Share count
7Mpeak FY2025
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WLFC, Willis Lease Finance Corporation
Willis Lease Finance Corporation with its subsidiaries is a leading lessor and servicer of commercial aircraft and aircraft engines.
Our executive offices are located at 4700 Lyons Technology Parkway, Coconut Creek, Florida 33073.
We enter into sale and lease back transactions with operators of aircraft, original equipment manufacturers of engines, and MROs.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$730M
+28.3% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $767M 5-yr avg $461M
Gross margin 92%
Revenue $194M +23.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 17.4% yr-ago 15.2%
Net income $24M yr-ago $15M
Net margin 12.2% yr-ago 9.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 85% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.0% to 25% — on a steadier 85% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 45% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →72% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States28%$206M
- Europe25%$184M
- India19%$138M
- Asia Pacific15%$111M
- Canada6%$42M
- South America5%$37M
- Other2%$13M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $207M | $275M | $348M | $409M | $289M | $274M | $312M | $419M | $569M | $730M | $767M | RevenueRevenue |
| 94% | 85% | 82% | 85% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 92% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 23% | 20% | 21% | 21% | 24% | 27% | 30% | 28% | 26% | 27% | 27% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $22M | $29M | $52M | $80M | $15M | $8M | $10M | $64M | $144M | $104M | $114M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 10.7% | 10.5% | 15.1% | 19.6% | 5.1% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 15.3% | 25.4% | 14.3% | 14.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $14M | $62M | $43M | $67M | $10M | $3M | $5M | $44M | $109M | $114M | $122M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 41% | — | 23% | 25% | 44% | — | 44% | 35% | 29% | 29% | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $92M | $137M | $189M | $230M | $93M | $91M | $144M | $230M | $284M | $283M | $299M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $66M | $66M | $77M | $86M | $95M | $91M | $88M | $91M | $92M | $112M | $117M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $8M | $5M | $63M | $69M | ($22M) | ($20M) | $37M | $80M | $54M | $13M | $9M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1M | $11M | $3M | $6M | $3M | $2M | $7M | $5M | $16M | $31M | $27M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 3.9% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 2.1% | 1.2% | 2.7% | 4.3% | 3.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $91M | $126M | $185M | $224M | $90M | $88M | $138M | $225M | $269M | $252M | $272M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 43.7% | 46.0% | 53.2% | 54.7% | 31.3% | 32.3% | 44.2% | 53.7% | 47.2% | 34.5% | 35.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $91M | $126M | $185M | $224M | $90M | $88M | $138M | $225M | $269M | $252M | $272M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 43.7% | 46.0% | 53.2% | 54.7% | 31.3% | 32.3% | 44.2% | 53.7% | 47.2% | 34.5% | 35.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $11M | $9M | $10M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $29M | $4M | $16M | $4M | $2M | $10M | $5M | $9M | $0 | $4M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 1% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 4% | 2% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 24% | 15% | 19% | 3% | 1% | 1% | 10% | 20% | 17% | 18% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 10% | 18% | 16% | 16% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $10M | $7M | $12M | $7M | $43M | $14M | $12M | $7M | $9M | $16M | $25M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $16M | $19M | $23M | $24M | $28M | $40M | $47M | $58M | $38M | $36M | $39M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $16M | $19M | $23M | $24M | $28M | $40M | $47M | $58M | $38M | $36M | $57M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1M | $300K | $300K | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $3.9B | $3.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $900M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $890M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.8× | 1.2× | 0.2× | 0.1× | 0.1× | 0.8× | 1.4× | 0.8× | 0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $196M | $259M | $287M | $350M | $364M | $376M | $405M | $439M | $549M | $662M | $694M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.8% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.9% | 3.9% | 6.0% | 4.3% | 3.5% | 5.1% | 6.1% | 6.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 6.7M | 6.2M | 6.0M | 6.1M | 6.1M | 6.3M | 6.3M | 6.5M | 6.8M | 7.0M | 7.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $30.87 | $44.19 | $57.62 | $67.54 | $47.11 | $43.21 | $49.54 | $64.58 | $83.66 | $104.02 | $105.74 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.10 | $9.99 | $7.15 | $11.05 | $1.59 | $0.53 | $0.86 | $6.76 | $15.96 | $16.20 | $16.82 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $13.49 | $20.31 | $30.63 | $36.97 | $14.76 | $13.94 | $21.88 | $34.65 | $39.50 | $35.92 | $37.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $13.49 | $20.31 | $30.63 | $36.97 | $14.76 | $13.94 | $21.88 | $34.65 | $39.50 | $35.92 | $37.47 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | $1.58 | $1.24 | $1.38 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.15 | $1.73 | $0.58 | $1.04 | $0.49 | $0.34 | $1.05 | $0.79 | $2.30 | $4.43 | $3.74 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $29.23 | $41.63 | $47.43 | $57.83 | $59.40 | $59.23 | $64.27 | $67.73 | $80.74 | $94.32 | $95.75 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +14.5%/yr | +17.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +11.5%/yr | +19.5%/yr |
| EPS | +25.5%/yr | +59.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +45.7%/yr | +55.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.9%/yr | +9.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
2%low FY2021
Gross margin
85%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.6×peak FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$252Mowner earningsvs.$114Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $114M of profit into $252M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $114M | $109M | $44M | $5M | $3M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$112M | +$92M | +$91M | +$88M | +$91M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$45M | +$29M | +$15M | +$14M | +$17M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$13M | +$54M | +$80M | +$37M | −$20M |
| Cash from operations | $283M | $284M | $230M | $144M | $91M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$31M | −$16M | −$5M | −$7M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | $252M | $269M | $225M | $138M | $88M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 35% | 47% | 54% | 44% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $45M), owner earnings is nearer $208M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K/A · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $104M ÷ interest expense $132M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.7B · 25.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $16M − debt $2.7B
What this means
Netting $16M of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, about 25.7× a year's operating profit (25.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 0%–4%; 2% latest = NOPAT $74M ÷ invested capital $3.3BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 31%–55%; latest $252M = operating cash $283M − maintenance capex $31MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 44% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $208M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $283M ÷ net income $114M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $13M ÷ Owner Earnings $252M
What this means
Of $252M Owner Earnings, $13M (5%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $4M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($45M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.28×HarvestingCapex $31M ÷ depreciation $112M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $730M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +123%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $12.60/share (latest year $16.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $94.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 18% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · 3.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$85M · 5%
- Dividends$19M · 1%
- Buybacks$82M · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 89%
- Returned to owners$102M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $19M as dividends and $82M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $14M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $82M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count8.0%
The diluted count rose from 7M to 7M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.24/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained31%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($369M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $114M, so each retained $1 added about 0.31 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Austin C. Willis | $6.4M | $5.1M | $225M |
| 2024 | Mr. Austin C. Willis | $7.2M | $20.4M | $269M |
| 2025 | Mr. Austin C. Willis | $19.2M | $11.1M | $252M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership53.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$45M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 43% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Willis Lease Finance Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.0%
Diluted shares grew 8.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $82M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$900M → $2.3B
Debt rose from $900M to $2.3B while owner earnings went from about $134M to $249M — about 6.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$100M · 13% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“One customer accounted for approximately 13% of total lease rent revenue during the year ended December 31, 2025.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LZLegalZoom.com Inc. | $756M | 66% | 3.3% | — | 15% |
| SPSCSPS Commerce | $752M | 67% | 14.1% | 13% | 21% |
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| CWANClearwater Analytics | $731M | 72% | 1.7% | 0% | 15% |
| WLFCWillis Lease Finance Corporation | $730M | 85% | 12.5% | 2% | 45% |
| NTSKNetskope Inc. | $709M | 65% | -76.9% | -107% | -27% |
| RMBSRambus | $708M | 80% | 11.9% | 3% | 44% |
| CLMBClimb Global Solutions Inc. | $653M | 16% | 4.6% | 26% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 69% | 8.2% | 3% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Willis Lease Finance Corporation has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Willis Lease Finance Corporation earns about $329M on its 45.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $272M on 7M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $2.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Willis Lease Finance Corporation (WLFC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WLFC, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← WLDN its page in the Manual WLK →
Industry order: ← WCC the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter WSC →