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SRAD, Sportradar Group AG
Sportradar is a leading technology platform enabling next generation engagement in sports and the number one provider of B2B solutions to the global sports betting industry based on revenue.
We provide mission-critical products, data and content to sports leagues and federations, betting operators and media companies.
Our end-to-end offering, integrated technology and global footprint deeply embeds us across the sports ecosystem.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Betting Technology and Solutions (81%) and Sports Content, Technology and Services (19%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 9.2% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.9% to 16% — on a steadier 83% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 31% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Betting Technology and Solutions is 81% of revenue, with Sports Content, Technology and Services the other meaningful line at 19%.
- Betting Technology and Solutions81%€1.0B
- Sports Content, Technology and Services19%€243M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| €380M | €405M | €561M | €730M | €878M | €1.1B | €1.3B | €1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 84% | 78% | 79% | 82% | 83% | 84% | 85% | 85% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| €3M | €39M | €56M | €60M | €81M | €102M | €205M | €205M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 0.9% | 9.7% | 10.0% | 8.2% | 9.2% | 9.2% | 15.9% | 15.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| €12M | €15M | €13M | €11M | €35M | €34M | €100M | €100M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 32% | 47% | 40% | 27% | — | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| €146M | €151M | €132M | €168M | €259M | €353M | €403M | €403M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €113M | €106M | €129M | €45M | €46M | €51M | €67M | €67M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| €21M | €30M | (€10M) | €113M | €178M | €268M | €236M | €236M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €7M | €2M | €6M | €8M | €15M | €5M | €5M | €5M | CapexCapex |
| 1.8% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 1.7% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| €139M | €149M | €126M | €160M | €244M | €348M | €398M | €398M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 36.6% | 36.9% | 22.5% | 21.9% | 27.8% | 31.4% | 30.9% | 30.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| €139M | €149M | €126M | €160M | €244M | €348M | €398M | €398M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 36.6% | 36.9% | 22.5% | 21.9% | 27.8% | 31.4% | 30.9% | 30.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | €4M | €9M | €29M | €105M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 12% | 7% | 7% | 9% | 17% | 26% | 26% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 9% | 2% | 1% | 4% | 4% | 10% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 9% | 2% | 1% | 4% | 4% | 10% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| €57M | €388M | €747M | €248M | €278M | €352M | €405M | €405M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | €24M | €34M | €63M | €71M | €77M | €94M | €94M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | €131M | €150M | €205M | €260M | €260M | €427M | €427M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | (€108M) | (€116M) | (€142M) | (€188M) | (€183M) | (€333M) | (€333M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | €450M | €850M | €402M | €449M | €573M | €670M | €670M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | €200M | €253M | €309M | €356M | €374M | €575M | €575M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.3× | 3.4× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| €749M | €747M | €1.2B | €304M | €296M | — | — | €296M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | €957M | €1.8B | €1.4B | €2.2B | €2.3B | €2.9B | €2.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | €431M | €429M | €15M | €41M | €37M | €52M | €52M | Total debtDebt |
| — | €43M | (€318M) | (€232M) | (€237M) | (€315M) | (€353M) | (€353M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.2× | 2.4× | 1.7× | 1.4× | 2.4× | 1.3× | 2.4× | 2.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| €154M | €167M | €739M | €752M | €868M | €925M | €978M | €978M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| — | 155K | 0K | — | — | — | — | 0K | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned €100M of profit into €398M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | €100M | €34M | €35M | €11M | €13M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +€67M | +€51M | +€46M | +€45M | +€129M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +€236M | +€268M | +€178M | +€113M | −€10M |
| Cash from operations | €403M | €353M | €259M | €168M | €132M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −€5M | −€5M | −€15M | −€8M | −€6M |
| Owner earnings | €398M | €348M | €244M | €160M | €126M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 31% | 31% | 28% | 22% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“As disclosed in our Annual Report on Form 20-F as of December 31, 2021, we identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting relating to insufficient design and implementation of controls and segregation of duties.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income €205M ÷ interest expense €87M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- Net cashCash €365M + ST investments €40M − debt €52M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €353M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 26 + DIO 0 − DPO 816 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle6-yr median, range 7%–26%; 26% latest = NOPAT €173M ÷ invested capital €665MIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 26% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 22%–37%; latest €398M = operating cash €403M − maintenance capex €5MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 31% of revenue this year, a 31% median across 7 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops €403M ÷ net income €100M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks €105M ÷ Owner Earnings €398M
What this means
Of €398M Owner Earnings, €105M (26%) went back to shareholders, €0 dividends, €105M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.07×HarvestingCapex €5M ÷ depreciation €67M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · €52M vs €96M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +328%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 11% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 37%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · 0.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our inability to achieve efficiencies through the use of AI may adversely affect our competitiveness.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments€405M
- Receivables€94M
- Other current assets€172M
- Accounts payable€427M
- Other current liabilities€148M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated €1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested€48M · 3%
- Buybacks€147M · 9%
- Retained (debt / cash)€1.4B · 88%
- Returned to owners€147M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €0 as dividends and €147M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose €348M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran €147M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (0M to 0M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained263%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (€73M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew €192M, so each retained €1 added about 2.63 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sportradar Group AG is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈€1.0B · 79% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“The Customer Net Retention Rate of our top 200 clients, who represent approximately 79% of our revenue, was 109% (excluding any contribution from IMG) in 2025 and 127% in 2024, which demonstrates our ability to expand within our client base as well as our ability to grow alongside our clients.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IACIAC Inc. | $2.4B | 66% | -3.9% | -2% | 3% |
| TBLATaboola.com Ltd. | $1.9B | 30% | 0.3% | -2% | 6% |
| TRIPTripAdvisor Inc. | $1.9B | 93% | 6.9% | 9% | 10% |
| SRADSportradar Group AG | €1.3B | 83% | 9.2% | 11% | 31% |
| TEMTempus AI Inc. | $1.3B | — | -59.8% | -210% | -37% |
| BMBLBumble Inc. | $966M | 71% | -14.5% | -6% | — |
| DOCNDigitalOcean | $901M | 60% | -2.6% | -0% | 15% |
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| Group median | — | 71% | -1.2% | -1% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Sportradar Group AG reports in EUR, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that EUR, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in EUR. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sportradar Group AG has delivered.
Through the cycle, Sportradar Group AG earns about €398M on its 30.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 30.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings €398M on the share count you enter above; net cash €353M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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