Owner Scorecard


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VALE, VALE S.A.

Metals & Mining capital-intensive Cyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Our common shares are publicly traded in Brazil on the Novo Mercado segment of the S o Paulo Stock Exchange (B3), under the ticker symbol VALE3.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
VALE · VALE S.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$38.4B
+0.9% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $38.4B 5-yr avg $43.3B
Gross margin 35% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 15.4% 5-yr avg 33.6%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 68%
Owner-earnings margin 59% 5-yr avg 40%
Free cash flow margin 57% 5-yr avg 40%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 32% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 11% and 51% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 2 of 4 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 regions, the largest Country Of China at 51%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • Country Of China51%$19.4B
  • Asia Except Japan And China10%$3.9B
  • Europe Except Germany10%$3.9B
  • Country Of Brazil8%$3.1B
  • Country Of Japan6%$2.4B
  • Middle East Africa And Oceania5%$2.0B
  • Other10%$3.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$27.5B$34.0B$36.6B$36.5B$39.5B$54.5B$43.8B$41.8B$38.1B$38.4B$38.4BRevenueRevenue
36%38%40%47%56%60%45%42%36%35%35%Gross marginGross mgn
$7.1B$10.9B$12.0B$3.9B$12.8B$27.7B$17.2B$14.2B$10.8B$5.9B$5.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
25.7%32.2%32.7%10.7%32.4%50.8%39.3%34.0%28.3%15.4%15.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$4.0B$5.5B$6.9B($1.7B)$4.9B$22.4B$18.8B$8.0B$6.2B$2.4B$2.4BNet incomeNet inc.
41%21%-3%13%17%14%28%10%53%53%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$6.4B$12.4B$12.9B$12.1B$14.3B$25.7B$18.8B$17.3B$13.8B$13.4B$25.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3.6B$3.5B$3.2B$3.5B$2.7B$2.6B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$2.9BDepreciationDeprec.
($1.1B)$3.4B$2.8B$10.3B$6.7B$5.9B($2.7B)$6.4B$4.8B$8.1B$20.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$5.0B$3.8B$2.9B$2.9B$3.7B$4.0B$3.8BCapexCapex
18.0%11.3%7.9%8.0%9.4%7.4%10.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.8B$8.6B$10.0B$9.2B$11.6B$21.6B$22.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.4%25.4%27.4%25.1%29.3%39.7%59.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.4B$8.6B$10.0B$9.2B$10.6B$21.6B$21.8BFree cash flowFCF
5.3%25.4%27.4%25.1%26.8%39.7%56.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$250M$1.5B$3.3B$3.4B$13.5B$6.6B$5.5B$3.9B$3.6B$3.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
$1.0B$5.5B$6.0B$2.7B$409MBuybacksBuybacks
7%15%23%68%8%ROICROIC
10%13%16%-4%14%65%52%20%18%7%7%Return on equityROE
10%9%8%4%26%34%6%7%−4%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4.6B$7.8B$5.8B$8.2B$14.3B$11.9B$4.8B$3.6B$5.0B$7.8B$7.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.7B$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$5.0B$3.9B$4.3B$4.2B$2.4B$2.3B$2.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$3.3B$3.9B$4.4B$4.3B$4.1B$4.4B$4.5B$4.7B$4.6B$5.9B$5.9BInventoryInvent.
$3.6B$4.0B$3.5B$4.1B$3.4B$3.5B$4.5B$5.3B$4.2B$5.6B$5.6BAccounts payablePayables
$3.4B$2.5B$3.6B$2.7B$5.7B$4.8B$4.3B$3.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$22.6B$19.0B$15.3B$17.0B$24.4B$22.4B$15.5B$18.7B$13.5B$18.3B$18.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$11.2B$13.1B$9.1B$13.8B$14.6B$15.2B$13.9B$14.7B$13.1B$15.9B$15.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×1.4×1.7×1.2×1.7×1.5×1.1×1.3×1.0×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$99.0B$99.2B$88.2B$91.7B$92.0B$89.4B$86.9B$94.2B$80.2B$86.5B$86.5BTotal assetsAssets
$27.7B$20.8B$14.5B$11.8B$12.5B$11.2B$13.1BTotal debtDebt
$23.0B$13.0B$8.6B$3.7B($1.8B)($755M)$5.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×3.3×5.2×1.1×11.1×22.2×14.6×9.7×7.3×3.6×3.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$39.0B$43.5B$44.0B$40.1B$35.7B$34.5B$35.9B$39.5B$33.4B$33.5B$33.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
5.2M5.2M5.2M5.1M5.1M5.0M4.6M4.4M4.3M4.3M4.27BShares out (diluted)Shares
$5288.77$6535.34$7063.51$7127.41$7709.20$10873.38$9452.55$9570.03$8902.29$8996.26$9.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$766.15$1059.56$1324.83$-328.20$951.54$4477.87$4051.06$1828.39$1442.39$550.98$0.55EPS (diluted)EPS
$547.77$1658.32$1932.20$1792.14$2256.71$4318.27$5.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$278.98$1658.32$1932.20$1792.14$2069.76$4318.27$5.12Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$48.10$280.14$639.82$653.07$2689.92$1423.74$1262.67$915.59$834.20$0.83Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$952.59$737.09$559.29$569.43$722.28$804.80$0.90Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7511.79$8361.44$8494.55$7813.45$6968.21$6877.31$7733.63$9037.98$7814.54$7849.79$7.85Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1000 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.1%/yr+3.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+51.1%/yr (5-yr)+51.1%/yr
EPS−3.6%/yr−10.4%/yr
Dividends / share+37.3%/yr+5.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−3.3%/yr (5-yr)−3.3%/yr
Book value / share+0.5%/yr+2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
4Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
68%low FY2016
Gross margin
35%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.0×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$21.6Bowner earningsvs.$22.4Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2021 the business reported $22.4B of profit but $21.6B of owner earnings: $800M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$22.4B
Owner earnings$21.6B · 40% of revenue
FY2021FY2020FY2019FY2018FY2017
Reported net income$22.4B$4.9B($1.7B)$6.9B$5.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back−$2.6B+$2.7B+$3.5B+$3.2B+$3.5B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$5.9B+$6.7B+$10.3B+$2.8B+$3.4B
Cash from operations$25.7B$14.3B$12.1B$12.9B$12.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$4.0B−$2.7B−$2.9B−$2.9B−$3.8B
Owner earnings$21.6B$11.6B$9.2B$10.0B$8.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$959M
Free cash flow$21.6B$10.6B$9.2B$10.0B$8.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue40%29%25%27%25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $5.9B ÷ interest expense $1.6B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.7B · 1.0× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $7.4B + ST investments $13M − debt $13.1B
    What this means

    Netting $7.4B of cash and short-term investments against $13.1B of debt leaves $5.7B owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 22 + DIO 87 − DPO 81 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    4-yr median, range 7%–68%; 8% latest = NOPAT $2.9B ÷ invested capital $39.2B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range 10%–40%; latest $22.8B = operating cash $25.7B − maintenance capex $2.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 59% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 6 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $25.7B ÷ net income $2.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $3.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $22.8B
    What this means

    Of $22.8B Owner Earnings, $3.6B (16%) went back to shareholders, $3.6B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.31×
    Expanding
    Capex $3.8B ÷ depreciation $2.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $38.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.15×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $13.1B vs $2.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every tagged year (9 of 10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. One year of this record is untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +1%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1288.50/share (latest year $550.98), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7849.79/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 30% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 30% early to 26% lately, median 32% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +24%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 10.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“These AI-enabled threats may heighten the risk of operational disruptions, data compromise, safety impacts and regulatory or financial consequences.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$18.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$7.4B
  • Receivables$2.3B
  • Inventory$5.9B
  • Other current assets$2.7B
Current liabilities$15.9B
  • Debt due within a year$1.9B
  • Accounts payable$5.6B
  • Other current liabilities$8.4B
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.78×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.9B due · $7.4B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$30.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($33.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$13.7B$668M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$127Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2021

Over the record, the business generated $83.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$22.3B · 27%
  • Dividends$21.9B · 26%
  • Buybacks$6.5B · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$33.1B · 40%
  • Returned to owners$28.4B

    44% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $21.9B as dividends and $6.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $14.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $2.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $6.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count82032.5%

    The diluted count rose from 5M to 4269M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2689.92/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 173% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained51%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($13.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $7.0B, so each retained $1 added about 0.51 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why VALE S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?82032.5%

    Diluted shares grew 82032.5% over 2016–2021, even as the company spent $6.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    1 plain admission in this year's filing
    “Certain holders of our participative shareholders' debentures have brought claims against us, alleging that premium payments should have been triggered by production volumes, rather than sales volumes.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Metals & Mining

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VALEVALE S.A.$38.4B41%32.3%19%26%
FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc.$25.2B29%25.5%15%13%
NEMNewmont Corporation$22.7B12.0%4%19%
CLFCleveland-Cliffs$18.6B14%8.4%16%9%
SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation$13.4B52%41.5%18%24%
CDECoeur Mining Inc.$2.1B79%4.3%2%2%
MPMP Materials$224M-10.4%-4%-3%
MUXMcEwen Inc.$198M77%-43.0%-9%-7%
Group median47%10.2%9%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares (evidenced by American Depositary Receipts), each representing one common”; VALE S.A. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what VALE S.A. has delivered.

VALE S.A.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, VALE S.A. earns about $10.5B on its 27.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 59.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’21+16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’21+26%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $21.8B on 4M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $5.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 4269M, 99900% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3.8B) runs well above depreciation ($2.9B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $22.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "VALE S.A. (VALE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VALE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UZX its page in the Manual VALN →

Industry order: ← UUUU the Metals & Mining chapter VMC →