Owner Scorecard


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SE, Sea Limited

Professional Services diversified

A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 1 ordinary share
SE · Sea Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$19.6B
+33.2% YoY · 35% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $19.6B 5-yr avg $13.6B
Gross margin 35% 5-yr avg 38%
Operating margin 10.1% 5-yr avg −2.3%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −30%) on a 33% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$346M$414M$827M$2.2B$4.4B$10.0B$12.4B$11.5B$14.7B$19.6B$19.6BRevenueRevenue
33%21%2%28%31%39%42%37%35%35%35%Gross marginGross mgn
($205M)($502M)($989M)($891M)($1.3B)($1.6B)($1.5B)$225M$662M$2.0B$2.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−59.4%−121.3%−119.6%−41.0%−29.8%−15.9%−11.9%2.0%4.5%10.1%10.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($225M)($561M)($961M)($1.5B)($1.6B)($2.0B)($1.7B)$163M$448M$1.6B$1.6BNet incomeNet inc.
42%29%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($102M)($259M)($495M)$70M$556M$209M($1.1B)$2.1B$3.3B$5.0B$5.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$18M$23M$55M$117M$181M$279M$428M$441M$390M$372M$372MDepreciationDeprec.
$105M$279M$411M$1.4B$2.0B$2.0B$174M$1.5B$2.4B$3.0B$3.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$17M$67M$177M$240M$336M$772M$924M$242M$318M$514M$514MCapexCapex
4.9%16.3%21.4%11.0%7.7%7.8%7.4%2.1%2.2%2.6%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($119M)($283M)($550M)($47M)$375M($70M)($1.5B)$1.8B$3.0B$4.7B$4.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−34.4%−68.2%−66.5%−2.2%8.6%−0.7%−11.9%16.0%20.1%23.7%23.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($119M)($327M)($673M)($170M)$220M($564M)($2.0B)$1.8B$3.0B$4.5B$4.5BFree cash flowFCF
−34.4%−78.9%−81.3%−7.8%5.0%−5.7%−15.9%16.0%20.1%23.0%23.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$14MBuybacksBuybacks
3%6%17%17%ROICROIC
-120%-125%-48%-28%-29%2%5%13%13%Return on equityROE
−120%−125%−48%−28%−29%2%5%13%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$170M$1.4B$1.0B$3.2B$6.3B$10.2B$6.9B$5.4B$8.6B$10.6B$10.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$35M$62M$98M$187M$363M$388M$269M$263M$307M$378M$378MReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$10M$38M$27M$64M$117M$110M$125M$143M$223M$223MInventoryInvent.
$6M$9M$37M$69M$122M$214M$259M$343M$350M$468M$468MAccounts payablePayables
$33M$63M$98M$145M$306M$292M$120M$46M$100M$133M$133MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$310M$1.7B$1.7B$4.4B$8.9B$15.1B$12.7B$11.8B$16.9B$23.2B$23.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$264M$638M$1.2B$2.4B$4.6B$7.2B$6.9B$8.2B$11.3B$14.7B$14.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×2.7×1.4×1.9×1.9×2.1×1.8×1.4×1.5×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$31M$31M$31M$216M$540M$230M$113M$108M$104M$104MGoodwillGoodwill
$486M$2.0B$2.2B$5.2B$10.5B$18.8B$17.0B$18.9B$22.6B$29.4B$29.4BTotal assetsAssets
-8930.0×-19.0×-31.6×-18.5×-10.5×-11.6×-32.8×5.5×17.3×59.1×59.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($126M)$469M($243M)$1.2B$3.4B$7.4B$5.7B$6.6B$8.4B$12.5B$12.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
171M206M338M437M477M533M558M594M605M638M0KShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.02$2.01$2.44$4.98$9.17$18.69$22.31$19.27$24.36$30.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.31$-2.73$-2.84$-3.34$-3.40$-3.84$-2.97$0.27$0.74$2.52EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.69$-1.37$-1.63$-0.11$0.79$-0.13$-2.66$3.09$4.89$7.29Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.69$-1.59$-1.99$-0.39$0.46$-1.06$-3.55$3.09$4.89$7.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.10$0.33$0.52$0.55$0.70$1.45$1.66$0.41$0.53$0.81Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.73$2.28$-0.72$2.66$7.09$13.89$10.24$11.09$13.85$19.63Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+35.3%/yr+27.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+56.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+26.2%/yr+2.7%/yr
Book value / share+22.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
638Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
17%low FY2023
Gross margin
35%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$4.7Bowner earningsvs.$1.6Bnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $4.7B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $372M it takes just to hold its position. It put $142M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $4.5B.

Reported net income$1.6B
Owner earnings$4.7B · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.6B$448M$163M($1.7B)($2.0B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$372M+$390M+$441M+$428M+$279M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$3.0B+$2.4B+$1.5B+$174M+$2.0B
Cash from operations$5.0B$3.3B$2.1B($1.1B)$209M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$372M−$318M−$242M−$428M−$279M
Owner earnings$4.7B$3.0B$1.8B($1.5B)($70M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$142M−$496M−$493M
Free cash flow$4.5B$3.0B$1.8B($2.0B)($564M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%20%16%-12%-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $372M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $142M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $2.0B ÷ interest expense $34M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $4.2B + ST investments $6.4B − debt $1M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $10.6B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 7 + DIO 6 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    3-yr median, range 3%–17%; 17% latest = NOPAT $1.4B ÷ invested capital $8.4B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $4.7B = operating cash $5.0B − maintenance capex $372M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -2%)
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a -2% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $5.0B ÷ net income $1.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $14M ÷ Owner Earnings $4.7B
    What this means

    Of $4.7B Owner Earnings, $14M (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $14M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.38×
    Expanding
    Capex $514M ÷ depreciation $372M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $19.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.58×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1M vs $8.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.16/share (latest year $2.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.63/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −100% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −100% early to 6% lately, median −30% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Worst year 2017 · −121.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$23.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$10.6B
  • Receivables$378M
  • Inventory$223M
  • Other current assets$12.1B
Current liabilities$14.7B
  • Accounts payable$468M
  • Other current liabilities$14.2B
Current ratio1.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.57×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.72×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$8.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$12.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$6.5BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$369M$368M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$3.6B · 39%
  • Buybacks$14M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$5.7B · 61%
  • Returned to owners$14M

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $14M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $10.4B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $14M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count273.0%

    The diluted count rose from 171M to 638M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sea Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?273.0%

    Diluted shares grew 273.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $14M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Professional Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc.$33.2B15.8%16%19%
MAMastercard Incorporated$32.8B53.2%81%42%
MELIMercadoLibre Inc.$20.3B36%11.0%14%23%
SESea Limited$19.6B34%-22.8%6%-1%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.$14.4B10%2.5%3%1%
DASHDoorDash Inc.$13.7B-12.2%-14%8%
FISFidelity National Info$10.7B36%14.3%4%23%
CNXCConcentrix Corporation$9.8B36%6.5%6%7%
Group median36%8.8%6%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one Class”; Sea Limited reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sea Limited has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+57%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $4.5B on 638M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $10.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($514M) runs well above depreciation ($372M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sea Limited (SE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SDA its page in the Manual SFL →

Industry order: ← RYOJ the Professional Services chapter SUPX →