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V, Visa Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified Serial acquirer

Visa runs one of the world's payment networks. It does not lend money or issue cards; it operates the rails that authorize, clear, and settle transactions between the banks that issue cards to shoppers and the banks that sign up the merchants who accept them. For carrying that traffic it collects a small fee on the money that moves, so its revenue tracks the dollars spent across its network rather than any product it sells to the public.

We provide transaction processing services (primarily authorization, clearing and settlement) among consumers, issuing and acquiring financial institutions and sellers in a structure we call the "four-party" model.

As the payments ecosystem continues to evolve, we have broadened this model to include digital banks, digital wallets, a range of financial technology companies (fintechs), governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

V · Visa Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$40.0B

+11.3% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $43.0B 5-yr avg $32.4B

Operating margin 61.1% 5-yr avg 63.9%

ROIC 47% 5-yr avg 38%

Owner-earnings margin 49% 5-yr avg 58%

Free cash flow margin 49% 5-yr avg 58%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Data processing revenue (50%) and Services (44%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 48% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: The question to settle is whether this is a toll bridge or just a road anyone can pave alongside. A payment network feeds on itself — cardholders want the network merchants take, merchants want the network cardholders carry — and the test of that loop is whether a rival can pry either side loose: watch the cost to switch and the share of spending that stays. Against it sits the company's own warning that it leans on a concentrated set of bank clients who themselves press hard on price, and that the fees it earns draw regulators and class-action plaintiffs who would cap them or claw them back. The record below shows how much of each transacted dollar reaches the owner, and whether the bridge has yet been forced to lower its toll.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 9 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 53% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Data processing revenue at 50%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Data processing revenue50%$20.0B
Services44%$17.5B
International transaction revenue35%$14.2B
Other revenue10%$4.1B
Client incentives-39%($15.8B)

By geographyInternational61%United States39%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$15.1B	$18.4B	$20.6B	$23.0B	$21.8B	$24.1B	$29.3B	$32.7B	$35.9B	$40.0B	$43.0B	RevenueRevenue
5%	6%	6%	5%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$7.9B	$12.1B	$13.0B	$15.0B	$14.1B	$15.8B	$18.8B	$21.0B	$23.6B	$24.0B	$26.3B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
52.3%	66.2%	62.9%	65.3%	64.5%	65.6%	64.2%	64.3%	65.7%	60.0%	61.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$6.0B	$6.7B	$10.3B	$12.1B	$10.9B	$12.3B	$15.0B	$17.3B	$19.7B	$20.1B	$22.2B	Net incomeNet inc.
25%	43%	20%	19%	21%	23%	18%	18%	17%	17%	16%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$5.6B	$9.3B	$12.9B	$12.8B	$10.4B	$15.2B	$18.8B	$20.8B	$19.9B	$23.1B	$22.8B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$502M	$556M	$613M	$656M	$767M	$804M	$861M	$943M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	DepreciationDeprec.
($1.1B)	$1.8B	$1.7B	($359M)	($1.6B)	$1.6B	$2.4B	$1.8B	($1.7B)	$884M	($1.7B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$523M	$707M	$718M	$756M	$736M	$705M	$970M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.6B	CapexCapex
3.5%	3.9%	3.5%	3.3%	3.4%	2.9%	3.3%	3.2%	3.5%	3.7%	3.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$5.1B	$8.8B	$12.2B	$12.0B	$9.7B	$14.5B	$17.9B	$19.7B	$18.7B	$21.6B	$21.2B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
33.5%	47.7%	59.3%	52.3%	44.4%	60.2%	61.0%	60.3%	52.0%	53.9%	49.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$5.1B	$8.6B	$12.2B	$12.0B	$9.7B	$14.5B	$17.9B	$19.7B	$18.7B	$21.6B	$21.2B	Free cash flowFCF
33.5%	46.9%	59.3%	52.3%	44.4%	60.2%	61.0%	60.3%	52.0%	53.9%	49.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9.1B	$302M	$196M	$699M	$77M	$75M	$1.9B	$0	$915M	$887M	$705M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.8B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$4.9B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	$6.9B	$7.2B	$8.6B	$8.1B	$8.7B	$11.6B	$12.1B	$16.7B	$18.3B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
14%	17%	25%	28%	25%	29%	37%	40%	41%	43%	47%	ROICROIC
18%	20%	30%	35%	30%	33%	42%	45%	50%	53%	62%	Return on equityROE
14%	16%	25%	28%	23%	25%	33%	35%	40%	41%	49%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$12.8B	$15.3B	$15.7B	$7.8B	$16.3B	$16.5B	$15.7B	$16.3B	$12.0B	$17.2B	$18.8B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$3.4B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$203M	$179M	$183M	$156M	$174M	$266M	$340M	$375M	$479M	$555M	$557M	Accounts payablePayables
$838M	$953M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$2.8B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$14.3B	$19.0B	$18.2B	$21.0B	$27.6B	$27.6B	$30.2B	$33.5B	$34.0B	$37.8B	$31.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$8.0B	$10.0B	$11.3B	$13.4B	$14.5B	$15.7B	$20.9B	$23.1B	$26.5B	$35.0B	$29.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.9×	1.6×	1.6×	1.9×	1.8×	1.4×	1.5×	1.3×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$15.1B	$15.1B	$15.2B	$15.7B	$15.9B	$16.0B	$17.8B	$18.0B	$18.9B	$19.9B	$20.9B	GoodwillGoodwill
$64.0B	$68.0B	$69.2B	$72.6B	$80.9B	$82.9B	$85.5B	$90.5B	$94.5B	$99.6B	$95.0B	Total assetsAssets
$15.9B	$18.4B	$16.6B	$16.7B	$24.1B	$21.0B	$22.4B	$20.5B	$20.8B	$25.2B	$24.0B	Total debtDebt
$3.1B	$3.1B	$937M	$8.9B	$7.8B	$4.5B	$6.8B	$4.2B	$8.9B	$8.0B	$5.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	35.0×	32.6×	36.8×	40.7×	42.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$32.9B	$32.8B	$34.0B	$34.7B	$36.2B	$37.6B	$35.6B	$38.7B	$39.1B	$37.9B	$35.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	1.3%	1.6%	1.8%	1.9%	2.2%	2.1%	2.3%	2.4%	2.2%	2.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+11.3%
“Net revenue increased 11% over the prior year, primarily due to the growth in processed transactions, nominal cross-border volume, and nominal payments volume, partially offset by higher client incentives.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC

43%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.4×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$21.6Bowner earningsvs.$20.1Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $20.1B of profit into $21.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$20.1B

Owner earnings$21.6B · 54% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$20.1B	$19.7B	$17.3B	$15.0B	$12.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.2B	+$1.0B	+$943M	+$861M	+$804M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$897M	+$850M	+$765M	+$602M	+$542M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$884M	−$1.7B	+$1.8B	+$2.4B	+$1.6B
Cash from operations	$23.1B	$19.9B	$20.8B	$18.8B	$15.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1.5B	−$1.3B	−$1.1B	−$970M	−$705M
Owner earnings	$21.6B	$18.7B	$19.7B	$17.9B	$14.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	54%	52%	60%	61%	60%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $897M), owner earnings is nearer $20.7B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 40.7×

Comfortable

Operating income $24.0B ÷ interest expense $589M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.6B · 0.2× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $17.2B + ST investments $3.4B − debt $25.2B

What this means
Netting $20.6B of cash and short-term investments against $25.2B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $4.1B in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $476M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 28%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

10-yr median, range 14%–43%; 43% latest = NOPAT $19.9B ÷ invested capital $45.9B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 43% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 52%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 33%–61%; latest $21.6B = operating cash $23.1B − maintenance capex $1.5B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 54% of revenue this year, a 52% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $897M of SBC) leaves $20.7B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.15×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $23.1B ÷ net income $20.1B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 106%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $22.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $21.6B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $21.6B of Owner Earnings, $22.9B (106%) went back to shareholders, $4.6B dividends, $18.3B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $897M stock comp, the real buyback was about $17.4B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.21×

Expanding

Capex $1.5B ÷ depreciation $1.2B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $40.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.08×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $25.2B vs $2.7B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +148%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.61/share (latest year $11.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.13/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 60% → 63% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 60% early to 63% lately, median 64% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 52.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We expect to face more competition as AI continues to advance and GenAI and agentic AI capabilities become integrated into payments and related services in two main ways: first, by competitors successfully enhancing their products, services and external offerings with AI to achieve greater and faster product adoption; …”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$31.6B

Cash & short-term investments$15.9B
Receivables$3.4B
Other current assets$12.4B

Current liabilities$29.1B

Debt due within a year$1.6B
Accounts payable$557M
Other current liabilities$27.0B

Current ratio1.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$1.6B due · $15.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($13.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($27.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$24.9B$913M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$5.6B

'27$2.8B

'28$1.5B

'29$1.2B

'30$1.5B

later$12.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$5.6Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$8.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$5.6Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$25.4Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$15.9B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$21.6B

Together, against $5.6B due next year6.7×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $37.4B against the $5.6B due in the twelve months after the Sep 30, 2025 schedule: 6.7 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $148.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$8.9B · 6%
Dividends$28.4B · 19%
Buybacks$98.2B · 66%
Retained (debt / cash)$13.4B · 9%

Returned to owners$126.6B
90% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $28.4B as dividends and $98.2B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $98.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
Dividend recordPays
Paid in 10 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$47.5B48% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity52%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$14.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $8.9B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$30.9M	$49.0M	$14.5B
2022	$28.1M	$20.0M	$17.9B
2023	$29.7M	$52.8M	$19.7B
2023	$22.6M	$37.9M	$19.7B
2024	$26.0M	$37.5M	$18.7B
2025	$31.6M	$55.8M	$21.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$897M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Visa Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ACNAccenture PLC	$69.7B	32%	14.6%	54%	14%
UBERUber Technologies Inc.	$52.0B	—	-22.0%	-12%	-4%
VVisa Inc.	$40.0B	—	64.4%	28%	53%
PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc.	$33.2B	—	15.8%	16%	19%
MAMastercard Incorporated	$32.8B	—	53.2%	81%	42%
MELIMercadoLibre Inc.	$20.3B	36%	11.0%	14%	23%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.	$14.4B	10%	2.5%	3%	1%
DASHDoorDash Inc.	$13.7B	—	-12.2%	-14%	8%
Group median	—	—	12.8%	15%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Visa Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Visa Inc. earns about $21.3B on its 53.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 53.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($21.3B) Net of stock comp (−$920M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+13%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $21.2B on 1794M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $5.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh V against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Visa Inc. (V), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/V, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UZF its page in the Manual VAC →

Industry order: ← UXIN the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter VSTS →