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SFL, SFL Corporation Ltd
We currently operate in several sectors of the maritime, shipping and offshore industries, including oil transportation, dry bulk shipments, oil products transportation, container transportation, car transportation and drilling rigs.
We have a diverse asset base consisting of crude oil tankers, oil product tankers, chemical tankers, container vessels, car carriers, dry bulk carriers, a jack-up drilling rig and an ultra-deepwater drilling rig.
As of March 16, 2026, our customers includes, among others, Maersk, MSC, ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS, or ConocoPhillips, Phillips 66 Company, or Phillips 66, Volkswagen Konzernlogistik Gmbh Co.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 32% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from −29% to 47% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $413M | $381M | $419M | $459M | $471M | $513M | $670M | $752M | $904M | $733M | $733M | RevenueRevenue |
| $168M | $155M | $118M | $138M | ($138M) | $243M | $275M | $240M | $307M | $137M | $137M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 40.7% | 40.6% | 28.1% | 30.0% | −29.3% | 47.3% | 41.1% | 31.9% | 33.9% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $146M | $101M | $74M | $89M | ($224M) | $164M | $203M | $84M | $131M | ($26M) | ($26M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | 4% | 8% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $230M | $178M | $201M | $250M | $276M | $294M | $355M | $343M | $370M | $267M | $267M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $94M | $88M | $104M | $116M | $111M | $138M | $188M | $214M | $239M | $235M | $235M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($11M) | ($12M) | $23M | $44M | $390M | ($9M) | ($35M) | $45M | $27K | $59M | $59M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $168M | $153M | $149M | $151M | $109M | $78M | $112M | $123M | $138M | $125M | $125M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $10M | — | $10M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 5% | 4% | 4% | -5% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 7% | 3% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 8% | 6% | 8% | -28% | 17% | 19% | 8% | 12% | -3% | -3% | Return on equityROE |
| −2% | −4% | −6% | −6% | −42% | 9% | 8% | −4% | −1% | −16% | −16% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $62M | $153M | $211M | $200M | $215M | $146M | $188M | $165M | $135M | $151M | $151M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $4M | $13M | $3M | $5M | $7M | $11M | $20M | $41M | $37M | $12M | $12M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $5M | $5M | $9M | $8M | $9M | $10M | $16M | $12M | $17M | $14M | $14M | InventoryInvent. |
| $9M | $18M | $12M | $13M | $15M | $21M | $36M | $53M | $54M | $25M | $25M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $278M | $318M | $414M | $390M | $356M | $250M | $297M | $298M | $316M | $259M | $259M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $239M | $344M | $404M | $366M | $577M | $400M | $1.1B | $969M | $828M | $710M | $710M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 0.4× | 0.4× | 0.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 2.3× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $796M | $982M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $961M | $961M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 108M | 103M | 108M | 108M | 109M | 139M | 137M | 127M | 130M | 133M | 145M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.82 | $3.70 | $3.89 | $4.26 | $4.32 | $3.68 | $4.88 | $5.94 | $6.96 | $5.51 | $5.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.36 | $0.98 | $0.68 | $0.83 | $-2.06 | $1.18 | $1.48 | $0.66 | $1.01 | $-0.20 | $-0.18 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.56 | $1.49 | $1.39 | $1.40 | $1.00 | $0.56 | $0.81 | $0.97 | $1.07 | $0.94 | $0.87 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $10.50 | $11.61 | $10.97 | $10.27 | $7.30 | $7.05 | $7.94 | $8.21 | $8.68 | $7.22 | $6.65 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.1%/yr | +5.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −5.5%/yr | −1.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −4.1%/yr | −0.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $137M ÷ interest expense $181M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.4B · 17.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $151M − debt $2.6B
What this means
Netting $151M of cash and short-term investments against $2.6B of debt leaves $2.4B owed, about 17.7× a year's operating profit (18.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -5%–9%; 3% latest = NOPAT $108M ÷ invested capital $3.4BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($26M) · cash from operations $267M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $733M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.36×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.6B vs ($451M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −41%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.43/share (latest year $-0.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 36% → 28% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 36% early to 28% lately, median 32% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2020 · −29.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$151M
- Receivables$12M
- Inventory$14M
- Other current assets$83M
- Debt due within a year$606M
- Other current liabilities$104M
From the company's latest filing.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why SFL Corporation Ltd is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?28.2% vs 36.5%
The operating margin averaged 36.5% early in the record and 28.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 3% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $9M to $25M while revenue grew 78%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 3% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| SFLSFL Corporation Ltd | $733M | — | 32.9% | 5% | — |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited | $342M | — | -1.1% | -0% | 31% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.6% | 4% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. SFL Corporation Ltd's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered12%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← SE its page in the Manual SFWL →
Industry order: ← SBLK the Marine Shipping chapter SHIP →