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TH, Target Hospitality Corp.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is led by HFS - South (49%) and WHS (34%), with 2 more segments behind.

Our company, Target Hospitality, is one of the largest vertically integrated specialty rental and hospitality services companies in North America.

A large portion of our specialty rental asset base is comprised of modular unit assets that are generally interchangeable across segments and geographies.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TH · Target Hospitality Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$275M

+3.4% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $276M 5-yr avg $291M

Operating margin −17.4% 5-yr avg 32.7%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 19%

Owner-earnings margin 28% 5-yr avg 52%

Free cash flow margin 28% 5-yr avg 52%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A hotel and lodging business, earning on rooms filled and the brand that fills them.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 22% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −13% and 66% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 42% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest HFS - South at 49%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

HFS - South49%$135M
WHS34%$92M
Government13%$36M
All Other4%$11M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$75M	$187M	$261M	$172M	$214M	$334M	$366M	$266M	$275M	$276M	RevenueRevenue
32%	22%	29%	22%	22%	17%	15%	20%	21%	21%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$21M	$41M	$48M	$4M	$37M	$174M	$241M	$109M	($35M)	($48M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
28.5%	21.9%	18.4%	2.4%	17.3%	52.3%	65.8%	40.9%	−12.6%	−17.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$981K	$5M	$12M	($25M)	($5M)	$74M	$174M	$71M	($37M)	($44M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	39%	—	—	30%	23%	23%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$41M	$26M	$60M	$47M	$105M	$306M	$157M	$152M	$74M	$77M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$30M	$39M	$59M	$66M	$71M	$68M	$84M	$73M	$73M	$75M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	($18M)	($12M)	$3M	$34M	$145M	($112M)	$298K	$30M	$38M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$899K	$951K	$441K	$381K	$427K	$21M	$3M	$687K	$751K	$312K	CapexCapex
1.2%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	6.2%	0.8%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$40M	$25M	$60M	$46M	$104M	$285M	$154M	$151M	$73M	$77M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
52.9%	13.5%	23.0%	26.9%	48.6%	85.4%	42.0%	56.8%	26.7%	27.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$40M	$25M	$60M	$46M	$104M	$285M	$154M	$151M	$73M	$77M	Free cash flowFCF
52.9%	13.5%	23.0%	26.9%	48.6%	85.4%	42.0%	56.8%	26.7%	27.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$37M	$200M	$30M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$30M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$18M	$5M	—	—	—	$33M	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
87%	6%	5%	1%	7%	35%	41%	20%	-7%	-5%	ROICROIC
4%	1%	10%	-25%	-5%	37%	46%	17%	-10%	-12%	Return on equityROE
4%	1%	10%	−25%	−5%	37%	46%	17%	−10%	−12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$13M	$12M	$7M	$7M	$23M	$182M	$104M	$191M	$8M	$5M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$57M	$48M	$28M	$29M	$42M	$67M	$49M	$56M	$46M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$900K	$1M	$900K	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	InventoryInvent.
$226K	$22M	$8M	$11M	$12M	$18M	$21M	$16M	$44M	$33M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$36M	$42M	$18M	$19M	$27M	$48M	$35M	$14M	$15M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$0	$75M	$61M	$44M	$61M	$236M	$181M	$249M	$73M	$59M	Current assetsCur. assets
$226K	$65M	$61M	$46M	$73M	$191M	$70M	$233M	$84M	$69M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.0×	1.2×	1.0×	1.0×	0.8×	1.2×	2.6×	1.1×	0.9×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$34M	$41M	$41M	$41M	$41M	$41M	$41M	$41M	$41M	GoodwillGoodwill
$242K	$565M	$601M	$534M	$513M	$772M	$694M	$726M	$530M	$540M	Total assetsAssets
—	$23M	$422M	$392M	$341M	$331M	$180M	$184M	$4M	$359M	Total debtDebt
—	$11M	$415M	$385M	$318M	$149M	$77M	($7M)	($5M)	$353M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$25M	$349M	$121M	$99M	$97M	$201M	$377M	$421M	$389M	$377M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	0.7%	2.1%	2.4%	5.8%	3.1%	2.7%	2.7%	2.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
25.7M	41.3M	94.5M	96.0M	96.6M	100M	105M	101M	99.5M	99.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.94	$4.53	$2.76	$1.79	$2.22	$3.34	$3.47	$2.62	$2.76	$2.76	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.04	$0.12	$0.13	$-0.26	$-0.05	$0.74	$1.65	$0.70	$-0.37	$-0.44	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.55	$0.61	$0.64	$0.48	$1.08	$2.85	$1.46	$1.49	$0.74	$0.77	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.55	$0.61	$0.64	$0.48	$1.08	$2.85	$1.46	$1.49	$0.74	$0.77	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$0.02	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.21	$0.03	$0.01	$0.01	$0.00	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.97	$8.45	$1.28	$1.03	$1.01	$2.01	$3.58	$4.15	$3.91	$3.77	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.61 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.29 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.8%/yr	+9.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−8.9%/yr	+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−17.5%/yr	+13.7%/yr
Book value / share	+19.0%/yr	+30.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

100Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

−7%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-0.1×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$73Mowner earningsvs.($37M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $37M loss into $73M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($37M)	$71M	$174M	$74M	($5M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$73M	+$73M	+$84M	+$68M	+$71M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$8M	+$7M	+$11M	+$19M	+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$30M	+$298K	−$112M	+$145M	+$34M
Cash from operations	$74M	$152M	$157M	$306M	$105M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$751K	−$687K	−$3M	−$21M	−$427K
Owner earnings	$73M	$151M	$154M	$285M	$104M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	27%	57%	42%	85%	49%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $66M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $350M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $8M − debt $358M

What this means
Netting $8M of cash and short-term investments against $358M of debt leaves $350M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -7%–87%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($27M) ÷ invested capital $739M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 42%

High through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range 14%–85%; latest $73M = operating cash $74M − maintenance capex $751K

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 42% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $66M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $74M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($37M) · cash from operations $74M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 46%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $73M

What this means
Of $73M Owner Earnings, $33M (46%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $33M buybacks. Net of $8M stock comp, the real buyback was about $26M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.01×

Harvesting

Capex $751K ÷ depreciation $73M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $275M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.87×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $358M vs ($11M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +1061%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.69/share (latest year $-0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 23% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 23% early to 31% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +17%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · −12.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$59M

Cash & short-term investments$5M
Receivables$46M
Inventory$2M
Other current assets$5M

Current liabilities$69M

Debt due within a year$180M
Accounts payable$33M

Current ratio0.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.82×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($11M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$180M due · $5M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$300Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($104M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$364M$5M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$30Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $967M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$28M · 3%
Buybacks$57M · 6%
Retained (debt / cash)$882M · 91%

Returned to owners$57M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $57M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$8.66
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $33M, about $8.66 each.
Net change in share count289.0%
The diluted count rose from 26M to 100M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained40%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($213M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $84M, so each retained $1 added about 0.40 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$80M15% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity11%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$267Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $28M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Archer	$3.6M	$5.1M	$104M
2022	Mr. Archer	$4.9M	$25.7M	$285M
2023	Mr. Archer	$3.5M	−$3.7M	$154M
2024	Mr. Archer	$4.1M	$2.0M	$151M
2025	Mr. Archer	$7.2M	$7.6M	$73M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio163:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Target Hospitality Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?289.0%
Diluted shares grew 289.0% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $57M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$77M · 28% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company had three customers who accounted for 28%, 11% and 11% of our revenues, respectively.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.	$1.1B	32%	9.8%	4%	10%
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.	$960M	—	13.6%	5%	9%
CVEOCiveo Corporation (Canada)	$639M	24%	-4.6%	-6%	9%
MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc.	$545M	—	17.8%	13%	19%
THTarget Hospitality Corp.	$275M	—	21.9%	7%	42%
Group median	—	—	14.9%	5%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Target Hospitality Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Target Hospitality Corp. earns about $116M on its 42.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($116M) Net of stock comp (−$7M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−13%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $77M on 100M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $353M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Target Hospitality Corp. (TH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TGTX its page in the Manual THC →

Industry order: ← SPCE the Hotels & Resorts chapter TNL →