.2B | ARS 219.2B | ARS 127.0B | ARS 9.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +ARS 129.7B | +ARS 132.0B | +ARS 132.7B | +ARS 58.3B | +ARS 18.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −ARS 15.7B | +ARS 229.6B | −ARS 111.7B | −ARS 1.5B | +ARS 56.1B |
| Cash from operations | ARS 484.2B | ARS 412.8B | ARS 240.2B | ARS 183.8B | ARS 83.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −ARS 129.7B | −ARS 132.0B | −ARS 132.7B | −ARS 58.5B | −ARS 18.1B |
| Owner earnings | ARS 354.5B | ARS 280.8B | ARS 107.4B | ARS 125.3B | ARS 65.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −ARS 160.1B | −ARS 162.1B | −ARS 38.9B | — | −ARS 4.7B |
| Free cash flow | ARS 194.4B | ARS 118.7B | ARS 68.5B | ARS 125.3B | ARS 61.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 29% | 28% | 10% | 23% | 40% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ARS 129.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ARS 160.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income ARS 560.3B ÷ interest expense ARS 207.5B
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ARS 520.1B · 0.9× operating profitModest net debtCash ARS 60.0B − debt ARS 580.1B
What this means
Netting ARS 60.0B of cash and short-term investments against ARS 580.1B of debt leaves ARS 520.1B owed, about 0.9× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT ARS 356.3B ÷ invested capital ARS 2.75T (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 5%–40%; latest ARS 354.5B = operating cash ARS 484.2B − maintenance capex ARS 129.7BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years. It chose to put ARS 160.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ARS 194.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ARS 484.2B ÷ net income ARS 370.2B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ARS 0 ÷ Owner Earnings ARS 354.5B
What this means
Of ARS 354.5B Owner Earnings, ARS 0 (0%) went back to shareholders, ARS 0 dividends, ARS 0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.24×ExpandingCapex ARS 289.8B ÷ depreciation ARS 129.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · ARS 1.22T
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are ARS 283.64/share (latest year ARS 491.74), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is ARS 2967.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 22% → 35% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 22% early to 35% lately, median 32% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +79%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 79% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2015 · 16.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2015–2024
Over the record, the business generated ARS 1.47T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedARS 891.1B · 61%
- DividendsARS 29.4B · 2%
- BuybacksARS 16.3B · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)ARS 535.7B · 36%
- Returned to ownersARS 45.7B
5% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ARS 29.4B as dividends and ARS 16.3B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ARS 16.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−5.3%
The diluted count fell from 794M to 753M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordARS 0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained32%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (ARS 757.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ARS 244.6B, so each retained ARS 1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TGSTransportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS | ARS 1.22T | 44% | 34.4% | 13% | 22% |
| ETEnergy Transfer LP Common | $85.5B | 25% | 10.3% | 8% | 8% |
| EPDEnterprise Products Partners L.P. | $52.6B | 27% | 14.4% | — | 12% |
| OKEONEOK Inc. | $33.6B | 29% | 15.8% | 8% | 13% |
| LNGCheniere Energy Inc. | $19.5B | 45% | 25.7% | 19% | 18% |
| TRGPTarga Resources Inc. | $17.0B | 19% | 4.0% | 5% | 8% |
| KMIKinder Morgan Inc. | $15.2B | 68% | 27.8% | 5% | 20% |
| WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The) | $14.9B | 77% | 22.1% | 6% | 20% |
| Group median | — | 36% | 19.0% | 8% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS reports in ARS, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ARS, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in ARS. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS has delivered.
Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
ARS
Through the cycle, Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS earns about ARS 271.0B on its 22.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+35%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+67%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+79%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow ARS 194.4B on 753M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt ARS 520.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (ARS 289.8B) runs well above depreciation (ARS 129.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ARS 354.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Transportadora de Gas del Sur SA TGS (TGS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TGS, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TGB its page in the Manual THCH →
Industry order: ← SOBO the Pipelines & Midstream chapter TRGP →