Share count
18Mpeak FY2021
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GDEV, GDEV Inc.
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$404M
−3.9% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $404M 5-yr avg $441M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −38% to 18% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Europe at 33%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Europe33%$133M
- United States33%$132M
- Asia19%$77M
- Other15%$62M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $94M | $261M | $434M | $480M | $465M | $421M | $404M | $404M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($36M) | ($2M) | ($123M) | $19M | $38M | $40M | $71M | $71M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −38.1% | −0.6% | −28.4% | 3.9% | 8.3% | 9.6% | 17.6% | 17.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($36M) | ($751K) | ($117M) | $7M | $46M | $26M | $69M | $69M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 34% | 8% | 15% | 7% | 7% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $15M | $121M | $106M | $116M | $18M | $29M | $29M | $29M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $286K | $561K | $3M | $7M | $6M | $6M | $7M | $7M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $50M | $121M | $220M | $102M | ($34M) | ($3M) | ($47M) | ($47M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $19K | $147K | $1M | $994K | $739K | $343K | $311K | $311K | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $15M | $120M | $104M | $115M | $17M | $28M | $29M | $29M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 15.9% | 46.2% | 24.1% | 24.0% | 3.7% | 6.7% | 7.2% | 7.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $15M | $120M | $104M | $115M | $17M | $28M | $29M | $29M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 15.9% | 46.2% | 24.1% | 24.0% | 3.7% | 6.7% | 7.2% | 7.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $4M | $52M | $160M | — | — | — | $56M | $56M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $18M | $85M | $143M | $137M | $156M | $135M | $108M | $108M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $33M | $45M | $45M | $52M | $42M | $44M | $44M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $17M | $27M | $31M | $30M | $20M | $25M | $25M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $16M | $19M | $15M | $22M | $22M | $18M | $18M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $121M | $191M | $189M | $214M | $180M | $155M | $155M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $233M | $323M | $332M | $303M | $263M | $232M | $232M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $212M | $313M | $322M | $321M | $272M | $233M | $233M | Total assetsAssets |
| $4M | $49K | — | — | — | — | — | $94K | Total debtDebt |
| ($14M) | ($85M) | — | — | — | — | — | ($108M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -195.4× | -7.6× | -38.3× | 8.6× | 9.5× | 5.4× | 160.6× | 160.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($49M) | ($102M) | ($161M) | ($149M) | ($100M) | ($102M) | ($91M) | ($91M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 200M | 1.77B | 1.84B | 198M | 197M | 182M | 181M | 197M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.47 | $0.15 | $0.24 | $2.42 | $2.35 | $2.31 | $2.23 | $2.06 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.18 | $-0.00 | $-0.06 | $0.04 | $0.23 | $0.14 | $0.38 | $0.35 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.58 | $0.09 | $0.15 | $0.16 | $0.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.58 | $0.09 | $0.15 | $0.16 | $0.15 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.09 | — | — | — | $0.31 | $0.28 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.24 | $-0.06 | $-0.09 | $-0.75 | $-0.51 | $-0.56 | $-0.50 | $-0.46 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×8.83 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/9.27 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before TTM are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +29.7%/yr | +72.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.6%/yr | +18.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +57.0%/yr | +60.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +62.0%/yr | +83.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$29Mowner earningsvs.$69Mnet incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $69M of profit but $29M of owner earnings: $40M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $69M | $26M | $46M | $7M | ($117M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$7M | +$6M | +$6M | +$7M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$47M | −$3M | −$34M | +$102M | +$220M |
| Cash from operations | $29M | $29M | $18M | $116M | $106M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$311K | −$343K | −$739K | −$994K | −$1M |
| Owner earnings | $29M | $28M | $17M | $115M | $104M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 7% | 4% | 24% | 24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 160.6×ComfortableOperating income $71M ÷ interest expense $443K
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $63M + ST investments $45M − debt $94K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $108M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($153M) = debt $94K + equity ($91M) − cashIndustry peers: median -0%
What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 4%–46%; latest $29M = operating cash $29M − maintenance capex $311KIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 7 years.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $29M ÷ net income $69M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $56M ÷ Owner Earnings $29M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $29M of Owner Earnings, $56M (192%) went back to shareholders, $56M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.05×HarvestingCapex $311K ÷ depreciation $7M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $404M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.67×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $94K vs ($77M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.59/share (latest year $3.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-4.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −22% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −22% early to 12% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth −13%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · −38.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$155M
- Cash & short-term investments$108M
- Receivables$44M
- Other current assets$3M
Current liabilities$232M
- Debt due within a year$49K
- Accounts payable$25M
- Other current liabilities$207M
Current ratio0.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.67×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($77M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Debt due this year vs. cash$49K due · $108M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($93M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($169M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1M$1M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$188Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $433M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$4M · 1%
- Dividends$272M · 63%
- Buybacks$33M · 8%
- Retained (debt / cash)$124M · 29%
- Returned to owners$305M
71% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $272M as dividends and $33M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $4M and cash and short-term investments rose $91M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $33M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.7%
The diluted count fell from 200M to 197M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.31/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 147% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GDEV Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.9% vs 28.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 28.7% early in the record and 5.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOCSDoximity | $645M | 88% | 33.0% | 16% | 40% |
| VIAVia Transportation Inc. | $434M | 40% | -24.8% | -24% | -21% |
| AVPTAvePoint Inc. | $419M | 72% | -10.2% | — | 12% |
| PRCHPorch Group Inc. | $419M | 66% | -58.4% | -26% | -10% |
| CERTCertara Inc. | $419M | 61% | 4.7% | -0% | 21% |
| GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc. | $412M | 38% | -0.5% | -1% | 7% |
| GDEVGDEV Inc. | $404M | — | 3.9% | — | 16% |
| TBRGTruBridge Inc. | $347M | 52% | 6.5% | 6% | 9% |
| Group median | — | — | 1.7% | — | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. GDEV Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GDEV Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, GDEV Inc. earns about $64M on its 15.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $29M on 18M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $108M. The if-converted diluted count is 197M, 983% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GDEV Inc. (GDEV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDEV, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GCL its page in the Manual GDHG →
Industry order: ← FORTY the IT Services & Consulting chapter GDRX →