Owner Scorecard


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MGPI, MGP Ingredients Inc.

Brewers, Distillers & Wineries capital-intensive

MGP is a leading producer of branded and distilled spirits, as well as food ingredient solutions.

We have an extensive award-winning global portfolio of branded spirits, which we produce through our distilleries and bottling facilities and sell to distributors.

Our branded spirits products account for a range of price points from value products through premium plus brands.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MGPI · MGP Ingredients Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$536M
−23.8% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $521M 5-yr avg $697M
Gross margin 36% 5-yr avg 36%
Operating margin −51.2% 5-yr avg 10.0%
ROIC −25% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Branded Spirits (43%), Distilling Solutions (34%) and Ingredient Solutions (23%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −18% to 20% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Branded Spirits at 43%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Branded Spirits43%$233M
  • Distilling Solutions34%$181M
  • Ingredient Solutions23%$122M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$318M$347M$376M$363M$396M$627M$782M$837M$704M$536M$521MRevenueRevenue
21%22%22%21%25%32%32%36%41%37%36%Gross marginGross mgn
8%10%9%7%11%12%10%11%12%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$42M$43M$50M$47M$54M$126M$149M$149M$74M($95M)($267M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
13.2%12.3%13.3%13.0%13.7%20.2%19.0%17.8%10.6%−17.6%−51.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$31M$42M$37M$39M$40M$91M$109M$107M$35M($108M)($240M)Net incomeNet inc.
30%21%24%16%23%25%22%24%50%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$20M$33M$33M$20M$53M$88M$89M$84M$102M$122M$84MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$11M$11M$11M$12M$13M$19M$21M$22M$22M$24M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
($25M)($22M)($18M)($34M)($3M)($28M)($47M)($56M)$42M$201M$294MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$18M$21M$31M$17M$20M$47M$45M$55M$71M$45M$31MCapexCapex
5.6%6.1%8.3%4.6%5.0%7.6%5.8%6.6%10.1%8.5%6.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$8M$22M$22M$8M$40M$69M$67M$62M$80M$97M$59MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.7%6.4%5.9%2.2%10.2%11.0%8.6%7.4%11.4%18.2%11.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2M$12M$2M$3M$34M$41M$44M$29M$31M$76M$53MFree cash flowFCF
0.6%3.6%0.6%0.8%8.5%6.5%5.6%3.4%4.4%14.2%10.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M$0$0$0$3M$149M$0$104M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2M$17M$6M$7M$8M$10M$11M$11M$11M$10M$10MDividends paidDiv. paid
$2M$5M$2M$5M$4M$767K$715K$801K$49M$1MBuybacksBuybacks
16%18%17%15%15%11%12%10%3%-8%-25%ROICROIC
21%25%19%17%15%14%15%13%4%-15%-41%Return on equityROE
20%14%16%14%12%13%13%11%3%−16%−43%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2M$3M$5M$3M$22M$22M$48M$18M$25M$18M$10MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$26M$34M$39M$41M$57M$93M$109M$144M$148M$116M$87MReceivablesReceiv.
$20M$30M$25M$30M$30M$54M$66M$74M$66M$55M$50MAccounts payablePayables
$6M$4M$13M$11M$27M$39M$43M$71M$82M$62M$71MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$111M$135M$155M$184M$222M$367M$454M$514M$546M$523M$506MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$37M$42M$37M$39M$53M$89M$105M$114M$92M$200M$185MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×3.2×4.1×4.7×4.2×4.1×4.3×4.5×5.9×2.6×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$2M$3M$226M$226M$322M$248M$116M$0GoodwillGoodwill
$225M$240M$278M$323M$367M$1.0B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$37M$25M$32M$41M$40M$233M$230M$294M$329M$260M$260MTotal debtDebt
$35M$21M$27M$38M$18M$212M$182M$275M$304M$242M$250MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
32.4×36.2×42.9×36.2×23.9×31.3×27.3×22.4×8.8×-13.4×-37.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$146M$169M$201M$231M$263M$645M$747M$850M$834M$718M$581MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.7%0.8%0.9%0.8%0.9%0.7%1.3%0.6%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$74M$132M$132MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
16.6M16.7M16.9M17.0M16.9M20.7M22.1M22.2M22.0M21.4M21.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$19.12$20.75$22.30$21.32$23.35$30.25$35.47$37.73$31.96$25.11$24.36Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.87$2.50$2.21$2.28$2.38$4.41$4.96$4.85$1.57$-5.05$-11.20EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.51$1.32$1.31$0.48$2.38$3.34$3.06$2.78$3.65$4.56$2.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.11$0.74$0.14$0.18$1.98$1.97$1.98$1.29$1.41$3.56$2.46Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.12$1.04$0.33$0.40$0.48$0.48$0.48$0.48$0.48$0.48$0.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.08$1.26$1.84$0.98$1.16$2.29$2.06$2.49$3.23$2.13$1.46Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.79$10.08$11.94$13.58$15.50$31.12$33.86$38.36$37.89$33.63$27.18Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.1%/yr+1.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+27.6%/yr+13.9%/yr
Dividends / share+16.3%/yr−0.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.9%/yr+12.9%/yr
Book value / share+16.1%/yr+16.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Branded Spirits-3.3%
    “Branded Spirits segment sales decreased 5 percent, primarily due to decreased sales of brands within the mid and value price tiers.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record
  • Distilling Solutions-45.4%
    “Distilling Solutions segment sales decreased 45 percent, primarily due to decreased sales of brown goods.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Ingredient Solutions-6.6%
    “Ingredient Solutions segment sales decreased 7 percent, primarily due to decreased sales of specialty wheat starches.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
21Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−8%low FY2025
Gross margin
37%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.5×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$97Mowner earningsvs.($108M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $97M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $24M it takes just to hold its position. It put $21M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $76M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($108M)$35M$107M$109M$91M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$24M+$22M+$22M+$21M+$19M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$5M+$4M+$11M+$6M+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$201M+$42M−$56M−$47M−$28M
Cash from operations$122M$102M$84M$89M$88M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$24M−$22M−$22M−$21M−$19M
Owner earnings$97M$80M$62M$67M$69M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$21M−$49M−$33M−$24M−$28M
Free cash flow$76M$31M$29M$44M$41M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue18%11%7%9%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $24M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $21M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $93M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($95M) ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $18M − debt $262M
    What this means

    Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $262M of debt leaves $243M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 79 + DIO 18 − DPO 59 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -8%–18%; -8% latest = NOPAT ($75M) ÷ invested capital $962M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–18%; latest $97M = operating cash $122M − maintenance capex $24M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put $21M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $76M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $93M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($108M) · cash from operations $122M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $11M ÷ Owner Earnings $97M
    What this means

    Of $97M Owner Earnings, $11M (12%) went back to shareholders, $10M dividends, $1M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($5M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.89×
    Expanding
    Capex $45M ÷ depreciation $24M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $536M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $262M vs $323M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −69%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.54/share (latest year $-5.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 4% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +22%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 22% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −17.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$506M
  • Cash & short-term investments$10M
  • Receivables$87M
  • Inventory$34M
  • Other current assets$375M
Current liabilities$185M
  • Debt due within a year$397K
  • Accounts payable$50M
  • Other current liabilities$135M
Current ratio2.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$321Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$397K due · $10M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−12.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.4× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$374Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$54MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$273M$13M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $644M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$371M · 58%
  • Dividends$92M · 14%
  • Buybacks$70M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$111M · 17%
  • Returned to owners$163M

    34% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $92M as dividends and $70M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $224M and cash and short-term investments rose $9M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$50.84

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $53M, about $50.84 each.

  • Net change in share count28.5%

    The diluted count rose from 17M to 21M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.48/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained24%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($262M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $62M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$360M29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity16%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$257Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $371M of capital spent building

$206M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 80% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$3.4M$4.0M$69M
2022$4.1M$5.3M$67M
2023$4.7M$4.3M$62M
2024$1.7M$296k$80M
2025$2.2M$1.5M$97M
2025$5.0M$4.4M$97M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio70:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MGP Ingredients Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.5%

    Diluted shares grew 28.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $70M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$37M → $260M

    Debt rose from $37M to $260M while owner earnings went from about $18M to $80M — about 2.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 17% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $26M to $87M while revenue grew 64%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 17% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Brewers, Distillers & Wineries

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GLPGlobal Partners LP Common$18.6B6%1.4%1%
ANDEAndersons$11.0B6%1.0%4%1%
SEBSeaboard Corporation$9.7B8%3.5%4%2%
CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common$3.7B8%1.8%2%
CENTCentral Garden & Pet$3.1B30%7.4%10%7%
ASHAshland$1.8B30%3.0%2%4%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.$536M28%13.3%14%8%
WEYSWeyco Group Inc.$276M41%9.6%11%11%
Group median18%3.3%7%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MGP Ingredients Inc. has delivered.

MGP Ingredients Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, MGP Ingredients Inc. earns about $43M on its 8.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+25%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $53M on 21M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $250M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($31M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $60M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MGP Ingredients Inc. (MGPI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MGPI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MGNI its page in the Manual MGR →

Industry order: ← CCU the Brewers, Distillers & Wineries chapter SAM →