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JL, J-Long Group Limited
Limited J-Long Group Limited, is the holding company of our operating subsidiaries, J-Long Limited and J-Long Trims Vietnam Co., Ltd; collectively with JLHK, the "Operating Subsidiaries").
We have nearly 30 years of experience in the apparel industry and have served over 100 international brands globally, including outerwear and sportswear brands, uniform and safety workwear brands and fashion brands.
We offer a wide range of services to cater to our customers' needs in reflective and non-reflective garment trims, including market trend analysis, product design and development, and production and quality control.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 6.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.3% to 16% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 65%, above 15% in 2 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Non-Asia at 32%.
- Non-Asia32%$12M
- Hong Kong SAR China25%$10M
- Asia23%$9M
- China20%$8M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $38M | $38M | $28M | $39M | $39M | RevenueRevenue |
| 23% | 26% | 24% | 29% | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $6M | $6M | $380K | $2M | $2M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.4% | 16.3% | 1.3% | 6.1% | 6.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $4M | $7M | $784K | $3M | $3M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 16% | 14% | 14% | 21% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $6M | $2M | ($2M) | $7M | $7M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $203K | $169K | $148K | $221K | $221K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $978K | ($5M) | ($2M) | $4M | $4M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $83K | $50K | $199K | $1M | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 2.6% | 2.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $6M | $2M | ($2M) | $6M | $6M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.6% | 5.0% | −6.0% | 15.9% | 15.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $6M | $2M | ($2M) | $6M | $6M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.6% | 5.0% | −6.0% | 15.9% | 15.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $2M | $400K | $400K | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 65% | 67% | 4% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 63% | 59% | 8% | — | 25% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −9% | — | 21% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $6M | $4M | $11M | $11M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $2M | $2M | $3M | $3M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $6M | $4M | $3M | $3M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $3M | $1M | $2M | $2M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $5M | $5M | $4M | $4M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $17M | $14M | $19M | $19M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $7M | $5M | $7M | $7M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.3× | 2.7× | 2.7× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $21M | $17M | $23M | $23M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $3M | $2M | $1M | $1M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($4M) | ($2M) | ($9M) | ($9M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $7M | $11M | $10M | — | $10M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 3.0M | 3.0M | 3.0M | 3.3M | 3.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $12.76 | $12.76 | $9.38 | $12.00 | $10.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.49 | $2.22 | $0.26 | $0.77 | $0.67 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.86 | $0.64 | $-0.56 | $1.91 | $1.65 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.86 | $0.64 | $-0.56 | $1.91 | $1.65 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $0.55 | $0.12 | $0.11 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.07 | $0.31 | $0.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $2.35 | $3.78 | $3.36 | — | $2.70 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.0%/yr | −2.0%/yr (3-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +0.8%/yr | +0.8%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −19.8%/yr | −19.8%/yr (3-yr) |
| Dividends / share | −77.8%/yr (1-yr) | −77.8%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +124.3%/yr | +124.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +19.5%/yr (2-yr) | +19.5%/yr (2-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $3M of profit into $6M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $3M | $784K | $7M | $4M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$221K | +$148K | +$169K | +$203K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$4M | −$2M | −$5M | +$978K |
| Cash from operations | $7M | ($2M) | $2M | $6M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1M | −$199K | −$50K | −$83K |
| Owner earnings | $6M | ($2M) | $2M | $6M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 16% | -6% | 5% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“As of March 31, 2025, our management completed an assessment of the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting and identified certain material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $11M + ST investments $2K − debt $1M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $9M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 29 + DIO 40 − DPO 26 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle3-yr median, range 4%–67%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -6%–16%; latest $6M = operating cash $7M − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 4 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $7M ÷ net income $3M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $400K ÷ Owner Earnings $6M
What this means
Of $6M Owner Earnings, $400K (6%) went back to shareholders, $400K dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 4.61×ExpandingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $221K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $39M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.68×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1M vs $12M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.88/share (latest year $0.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 15% → 4% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 4% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 1.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$11M
- Receivables$3M
- Inventory$3M
- Other current assets$2M
- Debt due within a year$1M
- Accounts payable$2M
- Other current liabilities$4M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $13M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1M · 10%
- Dividends$2M · 16%
- Retained (debt / cash)$10M · 74%
- Returned to owners$2M
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Net change in share count25.4%
The diluted count rose from 3M to 4M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.12/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 78% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained2%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($12M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $208K, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why J-Long Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?25.4%
Diluted shares grew 25.4% over 2022–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HBIHanesbrands | $3.5B | 38% | 9.3% | 16% | 8% |
| GCOGenesco Inc. | $2.4B | 48% | 3.6% | 6% | 4% |
| LELands' End Inc. | $1.3B | 42% | 2.9% | 6% | 1% |
| BKEBuckle | $1.3B | 49% | 19.2% | 113% | 17% |
| SCVLShoe Carnival | $1.1B | 33% | 5.6% | 14% | 5% |
| ZUMZZumiez | $929M | 34% | 5.0% | 9% | 5% |
| CTRNCiti Trends Inc. | $820M | 49% | 2.9% | 9% | 2% |
| JLJ-Long Group Limited | $39M | 25% | 10.3% | 65% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 40% | 5.3% | 12% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. J-Long Group Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what J-Long Group Limited has delivered.
J-Long Group Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, J-Long Group Limited earns about $4M on its 9.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $6M on 4M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-03-31; net cash $9M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← JKS its page in the Manual JLHL →
Industry order: ← JD the Specialty Retail chapter JWN →