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WRD, WeRide Inc.
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −390% through the cycle on a 44% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 54% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Chinese Mainland is 76% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- Chinese Mainland76%CN¥312M
- Overseas regions12%CN¥49M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| CN¥528M | CN¥402M | CN¥361M | CN¥410M | RevenueRevenue |
| 44% | 46% | 31% | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥779M) | (CN¥1.6B) | (CN¥2.2B) | (CN¥2.4B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −147.7% | −389.8% | −605.1% | −578.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥1.3B) | (CN¥1.9B) | (CN¥2.5B) | (CN¥2.4B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| (CN¥670M) | (CN¥475M) | (CN¥594M) | (CN¥930M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥87M | CN¥90M | CN¥101M | CN¥125M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥542M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥81M | CN¥37M | CN¥84M | CN¥185M | CapexCapex |
| 15.3% | 9.1% | 23.3% | 45.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (CN¥751M) | (CN¥512M) | (CN¥678M) | (CN¥1.1B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −142.4% | −127.3% | −187.6% | −257.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (CN¥751M) | (CN¥512M) | (CN¥678M) | (CN¥1.1B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −142.4% | −127.3% | −187.6% | −271.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | -60% | -68% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -36% | -38% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −36% | −38% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| CN¥2.2B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥4.3B | CN¥3.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | CN¥267M | CN¥253M | CN¥241M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | CN¥218M | CN¥205M | CN¥290M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | CN¥21M | CN¥47M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | CN¥485M | CN¥437M | CN¥484M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | CN¥5.4B | CN¥7.3B | CN¥6.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | CN¥8.6B | CN¥542M | CN¥601M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.6× | 13.4× | 11.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | CN¥45M | CN¥45M | CN¥45M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | CN¥5.6B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥7.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | CN¥0 | CN¥80M | CN¥150M | Total debtDebt |
| — | (CN¥1.7B) | (CN¥4.2B) | (CN¥3.7B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -185.4× | -448.8× | -633.2× | -441.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| (CN¥2.1B) | (CN¥3.1B) | CN¥7.1B | CN¥6.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2022–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a CN¥2.5B loss into (CN¥678M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (CN¥2.5B) | (CN¥1.9B) | (CN¥1.3B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥101M | +CN¥90M | +CN¥87M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +CN¥1.8B | +CN¥1.4B | +CN¥542M |
| Cash from operations | (CN¥594M) | (CN¥475M) | (CN¥670M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −CN¥84M | −CN¥37M | −CN¥81M |
| Owner earnings | (CN¥678M) | (CN¥512M) | (CN¥751M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -188% | -127% | -142% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“Risk Factors—Risks Related to Our Business and Industry—We previously identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -441.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income (CN¥2.4B) ÷ interest expense CN¥5M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥3.7BNet cashCash CN¥3.8B − debt CN¥150M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥3.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 215 + DIO 361 − DPO 59 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT (CN¥1.9B) ÷ invested capital CN¥2.8B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -0%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -142%Consumes cash through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -188%–-127%; latest (CN¥1.1B) = operating cash (CN¥930M) − maintenance capex CN¥125MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -257% of revenue this year, a -142% median across 3 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? (CN¥930M)Loss, and burning cashNet income (CN¥2.4B) · cash from operations (CN¥930M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.48×ExpandingCapex CN¥185M ÷ depreciation CN¥125M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥410M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 11.04×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥150M vs CN¥6.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥3.8B
- ReceivablesCN¥241M
- InventoryCN¥290M
- Other current assetsCN¥2.3B
- Debt due within a yearCN¥102M
- Accounts payableCN¥47M
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥452M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RBBNRibbon Communications Inc. | $845M | 53% | -5.6% | -5% | 3% |
| AVPTAvePoint Inc. | $419M | 72% | -10.2% | — | 12% |
| CERTCertara Inc. | $419M | 61% | 4.7% | -0% | 21% |
| GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc. | $412M | 38% | -0.5% | -1% | 7% |
| WRDWeRide Inc. | CN¥410M | 44% | -389.8% | -68% | -142% |
| TCXTucows Inc. | $390M | 27% | -0.2% | 0% | 10% |
| AGYSAgilysys | $319M | 61% | -2.5% | -14% | 17% |
| OSPNOneSpan Inc. | $243M | 68% | 1.4% | 1% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 57% | -1.5% | -1% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing three Class”; WeRide Inc. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
A reverse-DCF needs positive owner earnings, or at least revenue, to anchor to, there's no clean base here. Judge this one on assets or normalized earnings, not a growth model.
Manual order: ← WPRT its page in the Manual WSE →
Industry order: ← WK the Software chapter XNET →