Owner Scorecard


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HBI, Hanesbrands

Specialty Retail retail Cyclical

A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K
HBI · Hanesbrands
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$3.5B
−3.6% YoY · −12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $4.7B
Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 35%
Operating margin 13.1% 5-yr avg 6.7%
Owner-earnings margin −0% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 7.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.7% to 13% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMSep 2025
Income statement
$6.0B$6.5B$6.8B$6.4B$6.1B$3.9B$3.6B$3.5B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
38%38%39%38%26%35%35%39%42%Gross marginGross mgn
25%27%26%25%25%28%28%33%29%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$790M$736M$865M$851M$43M$267M$266M$186M$462MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.1%11.4%12.7%13.2%0.7%6.9%7.3%5.3%13.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$539M$74M$540M$601M($76M)($127M)($18M)($320M)$330MNet incomeNet inc.
6%16%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$606M$656M$643M$803M$448M($359M)$562M$264M$23MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$103M$122M$132M$115M$115M$79M$80M$79M$41MDepreciationDeprec.
($69M)$436M($49M)$78M$390M($334M)$479M$480M($374M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$83M$87M$86M$101M$54M$112M$44M$38M$31MCapexCapex
1.4%1.3%1.3%1.6%0.9%2.9%1.2%1.1%0.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$522M$569M$557M$702M$395M($471M)$518M$226M($8M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.7%8.8%8.2%10.9%6.4%−12.2%14.2%6.5%−0.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$522M$569M$557M$702M$395M($471M)$518M$226M($8M)Free cash flowFCF
8.7%8.8%8.2%10.9%6.4%−12.2%14.2%6.5%−0.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$964M$62M$335M$25M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$167M$220M$216M$217M$210M$209M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$380M$400M$0$0$200M$25M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
17%9%16%18%3%ROICROIC
48%12%62%49%-9%-18%-4%-942%74%Return on equityROE
33%−24%37%31%−35%−48%−4%−942%74%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$319M$422M$433M$329M$901M$196M$185M$215M$218MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$837M$903M$871M$815M$768M$721M$424M$376M$455MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$1.9B$1.4B$2.0B$956M$871M$991MInventoryInvent.
$762M$868M$1.0B$959M$892M$917M$539M$593M$572MAccounts payablePayables
$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.2B$1.8B$841M$654M$874MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B$3.4B$3.5B$3.2B$3.4B$3.1B$2.3B$1.7B$1.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$1.8B$2.1B$1.8B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×1.9×1.7×1.8×1.6×1.7×1.6×1.4×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$659M$659M$638M$650MGoodwillGoodwill
$6.9B$6.9B$7.2B$7.4B$7.7B$6.5B$5.6B$3.8B$4.3BTotal assetsAssets
$3.7B$4.0B$4.0B$3.4B$4.0B$3.9B$3.3B$2.3B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$3.4B$3.5B$3.5B$3.0B$3.1B$3.7B$3.1B$2.1B$2.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.2×4.2×4.4×4.8×0.3×2.0×1.2×0.9×2.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.1B$601M$872M$1.2B$814M$702M$419M$34M$446MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.4%0.3%0.1%0.3%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$25M$77M$77MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
385M369M365M366M353M350M351M352M357MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.68$17.52$18.67$17.58$17.37$11.04$10.37$9.96$9.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.40$0.20$1.48$1.64$-0.21$-0.36$-0.05$-0.91$0.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.36$1.54$1.53$1.92$1.12$-1.35$1.47$0.64$-0.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.36$1.54$1.53$1.92$1.12$-1.35$1.47$0.64$-0.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44$0.60$0.59$0.59$0.60$0.60$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.22$0.24$0.24$0.28$0.15$0.32$0.13$0.11$0.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.91$1.63$2.39$3.38$2.31$2.01$1.19$0.10$1.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.5%/yr−10.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−8.9%/yr−19.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.4%/yr−17.2%/yr
Book value / share−34.7%/yr−50.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
352Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
3%low FY2022
Gross margin
39%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.1×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$226Mowner earningsvs.($320M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $320M loss into $226M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2019
Reported net income($320M)($18M)($127M)($76M)$601M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$79M+$80M+$79M+$115M+$115M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$26M+$21M+$23M+$19M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$480M+$479M−$334M+$390M+$78M
Cash from operations$264M$562M($359M)$448M$803M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$38M−$44M−$112M−$54M−$101M
Owner earnings$226M$518M($471M)$395M$702M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%14%-12%6%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $201M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $186M ÷ interest expense $196M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 11.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $215M − debt $2.3B
    What this means

    Netting $215M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (12.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 39 + DIO 148 − DPO 101 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 3%–18%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -12%–14%; latest $226M = operating cash $264M − maintenance capex $38M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $201M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($320M) · cash from operations $264M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $226M
    What this means

    Of $226M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.48×
    Harvesting
    Capex $38M ÷ depreciation $79M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.37×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $467M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −140%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.44/share (latest year $-0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 7% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 0.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Sep 27, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$218M
  • Receivables$455M
  • Inventory$991M
  • Other current assets$216M
Current liabilities$1.2B
  • Debt due within a year$135M
  • Accounts payable$572M
  • Other current liabilities$537M
Current ratio1.51×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.71×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$635Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$135M due · $218M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Sep 27, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.7B$323M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $3.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$606M · 17%
  • Dividends$1.2B · 34%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 28%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$773M · 21%
  • Returned to owners$2.2B

    74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $1.3B and cash and short-term investments fell $102M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$31.27

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 12M shares were bought for $380M, about $31.27 each.

  • Net change in share count−7.2%

    The diluted count fell from 385M to 357M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.5B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $606M of capital spent building

$102M written down across 2 years (2021, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Stephen Bratspies$4.8M$3.6M
2020Stephen Bratspies$9.5M$6.3M
2021Stephen Bratspies$11.0M$15.4M$395M
2022Stephen Bratspies$9.2M−$2.0M($471M)
2023Stephen Bratspies$9.8M$5.4M$518M
2024Stephen Bratspies$12.9M$21.2M$226M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$26M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hanesbrands is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.8% vs 8.5%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.5% early in the record and 2.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AEOAmerican Eagle$5.5B37%6.7%21%5%
ANFAbercrombie & Fitch$5.3B73%3.5%12%6%
HBIHanesbrands$3.5B38%9.3%16%8%
DBIDesigner Brands Inc.$2.9B30%3.0%18%3%
GCOGenesco Inc.$2.4B48%3.6%6%4%
BOOTBoot Barn Holdings$2.3B35%10.8%17%4%
ZUMZZumiez$929M34%5.0%9%5%
CTRNCiti Trends Inc.$820M49%2.9%9%2%
Group median37%4.3%14%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hanesbrands has delivered.

Hanesbrands’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Hanesbrands earns about $296M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’24−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($8M) on 354M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-10-31; net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hanesbrands (HBI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HBI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HBCP its page in the Manual HBT →

Industry order: ← GME the Specialty Retail chapter HD →