Share count
15Mpeak FY2025
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GREEL, Greenidge Generation Holdings Inc.
We are a developer and operator of datacenters and powered assets designed to support energy-intensive computing workloads.
We are actively marketing the remaining land and industrial warehouse space.
During 2025, we paid $0.7 million in cash to repurchase an aggregate of $1.1 million principal amount of the Senior Notes in open market transactions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$59M
−1.3% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $60M 5-yr avg $75M
Revenue $21M +8.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −21.8% yr-ago −12.4%
Net income ($5M) yr-ago ($6M)
Net margin −22.0% yr-ago −28.9%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Power and capacity (38%), Datacenter hosting (37%) and Cryptocurrency mining (26%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 34% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −19%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −193%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Power and capacity at 38%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Power and capacity38%$22M
- Datacenter hosting37%$21M
- Cryptocurrency mining26%$15M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $20M | $97M | $90M | $70M | $60M | $59M | $60M | RevenueRevenue |
| 28% | 25% | 39% | 37% | 29% | 21% | 23% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($3M) | $33M | ($233M) | ($17M) | ($11M) | ($4M) | ($6M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −13.1% | 33.7% | −259.1% | −24.0% | −19.2% | −6.5% | −9.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($3M) | ($44M) | ($271M) | ($30M) | ($20M) | $5M | $6M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $557K | $40M | ($14M) | ($12M) | ($12M) | ($15M) | ($21M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $5M | $8M | $35M | $14M | $13M | $12M | $11M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($717K) | $72M | $219M | $1M | ($8M) | ($33M) | ($39M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| -5% | — | -825% | -170% | -217% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $5M | $83M | $15M | $13M | $9M | $20M | $7M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $390K | $237K | $3M | $358K | $1M | $2M | $930K | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2M | $6M | $10M | $3M | $4M | $2M | $2M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($1M) | ($6M) | ($7M) | ($3M) | ($2M) | $4K | ($970K) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $8M | $101M | $33M | $24M | $27M | $35M | $30M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $12M | $42M | $99M | $21M | $19M | $63M | $60M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.7× | 2.4× | 0.3× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 0.6× | 0.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $3M | — | — | — | — | $3M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $65M | $341M | $164M | $71M | $65M | $54M | $46M | Total assetsAssets |
| $1M | $75M | $85M | $72M | $69M | $43M | $43M | Total debtDebt |
| ($4M) | ($8M) | $69M | $59M | $60M | $24M | $36M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -4.4× | 8.9× | -10.8× | -1.3× | -1.6× | -0.9× | -4.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $44M | $212M | ($47M) | ($51M) | ($56M) | ($46M) | ($50M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 3.9% | 2.9% | 3.3% | 3.7% | 1.3% | 1.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 0K | 4.6M | 4.2M | 6.7M | 10.5M | 15.3M | 16.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $21.25 | $21.24 | $10.57 | $5.67 | $3.83 | $3.78 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | $-9.71 | $-63.98 | $-4.43 | $-1.88 | $0.34 | $0.39 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $46.39 | $-11.10 | $-7.66 | $-5.31 | $-3.02 | $-3.15 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×1.57 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.58 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
−217%low FY2022
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($4M) ÷ interest expense $4M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $20M − debt $43M
What this means
Netting $20M of cash and short-term investments against $43M of debt leaves $24M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($23M) = debt $43M + equity ($46M) − cashIndustry peers: median -16%
What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -2.84×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($15M) ÷ net income $5M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $59M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $43M vs ($28M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.90/share (latest year $0.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −80% → −17% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −80% early to −17% lately, median −19% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −259.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In particular, the use of available power capacity for AI and HPC workloads may reduce the power available for bitcoin mining, which is a highly competitive and capital-intensive industry.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$30M
- Cash & short-term investments$7M
- Receivables$930K
- Other current assets$22M
Current liabilities$60M
- Accounts payable$2M
- Other current liabilities$58M
Current ratio0.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.50×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($30M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($56M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($67M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$43Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$7M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses
$42M written down across 1 year (2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership28.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$760K
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Greenidge Generation Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−12.8% vs 10.3%
The operating margin averaged 10.3% early in the record and −12.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| WDWalker & Dunlop | $320M | — | 143.4% | 14% | 149% |
| GEMIGemini Space Station Inc. | $180M | — | -192.5% | -95% | -123% |
| GPGIGPGI Inc. | $60M | 53% | 30.4% | -3% | 27% |
| GREELGreenidge Generation Holdings Inc. | $59M | — | -16.2% | -193% | — |
| FWDIForward Industries Inc. | $18M | 20% | -3.9% | -21% | -1% |
| ASSTStrive Inc. | $4M | — | -404.4% | -104% | -592% |
| Group median | — | — | -5.9% | -21% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFGreenidge Generation Holdings Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered11%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Greenidge Generation Holdings Inc. (GREEL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GREEL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GRDN its page in the Manual GRMN →
Industry order: ← GRAN the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter GS →