Share count
180Mpeak FY2024
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YALA, Yalla Group Limited
Software asset-light
Revenue is Group Chatting Services (63%) and Games Services (36%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$342M
+0.7% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $342M 5-yr avg $315M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 65% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.8% to 48% — on a steadier 65% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 46%, above 15% in 4 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 48% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Group Chatting Services is 63% of revenue, with Games Services the other meaningful line at 36%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Group Chatting Services63%$216M
- Games Services36%$124M
- Others0%$2M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $42M | $63M | $135M | $273M | $304M | $319M | $340M | $342M | $342M | RevenueRevenue |
| 67% | 68% | 55% | 65% | 63% | 64% | 65% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $20M | $29M | $4M | $83M | $79M | $96M | $121M | $122M | $122M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 48.0% | 45.6% | 2.8% | 30.4% | 25.9% | 30.2% | 35.7% | 35.7% | 35.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $20M | $29M | $3M | $83M | $79M | $113M | $134M | $148M | $148M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 1% | 1% | 21% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 9% | 3% | 3% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $23M | $31M | $65M | $144M | $120M | $139M | $173M | $138M | $138M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $26K | $174K | $262K | $850K | $1M | $2M | $1M | $2M | $2M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $3M | $2M | $61M | $61M | $39M | $25M | $38M | ($12M) | ($12M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $204K | $428K | $1M | $1M | $2M | $1M | $706K | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $23M | $31M | $65M | $143M | $118M | $138M | $172M | $136M | $136M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 55.1% | 49.0% | 47.8% | 52.5% | 39.0% | 43.3% | 50.7% | 39.8% | 39.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $23M | $31M | $64M | $143M | $118M | $138M | $172M | $136M | $136M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 54.7% | 48.6% | 47.3% | 52.3% | 38.9% | 43.3% | 50.7% | 39.6% | 39.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $25M | $2M | $9M | $14M | $57M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | — | 229% | 37% | 51% | 42% | 42% | ROICROIC |
| — | 145% | 1% | 25% | 18% | 20% | 19% | 18% | 18% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $17M | $47M | $238M | $354M | $433M | $322M | $559M | $668M | $668M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $724K | $2M | $4M | $5M | $928K | $958K | $1M | $1M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $53M | $253M | $376M | $482M | $569M | $692M | $796M | $796M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $8M | $21M | $45M | $65M | $75M | $102M | $88M | $88M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 6.4× | 12.0× | 8.4× | 7.4× | 7.6× | 6.8× | 9.0× | 9.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $54M | $255M | $381M | $506M | $639M | $802M | $896M | $896M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($17M) | ($47M) | ($238M) | ($354M) | ($433M) | ($322M) | ($559M) | ($668M) | ($668M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($7M) | $20M | $234M | $336M | $441M | $568M | $704M | $810M | $810M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 73.4M | 73.4M | 91.8M | 180M | 177M | 182M | 183M | 180M | 73.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.58 | $0.86 | $1.47 | $1.52 | $1.72 | $1.75 | $1.85 | $1.90 | $4.66 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.28 | $0.39 | $0.04 | $0.46 | $0.45 | $0.62 | $0.73 | $0.82 | $2.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.32 | $0.42 | $0.70 | $0.80 | $0.67 | $0.76 | $0.94 | $0.76 | $1.85 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.32 | $0.42 | $0.69 | $0.79 | $0.67 | $0.76 | $0.94 | $0.75 | $1.85 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.03 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.10 | $0.27 | $2.55 | $1.87 | $2.49 | $3.12 | $3.85 | $4.50 | $11.04 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.96 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.45 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +18.5%/yr | +5.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.1%/yr | +1.4%/yr |
| EPS | +16.9%/yr | +88.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +21.7%/yr | −0.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +12.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
42%low FY2023
Gross margin
67%low FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$136Mowner earningsvs.$148Mnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $136M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2M it takes just to hold its position. It put $441K more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $136M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $148M | $134M | $113M | $79M | $83M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$1M | +$2M | +$1M | +$850K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$12M | +$38M | +$25M | +$39M | +$61M |
| Cash from operations | $138M | $173M | $139M | $120M | $144M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2M | −$706K | −$1M | −$1M | −$850K |
| Owner earnings | $136M | $172M | $138M | $118M | $143M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$441K | — | — | −$469K | −$638K |
| Free cash flow | $136M | $172M | $138M | $118M | $143M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 40% | 51% | 43% | 39% | 52% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $441K of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $527M + ST investments $141M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $668M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 39%–55%; latest $136M = operating cash $138M − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 40% of revenue this year, a 48% median across 8 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $138M ÷ net income $148M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $66M ÷ Owner Earnings $136M
What this means
Of $136M Owner Earnings, $66M (48%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $57M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.29×ExpandingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $342M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 9.02×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (8-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +655%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.73/share (latest year $0.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 8
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 32% → 34% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 32% early, 34% lately, median 30%.
- Owner earnings growth +28%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 28% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 2.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$796M
- Cash & short-term investments$668M
- Other current assets$128M
Current liabilities$88M
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$87M
Current ratio9.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio9.02×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio7.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$708Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$810Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$702MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$358K$358K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$55Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated $833M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$9M · 1%
- Dividends$9M · 1%
- Buybacks$106M · 13%
- Retained (debt / cash)$709M · 85%
- Returned to owners$115M
14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9M as dividends and $106M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $651M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $106M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (73M to 73M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.10/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained22%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($494M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $109M, so each retained $1 added about 0.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Yalla Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?44.6% vs 50.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 50.7% early in the record and 44.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| AMPLAmplitude Inc. | $343M | 70% | -32.2% | -77% | -4% |
| YALAYalla Group Limited | $342M | 65% | 33.1% | 46% | 48% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| Group median | — | 70% | 3.5% | 6% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one Class”; Yalla Group Limited reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yalla Group Limited has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Yalla Group Limited earns about $166M on its 48.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 39.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+28%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+28%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $136M on 180M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $668M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $136M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Yalla Group Limited (YALA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/YALA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← XYF its page in the Manual YB →
Industry order: ← XZO the Software chapter YMM →