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ASH, Ashland

Chemicals capital-intensive Cyclical

Ashland Inc. is a global additives and specialty ingredients company with a conscious and proactive mindset for sustainability.

Ashland serves customers in a wide range of consumer and industrial markets including, architectural coatings, construction, energy, food and beverage, personal care and pharmaceutical.

With approximately 2,900 employees worldwide, Ashland serves customers in more than 100 countries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ASH · Ashland

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.8B

−13.7% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $2.1B

Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 31%

Operating margin −34.0% 5-yr avg −2.6%

ROIC −11% 5-yr avg −1%

Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Life Sciences (35%) and Personal Care (32%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 2.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −42% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 26% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Life Sciences at 35%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Life Sciences35%$641M
Personal Care32%$577M
Specialty Additives28%$511M
Intermediates8%$137M

By geographyInternational75%United States25%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.0B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$1.8B	RevenueRevenue
29%	32%	33%	30%	30%	32%	35%	30%	29%	30%	30%	Gross marginGross mgn
28%	26%	23%	20%	20%	17%	16%	17%	19%	19%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($50M)	$49M	$102M	$86M	($461M)	$192M	$333M	$172M	($26M)	($775M)	($614M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.7%	2.1%	3.9%	4.0%	−22.9%	9.1%	13.9%	7.9%	−1.2%	−42.5%	−34.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($29M)	$1M	$114M	$505M	($508M)	$220M	$927M	$178M	$169M	($845M)	($706M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	-8%	6%	—	—	3%	-5%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$385M	$174M	$241M	$140M	$227M	$466M	$193M	$294M	$462M	$134M	$330M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$302M	$265M	$277M	$277M	$235M	$244M	$241M	$243M	$274M	$237M	$219M	DepreciationDeprec.
$82M	($112M)	($177M)	($663M)	$486M	($13M)	($993M)	($149M)	$4M	$728M	$803M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$231M	$168M	$157M	$147M	$133M	$105M	$113M	$170M	$137M	$98M	$85M	CapexCapex
7.7%	7.3%	6.1%	6.8%	6.6%	5.0%	4.7%	7.8%	6.5%	5.4%	4.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$154M	$6M	$84M	($7M)	$94M	$361M	$80M	$124M	$325M	$36M	$245M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.1%	0.3%	3.2%	−0.3%	4.7%	17.1%	3.3%	5.7%	15.4%	2.0%	13.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$154M	$6M	$84M	($7M)	$94M	$361M	$80M	$124M	$325M	$36M	$245M	Free cash flowFCF
5.1%	0.3%	3.2%	−0.3%	4.7%	17.1%	3.3%	5.7%	15.4%	2.0%	13.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$680M	$11M	$2M	—	$309M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$97M	$77M	$60M	$64M	$66M	$70M	$70M	$76M	$78M	$76M	$76M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$500M	$0	—	$200M	—	$450M	$200M	$300M	$380M	$100M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-1%	—	2%	2%	-8%	4%	8%	4%	-1%	-20%	-11%	ROICROIC
-1%	0%	3%	14%	-17%	8%	29%	6%	6%	-44%	-38%	Return on equityROE
−4%	−2%	2%	12%	−19%	5%	27%	3%	3%	−48%	−42%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.0B	$566M	$294M	$232M	$454M	$210M	$646M	$417M	$300M	$215M	$343M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$529M	$612M	$522M	$481M	$437M	$369M	$402M	$338M	$243M	$242M	$244M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$539M	$634M	$596M	$597M	$506M	$473M	$629M	$626M	$545M	$568M	$506M	InventoryInvent.
$376M	$409M	$331M	$313M	$211M	$236M	$265M	$210M	$214M	$189M	$181M	Accounts payablePayables
$692M	$837M	$787M	$765M	$732M	$606M	$766M	$754M	$574M	$621M	$569M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.2B	$968M	$1.1B	$757M	$813M	$934M	$553M	$456M	$490M	$423M	$395M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×	2.0×	1.6×	1.9×	1.9×	1.8×	3.2×	3.3×	2.4×	2.8×	3.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$1.8B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$705M	$700M	GoodwillGoodwill
$10.0B	$8.6B	$8.3B	$7.3B	$6.9B	$6.6B	$6.2B	$5.9B	$5.6B	$4.6B	$4.5B	Total assetsAssets
$2.5B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$2.9B	Total debtDebt
$1.5B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$624M	$913M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$2.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-8.3×	2.9×	25.5×	21.5×	-7.4×	9.6×	83.3×	57.3×	-13.0×	-387.5×	-307.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.6B	$3.0B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	1.0%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$171M	—	—	—	$530M	—	—	—	—	$706M	$706M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
63.0M	62.0M	64.0M	62.0M	61.0M	61.0M	56.0M	54.0M	50.0M	46.0M	46.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$47.92	$37.24	$40.45	$34.65	$33.05	$34.61	$42.70	$40.57	$42.26	$39.65	$39.30	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.46	$0.02	$1.78	$8.15	$-8.33	$3.61	$16.55	$3.30	$3.38	$-18.37	$-15.35	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.44	$0.10	$1.31	$-0.11	$1.54	$5.92	$1.43	$2.30	$6.50	$0.78	$5.33	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.44	$0.10	$1.31	$-0.11	$1.54	$5.92	$1.43	$2.30	$6.50	$0.78	$5.33	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.54	$1.24	$0.94	$1.03	$1.08	$1.15	$1.25	$1.41	$1.56	$1.65	$1.65	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.67	$2.71	$2.45	$2.37	$2.18	$1.72	$2.02	$3.15	$2.74	$2.13	$1.85	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$53.13	$54.94	$53.22	$57.60	$49.77	$45.11	$57.50	$57.35	$57.36	$41.39	$40.57	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−2.1%/yr	+3.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−11.9%/yr	−12.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+0.8%/yr	+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−5.9%/yr	−0.5%/yr
Book value / share	−2.7%/yr	−3.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

46Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

−20%low FY2025

Gross margin

30%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

32.5×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$36Mowner earningsvs.($845M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $845M loss into $36M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($845M)	$169M	$178M	$927M	$220M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$237M	+$274M	+$243M	+$241M	+$244M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$14M	+$15M	+$22M	+$18M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$728M	+$4M	−$149M	−$993M	−$13M
Cash from operations	$134M	$462M	$294M	$193M	$466M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$98M	−$137M	−$170M	−$113M	−$105M
Owner earnings	$36M	$325M	$124M	$80M	$361M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	15%	6%	3%	17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $22M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -387.5×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($775M) ÷ interest expense $2M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.6B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $215M − debt $2.8B

What this means
Netting $215M of cash and short-term investments against $2.8B of debt leaves $2.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 157d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 48 + DIO 163 − DPO 54 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -20%–8%; -14% latest = NOPAT ($612M) ÷ invested capital $4.5B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $36M = operating cash $134M − maintenance capex $98M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $22M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $134M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($845M) · cash from operations $134M

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 489%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $176M ÷ Owner Earnings $36M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $36M of Owner Earnings, $176M (489%) went back to shareholders, $76M dividends, $100M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $14M stock comp, the real buyback was about $86M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.41×

Harvesting

Capex $98M ÷ depreciation $237M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.85×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.8B vs $782M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −679%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.63/share (latest year $-18.45), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $41.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → −12% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −12% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +9%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · −42.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −3.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B

Cash & short-term investments$343M
Receivables$244M
Inventory$506M
Other current assets$116M

Current liabilities$395M

Accounts payable$181M
Other current liabilities$214M

Current ratio3.06×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.78×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.87×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$814Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 3.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$637Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$1.5B$104M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.5B · 54%
Dividends$734M · 27%
Buybacks$2.1B · 78%

Returned to owners$2.9B
228% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $734M as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.6B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.5B to $2.9B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $674M.
Average price paid for buybacks$91.13
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 23M shares were bought for $2.1B, about $91.13 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $64.88 (2025) to $114.73 (2021); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $99.01 ($500M).
Net change in share count−27.0%
The diluted count fell from 63M to 46M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.65/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.3B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity37%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.5B of capital spent building

$1.4B written down across 3 years (2016, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Guillermo Novo	$7.6M	$9.1M	$361M
2022	Guillermo Novo	$9.3M	$12.9M	$80M
2023	Guillermo Novo	$7.0M	$240k	$124M
2024	Guillermo Novo	$8.7M	$12.2M	$325M
2025	Guillermo Novo	$7.9M	−$2.9M	$36M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$14M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ashland is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $2.2B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GLPGlobal Partners LP Common	$18.6B	6%	1.4%	—	1%
ANDEAndersons	$11.0B	6%	1.0%	4%	1%
SEBSeaboard Corporation	$9.7B	8%	3.5%	4%	2%
CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common	$3.7B	8%	1.8%	—	2%
CENTCentral Garden & Pet	$3.1B	30%	7.4%	10%	7%
ASHAshland	$1.8B	30%	3.0%	2%	4%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.	$536M	28%	13.3%	14%	8%
WEYSWeyco Group Inc.	$276M	41%	9.6%	11%	11%
Group median	—	18%	3.3%	7%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ashland has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Ashland earns about $73M on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($73M) Net of stock comp (−$14M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $245M on 46M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $2.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ASH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ashland (ASH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ASGN its page in the Manual ASIC →

Industry order: ← ALTO the Chemicals chapter ASIX →