Owner Scorecard


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STRZ, Starz Entertainment Corp.

Entertainment & Studios diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Starz sells its services on a direct-to-consumer basis and through various distributors, including over-the-top providers and multichannel video programming distributors.

Launching in April 2016, Starz was among the first standalone over-the-top services offering premium video programming.

Starz's over- the-top service is consistently among the top dozen most subscribed video subscription services in the U.S.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-KT
STRZ · Starz Entertainment Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.4B
−1.6% YoY · −19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Operating margin −12.4% 5-yr avg −33.3%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −15%
Owner-earnings margin −5% 5-yr avg −14%
Free cash flow margin −5% 5-yr avg −14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is OTT revenue (68%) and Linear and other revenue (32%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 0.1% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −95% to 6.0% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −5%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

OTT revenue is 68% of revenue, with Linear and other revenue the other meaningful line at 32%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • OTT revenue68%$931M
  • Linear and other revenue32%$439M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2025
Income statement
$3.2B$4.1B$3.7B$3.9B$3.3B$3.6B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
11%11%12%11%15%13%9%9%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($16M)$249M$130M$3M$171M$9M($1.3B)($904M)($170M)($170M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.5%6.0%3.5%0.1%5.2%0.2%−94.8%−64.9%−12.4%−12.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$15M$474M($284M)($188M)($19M)($188M)($1.9B)($915M)($211M)($211M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$559M$386M$428M$615M($500K)($661M)($438M)($132M)($46M)($46M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$63M$159M$163M$198M$189M$178M$156M$162M$170M$170MDepreciationDeprec.
$404M($335M)$480M$555M($259M)($751M)$1.3B$597M($23M)($23M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$25M$46M$44M$31M$35M$33M$34M$20M$18M$18MCapexCapex
0.8%1.1%1.2%0.8%1.1%0.9%2.4%1.5%1.3%1.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$533M$341M$384M$584M($36M)($694M)($473M)($152M)($64M)($64M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
16.7%8.2%10.4%15.0%−1.1%−19.3%−33.2%−10.9%−4.6%−4.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$533M$341M$384M$584M($36M)($694M)($473M)($152M)($64M)($64M)Free cash flowFCF
16.7%8.2%10.4%15.0%−1.1%−19.3%−33.2%−10.9%−4.6%−4.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.1B$2M$77M$0$0$0$0$331M$331MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$27M$0$57M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$0$3M$2M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-0%5%3%-32%-21%-9%-4%ROICROIC
1%15%-10%-7%-1%-7%-122%-100%-28%-44%Return on equityROE
−0%15%−12%−7%−1%−44%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$322M$378M$184M$318M$529M$371M$272M$23M$18M$102MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$908M$946M$647M$522M$384M$442M$582M$53M$53M$82MReceivablesReceiv.
$573M$448M$531M$527M$545M$352M$368M$80M$65M$68MAccounts payablePayables
$335M$498M$116M($5M)($162M)$90M$214M($27M)($12M)$13MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.8B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$127M$171M$195MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.7B$2.4B$1.7B$1.5B$1.7B$2.4B$2.6B$408M$623M$628MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.7×0.8×0.9×0.7×0.4×0.4×0.3×0.3×0.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.7B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8B$494M$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$9.2B$9.0B$8.4B$8.0B$8.3B$9.0B$7.4B$2.1B$2.2B$1.8BTotal assetsAssets
$3.2B$2.6B$3.0B$2.8B$2.7B$2.4B$2.0B$2.5B$700M$2.7BTotal debtDebt
$2.9B$2.3B$2.8B$2.5B$2.1B$2.1B$1.7B$2.5B$682M$2.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.1×1.3×0.7×0.0×0.9×0.1×-6.1×-3.3×-3.7×-3.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.5B$3.2B$2.9B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$1.5B$919M$766M$479MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%2.1%1.9%1.3%2.7%2.8%1.8%1.8%1.3%1.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
172M220M214M218M221M224M228M16.7M16.7M16.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.59$18.73$17.22$17.85$14.84$16.08$6.24$83.38$82.01$81.52Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.09$2.15$-1.33$-0.86$-0.09$-0.84$-8.21$-54.80$-12.65$-12.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.10$1.54$1.80$2.68$-0.16$-3.10$-2.07$-9.11$-3.81$-3.79Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.10$1.54$1.80$2.68$-0.16$-3.10$-2.07$-9.11$-3.81$-3.79Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.00$0.27$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.15$0.21$0.20$0.14$0.16$0.15$0.15$1.22$1.05$1.05Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.60$14.32$13.66$12.20$12.67$12.49$6.72$55.04$45.89$28.49Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/13.65 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.4%/yr+35.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+28.0%/yr+49.2%/yr
Book value / share+15.4%/yr+30.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-1.6%
    “Revenue decreased $22.8 million reflecting a decrease of $26.4 million at Starz Networks, partially offset by increased revenue from International of $3.6 million.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
17Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−9%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($64M)owner earningsvs.($211M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2020

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $211M loss into ($64M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($211M)($915M)($1.9B)($188M)($19M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$170M+$162M+$156M+$178M+$189M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$18M+$25M+$26M+$100M+$89M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$23M+$597M+$1.3B−$751M−$259M
Cash from operations($46M)($132M)($438M)($661M)($500K)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$18M−$20M−$34M−$33M−$35M
Owner earnings($64M)($152M)($473M)($694M)($36M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-5%-11%-33%-19%-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer ($82M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-KT · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($170M) ÷ interest expense $46M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $18M − debt $2.7B
    What this means

    Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -32%–5%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($135M) ÷ invested capital $3.4B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -33%–17%; latest ($64M) = operating cash ($46M) − maintenance capex $18M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -5% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves ($82M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($211M) · cash from operations ($46M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.10×
    Harvesting
    Capex $18M ÷ depreciation $170M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.7B vs ($452M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −1568%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-59.51/share (latest year $-12.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → −57% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −57% lately, median 0% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2023 · −94.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$195M
  • Cash & short-term investments$102M
  • Receivables$82M
  • Other current assets$11M
Current liabilities$628M
  • Debt due within a year$11M
  • Accounts payable$68M
  • Other current liabilities$549M
Current ratio0.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.31×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($434M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $102M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−7.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.3× → 0.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($149M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$671M$57M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$175Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $710M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$286M · 40%
  • Dividends$84M · 12%
  • Buybacks$5M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$334M · 47%
  • Returned to owners$89M

    21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $84M as dividends and $5M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $548M and cash and short-term investments fell $220M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $5M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−90.2%

    The diluted count fell from 172M to 17M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$816M38% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.5Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $286M of capital spent building

$1.8B written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership22.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$18M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Starz Entertainment Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−16.3% vs 11.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.8% early in the record and −16.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LIONLionsgate Studios Corp$2.6B1.5%6%
WHWyndham Hotels & Resorts$1.4B25.7%12%18%
LFSTLifeStance Health Group Inc.$1.4B-10.2%-9%5%
ADUSAddus HomeCare$1.4B30%6.6%8%8%
WBTNWEBTOON Entertainment Inc.$1.4B24%-6.0%-8%0%
STRZStarz Entertainment Corp.$1.4B0.1%-5%-1%
KFRCKforce Inc.$1.3B29%5.6%29%5%
PGNYProgyny$1.3B21%4.2%13%10%
Group median2.9%8%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Starz Entertainment Corp. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−22%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−5%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Starz Entertainment Corp. (STRZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/STRZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← STRT its page in the Manual STT →

Industry order: ← SPHR the Entertainment & Studios chapter TKO →