Share count
367Mpeak FY2020
← All companies ← MRX Manual MT → ← MMYT Hotels & Resorts OSW →
MSC, STUDIO CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
A hotel and lodging business, earning on rooms filled and the brand that fills them.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$695M
+8.7% YoY · 70% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $695M 5-yr avg $380M
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 28% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −6.5%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $425M | $540M | $571M | $627M | $49M | $107M | $12M | $446M | $639M | $695M | $695M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($55M) | $80M | $138M | $178M | ($280M) | ($192M) | ($277M) | ($29M) | $38M | $70M | $70M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −12.9% | 14.9% | 24.1% | 28.4% | −568.9% | −179.3% | n/m | −6.5% | 6.0% | 10.1% | 10.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($243M) | ($76M) | ($21M) | $44M | ($405M) | ($302M) | ($361M) | ($146M) | ($106M) | ($64M) | ($64M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $15M | $68M | $140M | $229M | ($167M) | ($137M) | ($179M) | ($19M) | $190M | $210M | $210M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $172M | $176M | $168M | $172M | $160M | $128M | $127M | $169M | $205M | $212M | $212M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $86M | ($32M) | ($8M) | $13M | $77M | $38M | $56M | ($42M) | $91M | $63M | $63M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | 9% | -11% | -6% | -8% | -1% | — | — | — | ROICROIC |
| — | -10% | -2% | 5% | -38% | -38% | -45% | -22% | -18% | -12% | -12% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −10% | −2% | 5% | −38% | −38% | −45% | −22% | −18% | −12% | −12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | $348M | $346M | $299M | $575M | $499M | $510M | $228M | $128M | $109M | $109M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $2M | $2M | $1M | $157K | $247K | $263K | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $10M | $10M | $10M | $9M | $6M | $5M | $6M | $7M | $9M | $9M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $3M | $6M | $3M | $206K | $211K | $501K | $2M | $3M | $6M | $6M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $10M | $5M | $8M | $9M | $6M | $5M | $6M | $6M | $4M | $4M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $461M | $459M | $414M | $608M | $564M | $554M | $316M | $166M | $131M | $131M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $178M | $439M | $100M | $162M | $255M | $247M | $157M | $181M | $180M | $180M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.6× | 1.0× | 4.1× | 3.7× | 2.2× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.0B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.3× | 0.5× | 0.9× | 1.3× | -2.7× | -2.1× | -3.0× | -0.2× | 0.3× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | $740M | $843M | $891M | $1.1B | $789M | $801M | $666M | $591M | $524M | $524M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 181M | 181M | 192M | 242M | 367M | — | — | — | — | — | 367M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.34 | $2.98 | $2.98 | $2.59 | $0.13 | — | — | — | — | — | $1.89 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.34 | $-0.42 | $-0.11 | $0.18 | $-1.10 | — | — | — | — | — | $-0.18 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $4.08 | $4.40 | $3.69 | $2.89 | — | — | — | — | — | $1.43 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.52 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −51.1%/yr (4-yr) | −51.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −10.9%/yr (3-yr) | −10.9%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−1%low FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $70M ÷ interest expense $126M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 27.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $109M − debt $2.0B
What this means
Netting $109M of cash and short-term investments against $2.0B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 27.3× a year's operating profit (28.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -11%–9%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($64M) · cash from operations $210M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $695M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.73×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.0B vs ($49M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.13/share (latest year $-0.08), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (3%) sits below the early years (9%), but the latest year (10%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −7% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −2400.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$131M
- Cash & short-term investments$109M
- Receivables$2M
- Inventory$9M
- Other current assets$11M
Current liabilities$180M
- Accounts payable$6M
- Other current liabilities$174M
Current ratio0.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.68×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.61×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($49M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$524Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$2M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Hotels & Resorts
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BYDBoyd Gaming | $4.1B | — | 16.3% | 14% | 13% |
| PKPark Hotels & Resorts | $2.5B | — | 13.0% | 4% | 8% |
| RRRRed Rock Resorts | $2.0B | — | 24.8% | — | 13% |
| XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | 9.8% | 4% | 10% |
| SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. | $960M | — | 13.6% | 5% | 9% |
| MSCSTUDIO CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED | $695M | — | -0.3% | -6% | — |
| CVEOCiveo Corporation (Canada) | $639M | 24% | -4.6% | -6% | 9% |
| MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc. | $545M | — | 17.8% | 13% | 19% |
| Group median | — | — | 13.3% | 4% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares each representing four Class”; STUDIO CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered103%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "STUDIO CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (MSC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MSC, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MRX its page in the Manual MT →
Industry order: ← MMYT the Hotels & Resorts chapter OSW →