What it is: A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 48% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −6.0% to 6.4% — on a steadier 48% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Journeys Group is 61% of revenue, with Schuh Group the other meaningful segment at 21%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026

Journeys Group61%$1.5B
Schuh Group21%$500M
Johnston & Murphy Group13%$320M
Genesco Brands Group5%$121M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMay 2026
											Income statement
$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$1.8B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.4B	RevenueRevenue
48%	48%	48%	48%	45%	49%	48%	47%	47%	46%	46%	Gross marginGross mgn
43%	44%	44%	44%	46%	43%	44%	47%	46%	45%	45%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$108M	$74M	$82M	$83M	($107M)	$156M	$93M	($13M)	$14M	$17M	$30M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.3%	3.5%	3.7%	3.8%	−6.0%	6.4%	3.9%	−0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	1.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$97M	($112M)	($52M)	$61M	($56M)	$115M	$72M	($17M)	($19M)	$13M	$20M	Net incomeNet inc.
29%	—	—	25%	—	25%	20%	—	—	-5%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$165M	$165M	$237M	$117M	$158M	$240M	($165M)	$95M	$88M	$146M	$144M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$76M	$78M	$77M	$50M	$46M	$43M	$43M	$49M	$52M	$53M	$53M	DepreciationDeprec.
($8M)	$198M	$212M	$6M	$159M	$73M	($294M)	$48M	$41M	$67M	$59M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$94M	$128M	$57M	$30M	$24M	$54M	$60M	$60M	$41M	$62M	$59M	CapexCapex
4.7%	6.0%	2.6%	1.4%	1.4%	2.2%	2.5%	2.6%	1.8%	2.5%	2.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$71M	$86M	$180M	$87M	$134M	$197M	($208M)	$34M	$47M	$84M	$85M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.5%	4.1%	8.2%	4.0%	7.5%	8.1%	−8.7%	1.5%	2.0%	3.4%	3.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$71M	$37M	$180M	$87M	$134M	$186M	($225M)	$34M	$47M	$84M	$85M	Free cash flowFCF
3.5%	1.7%	8.2%	4.0%	7.5%	7.7%	−9.4%	1.5%	2.0%	3.4%	3.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$22K	$0	$0	$34M	$0	$80K	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$140M	$16M	$45M	$190M	$0	$78M	$77M	$32M	$10M	$13M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
8%	—	—	11%	-22%	39%	12%	-2%	1%	4%	4%	ROICROIC
11%	-13%	-7%	10%	-10%	19%	12%	-3%	-3%	2%	4%	Return on equityROE
11%	−13%	−7%	10%	−10%	19%	12%	−3%	−3%	2%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$48M	$40M	$167M	$81M	$215M	$321M	$48M	$35M	$34M	$105M	$27M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$44M	$34M	$132M	$29M	$31M	$40M	$41M	$54M	$49M	$40M	$48M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$564M	$388M	$367M	$365M	$291M	$278M	$458M	$379M	$425M	$434M	$477M	InventoryInvent.
$171M	$123M	$159M	$136M	$150M	$152M	$145M	$115M	$168M	$157M	$129M	Accounts payablePayables
$436M	$299M	$340M	$259M	$172M	$165M	$354M	$318M	$306M	$317M	$396M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$717M	$693M	$731M	$508M	$668M	$710M	$573M	$507M	$609M	$619M	$596M	Current assetsCur. assets
$309M	$255M	$276M	$362M	$403M	$432M	$361M	$320M	$380M	$376M	$325M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×	2.7×	2.6×	1.4×	1.7×	1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$271M	$100M	$93M	$122M	$39M	$39M	$38M	$10M	$9M	$9M	$9M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Total assetsAssets
$83M	$88M	$66M	$14M	$33M	$16M	$45M	$35M	$0	$3M	$45M	Total debtDebt
$35M	$48M	($102M)	($67M)	($182M)	($305M)	($3M)	($473K)	($34M)	($102M)	$18M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
20.4×	13.7×	19.9×	65.2×	-21.1×	63.5×	31.9×	-1.7×	—	—	6.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$921M	$831M	$738M	$619M	$567M	$602M	$607M	$571M	$547M	$567M	$552M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	0.5%	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$182M	—	—	$79M	—	—	$28M	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
20.2M	19.3M	19.5M	15.7M	14.2M	14.5M	12.7M	11.2M	10.8M	10.6M	10.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$100.18	$110.34	$112.26	$140.20	$125.67	$166.94	$187.68	$206.76	$214.57	$229.30	$234.86	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.83	$-5.80	$-2.66	$3.92	$-3.97	$7.92	$5.66	$-1.50	$-1.74	$1.25	$1.89	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.53	$4.47	$9.23	$5.58	$9.40	$13.57	$-16.35	$3.07	$4.31	$7.88	$8.19	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.53	$1.91	$9.23	$5.58	$9.40	$12.82	$-17.69	$3.07	$4.31	$7.88	$8.19	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$4.66	$6.63	$2.94	$1.90	$1.70	$3.72	$4.72	$5.36	$3.80	$5.84	$5.62	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$45.66	$43.08	$37.83	$39.52	$39.87	$41.52	$47.77	$50.81	$50.48	$53.37	$52.98	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.6%/yr	+12.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+9.3%/yr	−3.5%/yr
EPS	−14.0%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+2.5%/yr	+28.0%/yr
Book value / share	+1.7%/yr	+6.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Journeys Group+6.8%
“Journeys Group sales increased 7% and Schuh Group sales increased 4%, partially offset by a sales decrease of 4% at Genesco Brands Group, reflecting the wind-down of Levis and other licenses, while Johnston & Murphy Group sales were flat for Fiscal 2026 compared to Fiscal 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

11Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

4%low FY2021

Gross margin

46%low FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-1.2×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$84Mowner earningsvs.$13Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $13M of profit into $84M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$13M

Owner earnings$84M · 3% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$13M	($19M)	($17M)	$72M	$115M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$53M	+$52M	+$49M	+$43M	+$43M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$13M	+$14M	+$14M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$67M	+$41M	+$48M	−$294M	+$73M
Cash from operations	$146M	$88M	$95M	($165M)	$240M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$62M	−$41M	−$60M	−$43M	−$43M
Owner earnings	$84M	$47M	$34M	($208M)	$197M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$17M	−$11M
Free cash flow	$84M	$47M	$34M	($225M)	$186M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	2%	1%	-9%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $71M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.2×

Adequate

Operating income $17M ÷ interest expense $8M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$102M

Net cash

Cash $105M − debt $3M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $102M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 83d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 6 + DIO 121 − DPO 44 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -22%–39%; 4% latest = NOPAT $17M ÷ invested capital $465M

Industry peers: median 17%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $84M = operating cash $146M − maintenance capex $62M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $71M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 10.99×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $146M ÷ net income $13M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 15%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $13M ÷ Owner Earnings $84M

What this means
Of $84M Owner Earnings, $13M (15%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $13M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $325K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.16×

Maintaining

Capex $62M ÷ depreciation $53M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.64×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $3M vs $242M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.67/share (latest year $1.19), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to 0% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −2%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −6.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$596M

Cash & short-term investments$27M
Receivables$48M
Inventory$477M
Other current assets$44M

Current liabilities$325M

Accounts payable$129M
Other current liabilities$196M

Current ratio1.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.37×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$271Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$515Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($236M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$576M$530M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $521M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$147M

'27$108M

'28$81M

'29$69M

'30$60M

later$164M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$147Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$628Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$518Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3M

Lease obligations (present value)$518M

Total fixed claims on the business$521M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $521M, of which the leases are 99%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$610M · 49%
Buybacks$602M · 48%
Retained (debt / cash)$33M · 3%

Returned to owners$602M
84% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $602M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$46.39
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 13M shares were bought for $602M, about $46.39 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.79 (2026) to $65.17 (2017); its heaviest year, 2020, paid $41.66 ($190M).
Net change in share count−48.3%
The diluted count fell from 20M to 10M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$37M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity2%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$34Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $610M of capital spent building

$290M written down across 3 years (2018, 2021, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Vaughn	$2.8M	$4.0M	$134M
2022	Vaughn	$8.8M	$9.0M	$197M
2023	Vaughn	$3.7M	$3.6M	($208M)
2024	Vaughn	$4.3M	−$912k	$34M
2025	Vaughn	$5.2M	$7.1M	$47M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio778:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 71% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Genesco Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.3% vs 5.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.3% early in the record and 2.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $332M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FLFoot Locker	$8.0B	32%	7.3%	17%	6%
HBIHanesbrands	$3.5B	38%	9.3%	16%	8%
DBIDesigner Brands Inc.	$2.9B	30%	3.0%	18%	3%
GCOGenesco Inc.	$2.4B	48%	3.6%	6%	4%
BOOTBoot Barn Holdings	$2.3B	35%	10.8%	17%	4%
LELands' End Inc.	$1.3B	42%	2.9%	6%	1%
BKEBuckle	$1.3B	49%	19.2%	113%	17%
SCVLShoe Carnival	$1.1B	33%	5.6%	14%	5%
Group median	—	36%	6.4%	17%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Genesco Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Genesco Inc. earns about $91M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($91M) Net of stock comp (−$12M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $85M on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-29; net debt $18M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GCO against another business →

The owners of GCO: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Genesco Inc. (GCO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GCO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GCMG its page in the Manual GCT →

Industry order: ← GAP the Specialty Retail chapter GME →